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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The recent dramatic growth in subprime lending1 has rein-
vigorated initiatives for more effective consumer credit regula-
• 2
tion, giving new urgency to one of the perennial debates of con-
sumer credit regulation: Assuming the consumer credit market
requires some statutory regulation, are state or federal laws
more effective?3
1. Subprime lending is generally defined as lending to borrowers with
poor or nonexistent credit histories. See Expanded Guidance for Subprime
Lending Programs, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63,792 (Feb. 9, 2001) [here-
inafter 2001 Subprime Lending Guide]. The growth of such credit is well
documented. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BIRD ET AL., CREDIT CARDS AND THE POOR
(Inst. for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 1148-97, 1997) (analyzing
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances demonstrating a rise in credit
card use among the poor); Glenn B. Canner et al., Household Sector Borrowing
and the Burden of Debt, 81 FED. RES. BULL. 323, 323 (1995) (showing an in-
crease in the percentage of low-income households with consumer debt); Ron
Feldman & Jason Schmidt, Why All Concerns About Subprime Lending Are
Not Created Equal, FEDGAZETTE (Minneapolis), July 1999, at 8 (discussing the
difficulty of gauging the size of the subprime credit market and citing esti-
mates of recent growth); Timothy L. O'Brien, Lowering the Credit Fence: Big
Players Are Jumping Into the Risky Loan Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997,
at D1; Diane Ellis, FDIC, The Influence of Legal Factors on Personal Bank-
ruptcy Filings, BANK TRENDS (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1998, at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank.
2. Federal legislation on the topic of predatory lending has been intro-
duced in Congress. See, e.g., Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of
2002, S. 2438, 107th Cong. (2002); Predatory Lending Consumer Protection
Act of 2001, H.R. 1051, 107th Cong. (2001); Federal Payday Loan Consumer
Protection Amendments of 2001, H.R. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001); Payday Bor-
rower Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1684, 106th Cong. (1999). A significant
number of states and municipalities have enacted or are considering predatory
lending laws. See Lew Sichelman, "Anti-Predatory" Bills at 110 and Counting,
ORIGINATION NEWS, June 28, 2002, at 1 (describing recent state and local leg-
islative initiatives).
3. The broader issue of whether consumer protection is more effectively
legislated at the federal or state level reemerges with each round in the uni-
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An important factor in the current debate is the increased
participation of mainstream financial institutions, such as
banks and savings and loan institutions, in the subprime loan
market Some banks have shaped traditional banking prod-
ucts, such as credit cards, to market them to subprime borrow-
ers.5 Other banks are offering products that heretofore were the
sphere of the "fringe banking system," such as payday loans'
and tax refund anticipation loans.' The encroachment of main-
stream financial institutions into the subprime consumer credit
form commercial law drafting process. Most recently, it arose in connection
with debate over whether consumer protection provisions should be included
in the revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz,
The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four: A Process Which Excluded
Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REV. 827, 827-
28, 848-50 (1992) (discussing the need for a federal consumer payments law);
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV.
83, 146-55 (1993) (discussing the role of the uniform laws process in the dy-
namics of federalism); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Re-
vision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 586-92 (1991) (providing an
overview of the legislative process that generated the UCC revisions). In the
1960s, the more specific issue of whether consumer credit regulation is most
effectively accomplished at the federal or state level arose in the debates even-
tually leading to the adoption of federal consumer credit regulation. See infra
Part I.B-C. The general issue of what combination of federal and state legisla-
tion would be most effective in protecting consumers continues to be of interest
to many scholars. See, e.g., Roland E. Brandel & Kathleen M. Danchuk-
McKeithen, The Relationship of Federal to State Law in Electronic Fund
Transfer and Consumer Credit Regulation, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 331, 331-32
(1979) (discussing the need to harmonize state and federal law in the context
of consumer protection); Thomas D. Crandall, It Is Time for a Comprehensive
Federal Consumer Credit Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) (noting the prob-
lems with the combination of state and federal regulations).
4. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Fi-
nancial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to
Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 589, 612 (2000) ("The overwhelming majority of [refund anticipation
loan] lending is now performed by major depository lending institutions, in-
cluding bank subsidiaries of major finance companies."); Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
393-94 ("By early 2000, big banks controlled eight of the ten largest subprime
lending companies in the United States."); Jane Bryant Quinn, Banks Infringe
on "Fringe Bank" Specialties, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1999, § 5 at 3 (describing
national banks offering payday loans and check-cashing services).
5. Lisa Fickenscher, Credit Card Issuers Panning for Gold Among Tar-
nished Credit Histories, AM. BANKER, Oct. 22, 1998, at 1; Miriam Kreinin
Souccar, Subprime Specialists Break into Bank Card Elite, AM. BANKER, Sept.
21, 1999, at 1.
6. See infra Part II.B.5.c.iii.
7. See infra Part II.B.5.c.ii.
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market shines a bright spotlight on a legal power peculiar to
federally regulated banks and savings and loan associations."
Under the "Exportation Doctrine," such entities have the power
to "export" the consumer credit regulation (or lack thereof) from
the state in which they are located to all other states where
they have customers.
The Exportation Doctrine has evolved from a discrete
statutory privilege allowing national banks to charge the same
interest rates as other local lenders, to an expansive legal doc-
trine allowing almost any corporate entity to establish a na-
tionwide consumer lending program unrestrained by any sig-
nificant state consumer credit laws. Over the past few years, as
states and municipalities have become more aggressive about
regulating consumer credit through new legislation or in-
creased enforcement of existing statutes, federal banking regu-
lators have become equally aggressive in asserting the preemp-
tive force of the Exportation Doctrine.
The Exportation Doctrine has come to render ineffective
state predatory lending laws to an extent that has not been
adequately recognized or analyzed in the existing legal litera-
ture.9 Yet it has profound implications for the pitched battles
8. A third type of depository institution-the credit union-has powers
roughly equivalent to the bank and thrift powers that are the topic of this Ar-
ticle. 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g)(1) (2000); James G. Kreissman, Note, Administrative
Preemption in Consumer Banking Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 911, 928 (1987). This
Article, however, will not address credit unions, for a number of reasons. First,
credit unions represent a small proportion of the consumer credit market. In
1998, only 4.2% of the consumer loans in the United States were issued by
credit unions. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2001, at 727 (2001). Second, federal credit unions are legally prohib-
ited from charging over 15% on loans, making the most onerous types of
predatory lending difficult. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)(I); Organization and Op-
eration of Federal Credit Unions, 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(ii)(c) (2003). Edward
M. Gramlich, a governor of the Federal Reserve Board, has "called credit un-
ions the 'good guys' in the battle against abusive lending." Fed: Credit Unions
Lending's "Good Guys," AM. BANKER, Feb. 27, 2001, at 24; see also Scott A.
Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry,
5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 369-70 (Apr. 2001) (giving examples of credit un-
ions offering fringe banking services, including payday loans, with less ex-
ploitative terms, to meet credit needs of underserved communities). This is not
to say that credit union lending practices are entirely free from criticism. See,
e.g., Study: Fewer NCUA Loans to Minorities, AM. BANKER, Feb. 4, 2002, at 19
(describing results of study by the National Community Reinvestment Coali-
tion).
9. Although the expansion of the Exportation Doctrine has not gone un-
noticed by the legal academy, consumer activists, or the plaintiffs bar, the lit-
erature lacks any comprehensive analysis of the complete breadth of its cur-
522 [Vol 88:518
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surrounding predatory lending laws that are currently taking
place at both the federal and the state level.' ° If state predatory
lending laws are indeed ineffective in the face of the Exporta-
rent scope. Among the commentators who have commented on the Exportation
Doctrine's preemption of state consumer credit laws are John P.C. Duncan,
The Course of Federal Pre-emption of State Banking Law, 18 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 221, 314-19 (1999); Ralph J. Rohner, Problems of Federalism in
the Regulation of Consumer Financial Services Offered by Commercial Banks:
Part 1, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1979) [hereinafter Rohner, Part I]; Ralph
J. Rohner, Problems of Federalism in the Regulation of Consumer Financial
Services Offered by Commercial Banks: Part 11, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 313, 367
(1980) [hereinafter Rohner, Part II]; James J. White, The Usury Trompe
L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 464-65 (2000); Kreissman, supra note 8, at 925-
39. Various consumer activist publications have also noted this development.
See Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help
Payday Lenders Evade State Consumer Protections, the 2001 Payday Lezider
Survey and Report, (CFA & State Pub. Interest Research Groups), at
http://www.consumerfed.org/paydayreport.pdf (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Payday
Lending Report]; KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES § 3.4.5 (2d ed. 2000); Chi Chi Wu, Jean Ann Fox, & Elizabeth
Renuart, Refund Anticipation Loan Report (CFA & Natl Consumer Law Ctr.),
at http://www.consumerfed.org/taxpreparers.pdf, at 18-19 (Jan. 31, 2002)
[hereinafter RAL Report]; Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 605, 612-14,
646-48 (coauthored by two consumer advocates-one an Assistant Attorney
General and Deputy Administrator of the Iowa Consumer Credit Code and the
other a staff attorney with Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., and Florida Le-
gal Services, Inc.). The plaintiffs bar has brought lawsuits challenging the
Exportation Doctrine. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, Federal Usury Law Devel-
opments, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 1998, 267 (PLI Cor-
porate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1048, 1998); Jeffrey I.
Langer et al., Recent Developments Regarding Interstate Lending and Non-
Usury Theories Attacking Loan Charges, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 38
(1994).
10. To date, most of the recent state predatory lending laws have dealt
with mortgage lending. Mortgage loans are subject to a regulatory scheme
that is significantly different from the one addressed in this Article. Two excel-
lent recent articles addressing the federal preemption of state regulatory
schemes for subprime real estate secured loans are Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Preda-
tory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); and Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The
Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions:
Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV.
473 (2000). Although real estate lending is not the topic of this Article, some of
the general observations and conclusions concerning the relative role of state
and federal legislation in consumer credit issues may be applicable to real es-
tate loans as well. See, e.g., infra notes 462-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing preemption of state real estate lending laws supported by the Exporta-
tion Doctrine). Moreover, federal legislation that would enact a preemption
provision similar to the one addressed in this Article for real estate loans is
currently being considered by Congress. Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to
Mute State Laws: Republican's Proposal to Police Predatory Lending Would
Set Weaker National Standards, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at A4.
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tion Doctrine, does it make sense to continue to enact such
laws? If the Doctrine is the most powerful regulatory force in
the consumer credit market, what role does it play in combat-
ing predatory lending? If the Doctrine is not an adequate sub-
stitute for state predatory lending laws, should it be curbed or
should it be reformed? All of these questions are crucial to the
current debates over predatory lending laws."
This Article will undertake a historical analysis of the evo-
lution of the Exportation Doctrine, demonstrating that the Doc-
trine has expanded along three distinct dimensions, shaped by
different combinations of policy rationales and precedents.
These three dimensions are (1) the Doctrine's geographic reach
(from intrastate to interstate); (2) its substantive scope (from
numerical interest rate to many additional significant credit
terms); and (3) the orbit of its beneficiaries (from national
banks to any corporate entity that acquires or contracts with a
depository institution). Examining each of these dimensions
separately, and then analyzing them together in light of the
overall debate over the primacy of federal versus state con-
sumer credit regulation, yields a number of significant insights.
First, in its current expanded form, the Exportation Doctrine
virtually emasculates individual state predatory lending stat-
utes. Second, although the first two dimensions of the Doc-
trine's expansion are not vulnerable to judicial challenge, the
third is. Finally, even though the Doctrine in its expanded form
is not entirely justified under the principles of banking law
from which it stems, with a bit of tweaking, it could arguably
become an extremely effective mechanism for protecting con-
11. The general preemption issue raised by the Exportation Doctrine-the
extent to which states retain power to legislate on consumer credit issues-is
currently also at issue in a number of other contexts. Currently, two federal
regulators are aggressively asserting in regulatory proceedings that no state
consumer credit regulations of any type apply to federally chartered banks or
thrifts. See infra Part II.C.2-3. In addition, Congress is considering federal
legislation to preempt state mortgage laws, Spors, supra note 10, at A4, and
state payday lending laws, S. 884, 108th Cong. § 1018 (2003). Congress
recently debated preemption of state privacy laws dealing with sharing cus-
tomer data, in connection with its reauthorization of federal credit reporting
laws. See Michelle Heller, Compromise on ID Theft Clears FCRA Bill's Path,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 24, 2003, at 1; see also infra note 78. Congress is also con-
sidering legislation providing an optional federal charter for insurance compa-
nies, which would create an insurance system similar to the dual banking sys-
tem described in this Article, see infra note 98 and accompanying text, and
raise many of the same issues raised by the Exportation Doctrine. Nicole




sumers against predatory lending.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the complex pattern
of state and federal consumer credit regulation in the United
States. Part II depicts the historic evolution of the Exportation
Doctrine along the three dimensions described above, illustrat-
ing the dramatic extent to which the Exportation Doctrine has
emasculated state consumer credit laws and analyzing the ex-
tent to which the various expansions are justified under princi-
ples of banking law. Finally, Part III explores the implications
of the expanded Exportation Doctrine for the efficacy of state
predatory lending laws, and offers proposals for realizing the
potential of the Exportation Doctrine as a powerful vehicle foi
effective consumer credit regulation.
I. THE CONTEXT: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT
The plethora of laws governing consumer lending has vari-
ously been described as, among other things, "a crazy-quilt pat-
tern,"12 "[a] crazy-quilt, patch-work welter,"13 "a patchwork,"4 a
"hodgepodge," 5 "an utter hodgepodge,' 6 and "a maze, if not a
mess, and probably both.' 7 Traditionally, consumer protection
issues such as consumer credit regulation are considered to be
primarily the province of state, rather than federal, law. 8 In-
deed, every state has its own idiosyncratic consumer credit
laws. Efforts to promulgate a uniform state consumer credit
code, following the model of the Uniform Commercial Code,
were largely unsuccessful. In addition to nonuniform state
laws, federal consumer credit laws applicable to consumer
lenders in all states emerged in the 1960s. In order to fully ap-
preciate the significance of the Exportation Doctrine and the
extent to which it undermines state consumer credit laws, it is
12. JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., ET AL., CONSUMER LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (2d ed. 1991).
13. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1974) Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 88
(2002).
14. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION &
LEGAL CHALLENGES § 2.1 (1995) [hereinafter COST OF CREDIT].
15. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 94 (1972); SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
16. Rohner, Part I, supra note 9, at 20.
17. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 14, § 2.1.
18. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989); Greenwood
Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 828 (1st Cir. 1992); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990).
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necessary to have a basic understanding of the existing statu-
tory framework upon which it acts.
A. TYPICAL STATE LAWS GOVERNING CONSUMER CREDIT
The typical state consumer credit law starts with a general
usury statute-a law limiting the amount of interest that may
be charged on a loan. Every state has a basic statute setting a
maximum legal interest rate for any type loan, typically be-
tween 6% and 10%."9 Various other statutes carve out excep-
tions to the general usury limit for specific types of borrowers,
lenders, or credit arrangements. These exception statutes typi-
cally include some limitations: in exchange for immunity from
the general usury limit, lenders must comply with various
types of consumer protection provisions, such as prescribed
methodologies for calculating interest charges2 ° and prepay-
ment rebates,2 limits on the types of security that can be taken
for such loans, 2  limits on the ways in which security that is
19. Interest-Usury Chart, 1 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 510 (Aug. 5,
2003). This default usury statute normally is subject to a couple of generic ex-
ceptions for loans memorialized by contracts, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XV,
§ 1; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-501, 5-523 (McKinney 2001); N.Y. BANKING
LAW §§ 14-a, 108 (McKinney 2001); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 302.001-.102,
303.001, 303.301-.402 (Vernon 1998); loans to corporations, see, e.g., 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4(1)(a)-(c) (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 535.2(2)(a)(4)-(5) (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 438.31, 438.61
(West 2001), 450.1275 (West 2002); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-521, 526(1)
(McKinney 2001); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1997),
1302-2.09A (Vernon Supp. 2003); and loans exceeding certain amounts, see,
e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4(1) (West 1999) (loans of $5000 or more
secured by specified collateral); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (West 1995) (loans
over $100,000); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1), (6)(b) (McKinney 2001)
(loans over $2,500,000).
20. Illustrative provisions in licensed lending statutes include, for exam-
ple, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22307-09, 22400(a) (West 1999); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 351(4)-(5) (McKinney 2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 6213E-F (West 1995 &
Supp. 2002). Illustrative provisions in retail installment sales acts include, for
example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2982 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 168.72 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (motor vehicle).
21. Illustrative provisions in licensed lending statutes include, for exam-
ple, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22400(a)(2), 22400(c), 22402 (West 1999); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 351(5)(a) (McKinney 2001). Illustrative provisions in retail
installment sales acts include, for example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1806.3 (West
1998); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 305 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2003); TEX. FIN.
CODE ANN. § 345.074 (Vernon 1998).
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 516.17 (West 2002) (prohibiting assign-
ments of wages); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 354 (McKinney 2001) (regulating as-
signments of wages); CAL. FIN. CODE § 22330 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (pro-
hibiting taking real estate for security); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-568
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given for such loans can be repossessed,23 and prohibitions on
obtaining confessions of judgment or powers of attorney. 4
These exception statutes were enacted to address specific
types of credit arrangements offered by particular types of
lenders, as they emerged in the consumer credit market. For
example, "small loan laws" or "licensed loan laws" were adopted
in the first half of the twentieth century to foster the develop-
ment of a legitimate consumer finance industry to provide
small loans to consumers at a time when most banks provided
credit only to commercial enterprises. 25 "Retail installment
sales acts" were adopted in the 1950s and 1960s as retailers
began offering more credit to finance the purchase of goods or
services. 6 When credit cards burst onto the consumer credit
scene, states enacted "open-end credit laws."27 However, as the
consumer credit market developed in ways that blurred the dis-
tinctions among the types of providers and credit plans, these
state laws remained largely unchanged.28 In today's credit
market, for example, banks are eager to make small consumer
loans, and retailers offer credit through both installment loans
and credit cards issued by special purpose banks that they
29
own.The practical consequence of this accretive process of law-
(West 1996 & Supp. 2002) (prohibiting security interests in household goods);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:11C-32 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (regulating security
interests in household goods).
23. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.2 (West 1998); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 315 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2003) (motor vehicle); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 422 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2003) (general); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.
§ 345.355 (Vernon 1998) (general).
24. Illustrative provisions in licensed lending statutes include, e.g., CAL.
FIN. CODE § 22331 (West 1999); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 352 (McKinney 2001).
25. See generally F.B. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small
Loan Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1941) (discussing the history of
small loan laws).
26. James M. Ackerman, Note, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of
Usury, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 94-96 (1981).
27. LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 52-54
(1990)
28. BARBARA A. CURRAN, AM. BAR ASS'N, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT
LEGISLATION 3 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Delinquency on Consumer Loans: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of
Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency), available at 1996 WL
520181 (describing expansion of consumer loan portfolio of banks); Nordstrom
Bank Web site, http://about.nordstrom.com/aboutus/credit/
credit.asp?origin=footer (last visited Nov. 6, 2003) (retailer-owned thrift sub-
sidiary offering credit cards and home mortgages).
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making was that functionally identical loans to consumers in
the same state could be subject to dramatically different regu-
lations, depending on the corporate identity of the lender (e.g.,
bank, retailer, or finance company) or the form of the loan (e.g.,
credit card advance or one-time closed-end loan).3" Growing dis-
satisfaction with this artificially balkanized framework for
regulating the emerging national market for consumer credit
prompted reform initiatives on both the state and federal levels
in the late 1960s. The state initiative proved to be one of the
least successful uniform law efforts of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference of Com-
missioners): the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C).3 The
federal initiative led to the enactment of one of the most sig-
nificant pieces of federal consumer protection legislation, the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 (CCPA).32 Let us exam-
ine each of these in turn.
B. THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
The U3C was an ambitious undertaking. The Prefatory
Note to the U3C proclaims:
Enactment of the [U3C] would abolish the crazy-quilt, patchwork
welter of prior laws on consumer credit and replace them by a single
new comprehensive law providing a modern, theoretically and prag-
matically consistent structure of legal regulation designed to provide
an adequate volume of credit at reasonable cost under conditions fair
to both consumers and creditors. Upon its enactment, no longer would
credit regulation within a State consist of a number of separate unco-
ordinated statutes governing the activities of different types of credi-
tors in disparate ways.
The U3C was not, however, a success. Consumer groups
vehemently opposed its procreditor slant and failure to provide
meaningful consumer protections.34 One consumer advocacy
30. For an excellent description of the different regulatory schemes that
would govern a hypothetical $300 loan for the purchase of a television made to
a consumer in the state of Washington, depending on whether the loan was
financed by the retailer, a finance company, a small loan company, or a bank,
see Crandall, supra note 3, at 8-16.
31. Two versions of the U3C were published. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE (1968), 7 U.L.A. 285 (2002) [hereinafter 1968 U3C]; UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE (1974), 7 U.L.A. 88 (2002) [hereinafter 1974 U3C]; see infra text
accompanying note 37.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
33. 1974 U3C, supra note 31, Prefatory Note.
34. See, e.g., J. Barry Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A
Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 55 (1969); Neil 0. Littlefield, Preserv-
ing Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L.
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group, the National Consumer Law Center (Consumer Center),
published a counterproposal in 1970, the National Consumer
Act,3 5 which was roundly criticized as unreasonably procon-
sumer.3 6 Both the Conference of Commissioners and the Con-
sumer Center regrouped in the face of the criticism and drafted
revised versions of their model law proposals.
Not a single state adopted any of these proposals (Model
Laws) entirely as drafted. Eleven states have enacted compre-
hensive credit legislation containing elements of the various
proposals, each including nonuniform variations.38 The Confer-
REV. 272, 293-97 (1969); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Why Does the Proposed Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 BUS. LAW. 1039,
1048-50 (1968). But see, e.g., Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 458 (1968) (supporting
U3C); Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1969) (supporting U3C); Philip J. Murphy, Lawyers for
the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 298, 339 (1969) (offering qualified
support for U3C); George R. Richter, Jr., The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 24 BUS.
LAw. 183, 197 (1968) (supporting U3C).
35. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT (First Final Draft 1970); see also SPANOGLE
ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 (discussing how consumer groups responded to the
U3C); Jeffrey Davis, Legislative Restrictions of Creditor Powers and Remedies:
A Case Study of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act,
72 MICH. L. REV. 3, 4 (1973) (summarizing the National Consumer Law Cen-
ter's response to the U3C).
36. See, e.g., Paul R. Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 BUS. LAW.
957, 957-61 (1970) [hereinafter Moo, Consumerism] (criticizing generally pro-
consumer advocates as unreasonable); Paul R. Moo, New Consumer Credit
Legislation: Which Approach-The UCCC or NCA?, 2 URB. LAW. 439, 444-45
(1970) [hereinafter Moo, New Consumer] (stating that the National Consumer
Act is dogmatically proconsumer with "no apparent concern for legitimate
creditors"); Terrance P. Christenson, Comment, An Analysis of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 889, 909-11 (1971) (summarizing the radical consumer protection as-
pects of the National Consumer Act); Lorin G. Tobler, Comment, Consumer
Protection Under the UCCC and the NCA-A Comparison and Recommenda-
tions, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 572, 593 (1970) ("The National Consumer Act is some-
times overprotective of the consumer at the expense of the creditor.").
37. The Conference of Commissioners' revised version was the 1974 U3C,
supra note 31. The Consumer Center's revised version was the MODEL
CONSUMER CREDIT ACT (1973).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-9-103 (2002); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-41-
101 to 28-49-107 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to 24-
4.5-6-204 (1996); IOWA CODE §§ 537.1101-.7103 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16a-1-101 to 16a-9-102 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1-101 to 6-
415 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-17-10 (Law. Co-op. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 70C-1-101 to 70C-9-102 (2001 & Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. §§ 421.101-
427.105 (1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-101 to -702 (Michie 2003).
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ence of Commissioners is no longer pursuing any uniform con-
sumer credit law initiatives. 9 Nevertheless, the Model Laws
are significant for a number of reasons. First, over one-fifth of
the states did adopt their "modern, theoretically and pragmati-
cally consistent structure" in preference to the "crazy-quilt,
patchwork welter"40 of the nonuniform consumer credit laws.
Second, the Model Laws represent the considered judgment of a
body of experts in the area as to how every state should regu-
late consumer credit.4'
Both the consumer and the industry representatives
agreed on some basic organizational principles for the "ideal"
consumer credit law. The Model Laws incorporated the basic
quid pro quo of the nonuniform state laws that they sought to
replace. In exchange for complying with a set of consumer-
oriented restrictions on credit agreements and collection prac-
tices, lenders could extend credit at rates higher than the
state's basic usury limit. None of the consumer protection pro-
visions found in the Model Laws were very different from those
in the nonuniform state laws.4'
39. Donald P. Rothschild & David W. Carroll, 2 Consumer Protection Re-
porting Service (Nat'l L. Pub. Corp.) I 2.02 n.259 (Apr. 1982) (citing interview
with John McCabe, Legal Council of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, Nov. 2, 1981).
40. 1974 U3C, supra note 31, Prefatory Note.
41. Indeed, proponents of the uniform law process claim that it results in
laws that are qualitatively superior to the laws drafted by political bodies, be-
cause the persons involved in the drafting process are experts in the topic and
because of the more deliberative dialogue made possible outside of the political
process. See, e.g., Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process-Consensus and Bal-
ance, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 287, 305-07 (1994); James J. White, Ex Proprio
Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2096-97 (1991).
42. The restrictions imposed by the Model Laws consist predominantly of
limitations on creditors' rights and remedies aimed at some of the most abu-
sive practices extant in the consumer credit market, such as excessive late
fees, 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 2.203, 3.203; 1974 U3C, supra note 31,
§§ 2.502, 2.601; NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 2.204 (First Final Draft 1970);
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.206 (1973); prepayment penalties, 1968
U3C, supra note 31, § 2.209; 1974 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.509; NATIONAL
CONSUMER ACT § 2.209 (First Final Draft 1970); MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT
ACT § 2.210 (1973); balloon payment terms, 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 2.405,
3.402; 1974 U3C, supra note 31, § 3.308; NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 2.402
(First Final Draft 1970); MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.402 (1973); taking
security interests in property other than purchase money security interests,
1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.407; 1974 U3C, supra note 31, § 3.301; NATIONAL
CONSUMER ACT § 2.416 (First Final Draft 1970); MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT
ACT § 2.411 (1973); and garnishing wages, 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 2.410,
3.408, 5.104, 5.105; 1974 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 3.305, 5.104, 5.105; NATIONAL
CONSUMER ACT §§ 2.403, 5.106(1)(a) (First Final Draft 1970); MODEL
530 [Vol 88:518
2004] EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
What was radically different about the Model Laws,
though, was their comprehensive scope and universal applica-
tion. In marked contrast to the nonuniform state laws, the
Model Laws provided one coherent set of laws to govern all con-
sumer credit transactions, regardless of the corporate identity
of the lender-bank, finance company, or retailer.43 For the
44most part, the Model Laws imposed the same restrictions on
all consumer loans, defined as extensions of credit under
$25,000 to individuals for personal, family, household, or agri-
cultural purposes.45 Thus, the Model Laws consolidated the
regulation of the historically distinct, but functionally converg-
ing, types of transactions addressed by the nonuniform con-
sumer credit laws under one statutory umbrella.
The one area where most of the Model Laws did not impose
46
uniformity is the area of usury rates. 46 The U3C provided for a
graduated series of permissible interest rates, starting at a
base rate of 18% for all consumer loans,47 with higher rates
available for certain types of credit or lenders.48 The particular
usury rates proposed in the U3C were chosen because, at the
time, they were considered extremely high.49 They were in-
CONSUMER CREDIT ACT §§ 2.405, 7.1 10(1)(a) (1973).
43. The 1974 U3C drafters explained: "In moving away from the seg-
mented controls of particular types of credit grantors in consumer credit laws
prior to the U3C to a single comprehensive statute dealing with consumer
credit generally, it is believed that competition has been and will be en-
hanced." 1974 U3C, supra note 31, Prefatory Note.
44. But see Crandall, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing differences in U3C's
treatment of credit sales and loans).
45. 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 1.202, 2.104, 3.104; 1974 U3C, supra note
31, §§ 1.202, 1.301(12), 1.301(15); NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 1.202,
1.301(9), 1.301(10) (First Final Draft 1970); MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT
§§ 1.301, 1.411, 1.414 (1973).
46. The one exception is the National Consumer Act, which would subject
all forms of consumer credit transactions to the same usury limits. NATIONAL
CONSUMER ACT § 2.201, cmt. 2 (First Final Draft 1970).
47. 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 2.602, 3.201, 3.602; 1974 U3C, supra note
31, § 2.401(1).
48. Higher rates were available to sellers of consumer goods offering open-
end credit, 1968 U3C, supra note 31, §§ 2.201, 2.207; 1974 U3C, supra note 31,
§§ 2.201, 2.202; licensed lenders, 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 3.506; 1974 U3C,
supra note 31, § 2.401(2); and lenders already subject to state or federal su-
pervision, such as banks and savings and loan associations, 1968 U3C, supra
note 31, § 3.502; 1974 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.301.
49. See Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus.
LAW. 937, 946 (1970) (addressing how in the first year after its conception, the
U3C's rates "produced cries of outrage"); George W. Stengel, Should States
Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?, 60 KY. L.J. 8, 42 (1971) ("Among
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:518
tended to function as ceilings, rather than baseline rates for
consumer credit." In theory, these high ceilings would create
incentives for reputable lenders willing to comply with the ba-
sic consumer protection provisions established in the U3C to
enter the consumer lending market, protecting consumers who
would otherwise have to resort to more exploitative loan
sharks." The competition generated by this attractive free
market would cause lenders to charge rates lower than these•• 52
ceilings . The drafters believed that "the most effective means
of limiting prices" would be the comparison shopping of borrow-
ers, as facilitated by the new federal disclosure laws, 3 within
this thriving free market.
This reliance on the free market to regulate consumer
the numerous objections to the UCCC, the most frequent was its high interest
rates.").
50. 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.201, cmt. 1; 1974 U3C, supra note 31,
Prefatory Note; Moo, Consumerism, supra note 36, at 960 (arguing against the
notion that creditors would charge the ceiling credit rates); Stengel, supra note
49, at 42 (stating that the U3C's rates "were intended merely as ceilings").
51. See 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.201, cmt. 1(3) ("By design the license
required to make supervised loans is made readily accessible to those showing
financial responsibility, character, and fitness."). But see Harper, supra note
34, at 61-62 ("The code fails to provide necessary assurances for curbing the
loan shark or any of his modern counterparts.").
52. See 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.201, cmt. 1; 1974 U3C, supra note
31, Prefatory Note; see also Moo, Consumerism, supra note 36, at 960-61 ("The
philosophy of the code provisions is to permit and encourage competition
among all kinds of credit granting institutions. . . ."); Stengel, supra note 49,
at 42 ("[Rlates may be reduced by the competition provided by freedom of en-
try."). But see Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1968) (arguing for free market
competition, but against the effectiveness of rate ceilings). The drafters of the
U3C expected that the uniform rate ceiling for all lenders, regardless of the
nature of the creditor, type of item financed, or form of credit granted, would
reduce "[slegmentation of the market for credit by differentiated rate ceilings
[which] tends to reduce competition and introduce rigidities into the market
that benefit a few suppliers at the expense of others and work to the disadvan-
tage of consumers." 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.201, cmt. 1(2). Similarly, the
lack of barriers to entry into the market was expected to foster rate competi-
tion. The drafters noted that
the license required to make supervised loans is made readily acces-
sible to those showing financial responsibility, character, and fitness.
Provisions for minimum financial assets and for a showing of conven-
ience and advantage have been deliberately omitted, since their in-
clusion would tend to restrict competition and require establishment
of rates, rather than ceilings.
Id. § 2.201, cmt. 1(3).
53. 1968 U3C, supra note 31, § 2.201, cmt. 1(1). The new federal disclo-
sure law referred to is the Truth in Lending Act, discussed infra Part I.C.
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credit rates was one of the most controversial aspects of the
U3C.54 Both of the Consumer Center's proposals rejected this
idea.55 States that adopted the U3C also rejected the idea, uni-
formly selecting rates lower than those proposed by the U3C.56
C. FEDERAL LAW: THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
The CCPA, enacted in 1968, was "the first modern con-
sumer protection statute."57 The centerpiece of the CCPA was
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 8 which was subsequently
supplemented by the Fair Credit Reporting Act59 in 1970, the
Fair Credit Billing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
60
in 1974, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
6
' in 1977.62
54. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 34, at 66 (describing the problems with
the reliance on "free banking"). Relying on the free market to regulate con-
sumer credit rates remains a controversial issue. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova,
The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competi-
tion to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1343-44 (1995) (ar-
guing for a revival of usury law); Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against
Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 201 (1986) (argu-
ing that usury controls are unjustified and 'cause an artificial contraction in
the supply of credit"); Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Ra-
tionale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 151 (1988) (stating that usury controls
help to control the "negative consequences of debt"); Eric A. Posner, Contract
Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 284 (1995) (arguing that usury laws are beneficial in the reduction of
poverty); Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal
Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (argu-
ing against classic free market theories); George J. Wallace, The Uses of
Usury: Low Rate Ceilings Reexamined, 56 B.U. L. REV. 451, 452 (1976) ("Low
rate ceilings, if properly used, are potentially effective and beneficial regula-
tory tools.").
55. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 2.201, cmt. 2 (First Final Draft 1970);
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.202 (1973).
56. See Crandall, supra note 3, at 25.
57. Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1991).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93r (2000).
59. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970), amended by Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-426
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-t (2000)).
60. Both of these laws were enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511,
1521 (1974). The Fair Credit Billing Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666a-j
(2000); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-c
(2000).
61. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692a-o (2000)).
62. In 1978, the CCPA was further amended by addition of Title IX, gov-
erning electronic fund transfers-the use of debit cards to access funds depos-
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While each of these laws focuses on a particular substantive
aspect of consumer protection (respectively, misleading disclo-
sure of credit terms, abuses of consumer credit reports, billing
errors, discrimination in lending, and abusive debt collection
practices), with minor variations, they all follow the same basic
structural "template."63 This template is characterized by three
features: (1) its universal application to all consumer credit
transactions, regardless of the identity of the lender or the type
of credit extended; (2) its multilayered enforcement scheme;
and (3) its declared deference to more protective state consumer
protection laws.
1. Universal Application
The CCPA applies to all consumer credit transactions re-
gardless of the identity of the lender. Any person or entity in
the consumer credit business, whether a bank, finance com-
pany, retailer,6 credit reporting agency,65 or third-party debt
66
collector, is equally subject to the relevant provisions of the
CCPA. Consumer credit transactions covered by the CCPA
generally include all extensions of credit of $25,000 or less to
ited in consumer checking accounts. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a-r (2000)).
Since it does not relate to consumer credit, it will not be addressed in this Ar-
ticle.
63. Rubin, supra note 57, at 234.
64. TILA's definition of a "creditor" is broadly drafted to include any per-
son who regularly extends consumer credit "which is payable by agreement in
more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or
may be required." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2000). The same definition applies to
the Fair Credit Billing Act, which was inserted into TILA. See id. §§ 1666a-j.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's definition is even broader, defining as a
creditor "any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit," as
well as anyone who arranges or is assigned credit. See id. § 1691a(e).
65. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to all entities who use or fur-
nish information for "consumer reports." Id. § 1681t. "Consumer reports" are
defined to include:
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthi-
ness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected
to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as
a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for ... credit ... to
be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (footnote omitted).
66. See id. § 1692a(6). Creditors are subject to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act if they use a name other than their own, suggesting that a third
party is attempting to collect the debt. Id.
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individuals for personal, family, or household purposes.
2. Multi-Layered Enforcement Scheme
The CCPA's enforcement scheme is complex. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) is
designated as the federal agency responsible for drafting the
regulations that implement the statute.68 Compliance with
those regulations, however, is delegated to whatever federal
agency has primary enforcement responsibility for the particu-
lar type of lender involved. Thus, for example, the CCPA is en-
forced for national banks by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and for savings and loan associations by the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), both bureaus of the Treas-
69
ury Department. If no federal agency has primary enforce-
ment responsibility for any particular type of lender (as is the
case with finance companies or retailers), the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is responsible for enforcing compliance."7
The appropriate agency can use whatever general enforcement
powers it has over the lender to enforce compliance with the
CCPA.7" In addition to this administrative enforcement scheme,
the CCPA provides a private right of action to consumers.72
3. Deference to State Law
By declining to totally preempt the field of consumer credit
67. See id. §§ 1602(h), 1603(1), 1603(3). The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act's definition of "credit" is not limited to consumer loans and includes even
incidental loans. See id. § 1691a(d). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's
definition of "debt," while limited to consumer debt, dispenses with the
$25,000 limit. See id. § 1692a(5).
68. See id. §§ 1604, 1691b. The Fair Credit Reporting Act differs slightly
from other sections of the CCPA in that federal banking agencies have author-
ity to jointly prescribe regulations for entities under their respective jurisdic-
tions. See id. § 1681s(e).
69. See id. §§ 1607(a), 1681s(b), 1691c(a). The CCPA is enforced for state
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System by the Federal Re-
serve. See id. §§ 1607(a), 1681s(b), 1691c(a). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation enforces the CCPA for state banks that do not belong to the Fed-
eral Reserve System. See id. §§ 1607(a), 1681s(b), 1691c(a). With respect to the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, state law enforcement officials are also given back-
up enforcement authority. See id. § 1681s(c). For a general explanation of the
regulatory scheme applicable to the different types of depository institutions,
see infra Part II.A.
70. See 15 U.S.C. 99 1607(c), 1681s(a), 1691c(c), 16921(a).
71. See id. §§ 1607(b), 1681s(d), 1691c(b), 16921(c).
72. See id. §§ 1640(a), 1681n, 1691e, 1692k. Some violations of the CCPA
are also subject to criminal penalties. Id. §§ 1611, 1681q.
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disclosure regulation in enacting the CCPA, Congress at least
rhetorically acknowledged the traditional deference to state
legislators in matters related to consumer protection.73 The
CCPA provides that lenders must comply with both the CCPA
and with any other disclosure requirements imposed by state
law, "except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with
[the CCPA], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency." 4
Moreover, the Federal Reserve is given the power to fully ex-
empt from the CCPA "any class of credit transactions within
any State if it determines that under the law of that State that
class of transactions is subject to requirements substantially
similar to those imposed under this part, and that there is ade-
quate provision for enforcement."7
5
In practice, states do not retain much power to enact mean-
ingful state laws in areas covered by the CCPA. Determina-
tions by the Federal Reserve that state laws and enforcement
provisions are adequate to replace the CCPA are rare.6 At-
tempts by states to enact legislation that is more restrictive
than the CCPA are rare. Moreover, recent amendments to the
CCPA have completely preempted related state laws."
73. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
74. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(1), 1666j(a), 1681t(a), 1691d(f), 1692n.
75. See id. §§ 1633, 1666j(b), 1691d(g), 1692(o). The Fair Credit Reporting
Act chapter of the CCPA lacks a similar provision.
76. Only Maine, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Wyoming
have been granted exemptions from portions of TILA. FRB Reg. § 226.29a,
State Exemptions, FRB Official Staff Commentary, 1 Consumer Cred. Guide
(CCH) 3451, at 3451.04 (Oct. 1, 1982) (amended Mar. 31, 1983). These ex-
emptions all exclude federally chartered financial institutions. Since a state
does not have authority to examine federally chartered financial institutions,
the states obtaining the exemptions cannot establish that there is adequate
provision for enforcing state law with respect to such lenders. Rohner, Part H,
supra note 9, at 361. Only Maine has been granted an exemption from the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act. FTC Notice of Maine Exemption from the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,972 (Dec. 27, 1995). No exemp-
tions have been granted with respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
77. One such recent attempt, a California statute requiring credit card
issuers to include disclosures about the effect of making only minimum pay-
ments on outstanding credit card balances, was successfully challenged in
court by a coalition of federal depository institutions. Am. Bankers Ass'n v.
Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The court held that
TILA's preservation of a state's right to enact stricter disclosure requirements
did not mean such a state law could not be preempted under other federal
laws. See id. at 1008-09; see also infra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
78. A 1988 amendment to TILA, adding significant disclosure require-
ments with respect to credit card applications, solicitations, and renewal no-
tices, preempts state laws with respect to these new requirements. Fair Credit
536
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D. MORE FEDERAL LAW: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
An additional layer of regulation affecting consumer credit
is based on the general prohibition in section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 191479 (FTCA) of "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce." ° To the extent that
consumer credit practices involve unfair or deceptive practices,
they are subject to the FTCA.
While the same statutory prescription covers all lenders,
regardless of corporate identity, the FTCA is administered
through the same array of federal agencies that administer the
CCPA. The FTCA is administered by the primary federal regu-
latory agencies of banks and savings and loan associations for
such institutions, and by the FTC for other lenders.81
On two occasions, the FTC has determined that particular
practices in the consumer credit industry merited regulation as
unfair or deceptive practices. First, in 1975, the FTC promul-
gated its "Holder in Due Course Rule,"82 which protects con-
sumers' rights to assert claims and defenses arising from the
transaction underlying a consumer loan when the loan is trans-
ferred to or financed by a third party. The Holder in Due
Course Rule applies to all sellers of consumer goods who offer
and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960
(relevant provisions codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (2000)). In connection with a
major revision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1996, most state consumer
credit reporting laws were specifically preempted. See The Consumer Credit
Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub, L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-452
to -453 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (2000)). This preemption will expire on
January 1, 2004, unless renewed by Congress. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(d)(2). Even
state laws providing greater protection to consumers than the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act will only preempt the Act if enacted after January 1, 2004, with
the specific intention of supplementing it. See id. § 1681t(d); Joseph L. Seidel,
The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act: Information Sharing and Preemp-
tion, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 79 (1998) (describing the legislative history of pre-
emption provisions). Complicating the current federal debate over the exten-
sion of this preemption provision is California's recent enactment of the
California Financial Information Privacy Act, S.B. 1, which provides consum-
ers greater privacy protections than federal law. See Laura Mandaro, From
Calif to the Hill; Privacy Coalition Regroups with Eye on FCRA, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 21, 2003, at 1 (describing concerns of California consumer groups that
renewal of FCRA preemption provision would render California law ineffec-
tive).
79. Ch. 49, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000)).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
81. See id. § 57a(f).
82. FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg.
53,506 (Nov. 14, 1975) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 488 (2003)).
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credit either themselves or through arrangements with third
parties.83 The rule does not specifically preempt any state law,
but rather prohibits sellers and creditors from using contracts
containing language that would deny consumers protections
provided under state contract and commercial laws.84
Second, in 1984, the FTC promulgated its "Trade Regula-
tion Rule on Credit Practices."85 The Credit Practices Rule de-
clares specific consumer credit practices-such as confessions of
judgment 8 certain assignments of wages,87 failure to provide
clear disclosures of liability to cosigners, 8 and pyramiding of
late charges89-to be unfair acts or practices under the FTCA.
Federal banking regulators have promulgated substantially
similar regulations applicable to banks and savings and loan
associations." All of the versions of the Credit Practices Rule
promulgated by the various agencies include language from the
TILA template providing that the rule can be preempted by
state law if the appropriate agency determines that state law
"affords a level of protection to consumers that is substantially
equivalent to, or greater than, the protection afforded" in the
federal rule.91 Again, following the TILA model, such determi-
92
nations are rare.
83. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1(c), 443.1(e) (2003). The Holder in Due Course Rule
does not apply to third-party credit card transactions. Id. § 433.1(c). The
CCPA addresses the use of the rule in the credit card context. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1666(i) (2000).
84. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 14-9(a), at 536 (5th ed. 2000).
85. FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740
(Mar. 1, 1984) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 444).
86. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(1) (2003).
87. Id. § 444.2(a)(3) (permitting assignments of wages that are revocable
at the will of the debtor, pursuant to payroll deduction plans or preauthorized
payment plans entered into at the time of the transaction, or applicable only to
wages already earned).
88. Id. § 444.3.
89. Id. § 444.4.
90. Prohibited Consumer Credit Practices, 12 C.F.R. § 535 (2003).
91. Id. § 535.5; 16 C.F.R. § 444.5; Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 12
C.F.R. § 227.16 (2003).
92. Such determinations have been made by the FTC with respect to Cali-
fornia (only regarding the cosigner disclosure requirements), New York, and
Wisconsin, FTC Credit Practices Rule State Exemptions, FTC Rul. § 444.5, 6
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 10,475 at 10,475.15, .20, .45, .90 (Feb. 2,
1989); by the Federal Reserve with respect to California, New York, and Wis-
consin, FRB Reg. § 227.16, State Exemptions, 10,516, at 10,516.10, .55, .90
(Mar. 7, 1990); and by the OTS's predecessor, the FHLBB, with respect to
Wisconsin, OTS Credit Practices Rule State Exemptions, OTS Reg. § 535.5,
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E. SUMMARY OF STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF CONSUMER
CREDIT REGULATION
The existing statutory framework for consumer credit
regulation is based on the presumption that consumer protec-
tion is the province of states, rather than the federal govern-
ment. Each state has its own statutory scheme for consumer
credit regulation, structured around a blanket statutory prohi-
bition on charging interest above a certain minimal rate, unless
the loan qualifies for some exception. The exceptions are typi-
cally granted in exchange for regulation of the lender or of the
type of loan; they were enacted by states in response to the
emergence of certain types of loans or lenders in the market,
but they no longer reflect the realities of the current credit
market. The efforts of the Conference of Commissioners to re-
place these historical accretions with a comprehensive statute
providing for equal treatment of lenders were largely unsuc-
cessful.
Imposed on this layer of state laws are two federal con-
sumer protection statutes, the CCPA and the FTCA. Both of
these statutes apply equally to all lenders, although they are
administered by different federal regulatory agencies for differ-
ent lenders. Both statutes also, at least in theory, evince some
degree of respect for the authority of states over consumer pro-
tection issues, giving effect to state statutes that provide equal
or greater protection to consumers than the federal statutes. In
practice, however, state statutes dealing with these topics
rarely trump the federal laws.
On top of this already complex statutory structure is
perched yet another statutory scheme governing some of the
most significant players in the consumer finance market-
federally regulated financial institutions. This statutory
scheme has had the effect of undermining state consumer
credit protection laws that are, at least rhetorically, bastions of
consumer protection.
II. THE STORY: THE EXPANSION
OF THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
Consumer lenders chartered as banks or thrifts93 (referred
T 10,555 at 10,555.90 (Dec. 23, 1986).
93. The term "thrifts" refers to financial institutions chartered as savings
and loan associations or savings banks. Historically, thrifts were distinguished
from banks by their more limited focus on accepting savings deposits and mak-
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to collectively as "depository institutions")94 are treated differ-
ently from other consumer lenders in significant respects. As a
result of the unique role that they play as financial intermedi-
aries, depository institutions are among the most heavily regu-
lated business operations in the country and are subject to a
complex array of federal and state laws. A byproduct of the
complex interplay of federal and state law is that, owing to the
Exportation Doctrine, depository institutions have gradually
acquired significant power to ignore many state consumer
credit laws. More recently, these same powers have to some de-
gree become available to other types of consumer lenders, such
as retailers and check-cashing outlets.
This section will first explain the general framework of
laws applicable to depository institutions and then examine the
evolution of the Exportation Doctrine within that general
framework.
A. BANKING REGULATION 101-WHY ARE DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS SPECIAL?
95
Depository institutions differ from other consumer lenders
in that they operate under charters granted by either a state or
the federal government. This charter comes with significant
privileges-such as the power to accept federally insured depos-
its, and access to finding through federal reserve banks and
federal home loan banks-which are commensurate with the
public service role these depository institutions play as finan-
ing consumer and mortgage loans. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF
BANK REGULATION 24-26 (2d ed. 2003). For a general discussion of the differ-
ence between bank and thrift powers, see Mark E. Wohar, The Value of a
Thrift Charter: An Economic Comparison of Bank and Thrift Powers, 45
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 358 (1991). While thrifts have gradually acquired
the power to engage in more commercial banking activities, such activities are
still subject to limits, ensuring the continued focus of thrifts on consumer,
rather than commercial, lending. Michael Roster et al., Commercial Banks vs.
Thrift Institutions: A Legal Analysis, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 353, 354-
55 (1991).
94. The term "depository institution" generally refers to financial institu-
tions that accept federally insured deposits. See MALLOY, supra note 93, at 21-
22. This category also includes credit unions. Id.; see also supra note 8. For the
purposes of this Article, the term "depository institution" will be used to refer
collectively to banks, savings and loan associations, and savings banks.
95. This subsection title is suggested by the former President of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?,
1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, reprinted
in HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27 (1999).
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cial intermediaries." However, these privileges have a cost.
Depository institutions are subject to extensive regulation of
almost every facet of their day-to-day operations.97
This comprehensive regulatory scheme is further compli-
cated by the fact that the banking industry consists of two par-
allel systems of banks and thrifts-those that operate under
federal charters, and those that operate under state charters.
Under this "dual banking system," depository institutions can
choose to be chartered and primarily regulated either by the
federal government or by a state government.98 A state-
chartered bank or thrift will receive its charter and be primar-
ily regulated by the appropriate state banking regulator. A fed-
erally chartered bank will receive its charter and be primarily
regulated by a federal regulatory agency, the OCC'9 A federally
chartered thrift will receive its charter and be primarily regu-
lated by another federal regulatory agency, the OTS.'0°
The choice of one primary regulator does not, however,
wholly insulate a depository institution from the jurisdiction of
the other.' State-chartered depository institutions are subject
96. For general descriptions of the unique functions depository institu-
tions perform as financial intermediaries, see JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL.,
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 48-65 (3d ed. 2001); PATRICIA A. MCCOY,
BANKING LAW MANUAL § 1.02 (2d ed. 2002); Corrigan, supra note 95.
97. For a cogent overview of the regulatory burden on depository institu-
tions, see the U.S. General Accounting Office's summary of a flurry of govern-
ment and industry analyses of this topic in the early 1990s, GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REGULATORY BURDEN: RECENT STUDIES, INDUSTRY ISSUES, AND
AGENCY INITIATIVES (GAO/GGD-94-28, 1993). For an excellent discussion of
whether the regulatory burden remains justifiable given changes in the bank-
ing industry, see MCCOY, supra note 96, § 1.02, and sources cited therein.
98. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition
in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 684-89 (1988) (describ-
ing the historical evolution of the dual banking system and critiquing its tradi-
tional justifications); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking Sys-
tem, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1987) (critiquing the traditional justifications for
the dual banking system); Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A
Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977) (describing and
justifying the dual banking system as a method of ensuring efficient banking
regulation).
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 93(a) (2000).
100. Id. § 1463.
101. For an excellent discussion of the labyrinthian complexity of the over-
lapping jurisdictions of the various banking agencies for the various types of
depository institutions (including a diagram), see MALLOY, supra note 93, at
14-20; see also Kenneth E. Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal
Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687, 695-734 (1980) (explaining
the regulation of banks).
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to some federal laws that are applicable to all depository insti-
tutions, regardless of charter. °2 State-chartered banks typically
must also maintain federal deposit insurance,"3 and accepting
such insurance subjects the depository institution to substan-
tial federal regulation and to the jurisdiction of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).04 State-chartered banks
that choose to be members of the Federal Reserve system are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve."' Similarly,
state-chartered thrifts typically must maintain federal deposit
insurance, 0 6 subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the FDIC
and the OTS.' °7 In addition, some federal laws, like the con-
sumer protection laws discussed in the previous section, apply
equally to all consumer lenders regardless of charter.
At the same time, federally chartered depository institu-
tions are subject to some state regulation. Federally chartered
depository institutions are "instrumentalities of the Federal
government, created for a public purpose, and as such necessar-
ily subject to the paramount authority of the United States."18
Through the operation of the Supremacy Clause,0 9 the federal
102. For example, the Federal Reserve Act requires all depository institu-
tions to maintain certain levels of reserves against outstanding deposits. 12
U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A).
103. Many state chartering laws require banks to maintain federal deposit
insurance. Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Fi-
nancial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 65, 79 n.72 (1996). In addition, fed-
eral deposit insurance is a requirement for membership in the federal reserve
system, 12 U.S.C. § 329, and for state banks organized in holding company
structures, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(e). Moreover, as a practical matter, federal de-
posit insurance is regarded as a competitive necessity. See MALLOY, supra
note 93, at 56-57 (describing restrictions on the operations of non-FDIC-
insured depository institutions); Garten, supra, at 79 n.72 (stating that federal
deposit insurance might be less costly than potential losses).
104. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (restricting activities of state-chartered,
federally insured banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (subjecting operations of all fed-
erally insured depository institutions to federal safety and soundness stan-
dards).
105. Id. § 1813(q)(2).
106. Again, as a practical matter, federal deposit insurance is a necessity,
even if not mandated by a particular state's statutes. MALLOY, supra note 93,
at 56-57.
107. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462(4), 1464(d), 1823(c)(1).
108. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Following general preemption jurispru-
dence, state law otherwise applicable to federal depository institutions is pre-
empted by federal law if it expressly conflicts with a federal law and either
frustrates the purpose for which federal depository institutions were created
or impairs the efficiency of federal depository institutions in discharging the
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laws creating and regulating these depository institutions pro-
vide their fundamental legal framework. These laws, however,
leave some regulatory aspects to state law, either because fed-
eral law does not address the area or because federal law ex-
pressly provides for state governance. To illustrate the former,
federal law does not provide a unique system of general con-
tract, tort, or property law; consequently, federal depository in-
stitutions for the most part are subject to the laws of the state
where they are located with respect to such matters.10 To illus-
trate the latter, federal banking law expressly defers to the
laws of the state where a national bank is located to determine
the extent to which a national bank may establish branches
within a state.'
As a consumer protection issue, consumer credit regulation
traditionally has been considered the province of state law."
2
The fact that there is no comprehensive federal law governing
the extension of consumer credit would seem to support that
conclusion. Arguably, the areas of consumer credit regulation
that are not governed by the CCPA and the FTCA should be
left to state law. Under the Exportation Doctrine, however, de-
pository institutions are given the power to select one particu-
lar state's consumer credit regulation and give it preemptive
effect over all other state consumer credit laws. Although this
preemption power originated with a relatively modest statutory
provision setting interest rates for national banks, over the
years it has evolved to effectively exempt most depository insti-
tutions from the reach of significant state consumer credit laws
and to enable corporate entities which are not depository insti-
tutions to effectively assert the same powers.
duties imposed on them by federal law. Davis, 161 U.S. at 283. For a detailed
examination of federal preemption of state law in the banking area, including
a summary of general federal preemption principles, see Duncan, supra note
9.
110. First Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869); see
also Bank of Am. v. City of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2220 (2003); Kreissman, supra note 8, at 917 (citing
Schramm v. Bank of Cal., 20 P.2d 1093 (Or. 1933)).
111. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000). Fiduciary powers of national banks are also
determined by the law of the state where the bank is located. Id. § 92a(a).
112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
1. Section 85 of the National Bank Act and the "Most Favored
Lender Doctrine"
The Exportation Doctrine originated in the National Bank
Act (NBA), an 1864 law establishing a national banking sys-
tem.' Congress created the national banking system to effec-
tuate a number of federal policies, most importantly creating a
national currency and a national market for federal bonds to
finance the Civil War.1 ' Congress did not feel it could effectu-
ate these policies through the existing network of state-
chartered banks, so it established a competing system of na-
tional banks.15 The success of this national banking system de-
pended on the creation of a national bank charter that provided
an attractive alternative to the existing state bank charters.
Among the incentives offered to national banks was the
power to charge for loans
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where
the bank is located, and no more; except that where, by the laws of
any state, a different rate is limited for banks of issue, organized un-
der state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for [national
banks] organized [or existing] in any such state."
6
The Supreme Court made clear the value of this section 85
of the NBA (12 U.S.C. § 85) as one of the "perks" of a national
bank charter the first time it had occasion to examine it, in Tif-
fany v. National Bank of Missouri.117 Tiffany considered a Mis-
souri law that established a usury limit of 8% for its state
banks; all other lenders in the state were permitted to charge
10%.' 8 The National Bank of the State of Missouri relied on
113. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (amending and reenact-
ing the National Currency Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863)).
114. MALLOY, supra note 93, at 9-11; ROSS M. ROBERTSON, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION
33-45 (1995).
115. Miller, supra note 98, at 14.
116. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)). Section 85 was subsequently amended a
number of times. For a detailed description of the amendments, see William G.
Bornstein, Comment, Extension of the Most Favored Lender Doctrine Under
Federal Usury Law: A Contrary View, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1080-82 (1982).
117. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
118. Id. at 411. This was not an uncommon situation at the time. Espe-
cially in the western states, where banks were distrusted and disfavored, the
law often established lower usury limits for banks. JACKSON & SYMONS, supra
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what is now § 85 as its authority to charge 9% interest to its
customers.'19 The Supreme Court sanctioned this practice, ex-
plaining that in enacting the NBA, Congress intended to be-
stow upon national banks the status of "national favorites."2 °
Section 85 was intended to prevent state interest rate legisla-
tion disfavoring banks from forcing national banks out of busi-
ness. 12' Under what came to be known as the "Most Favored
Lender Doctrine," § 85 consistently has been interpreted to
permit national banks to make loans at the highest rates per-
mitted any type of lender under the laws of the state in which
the bank is located.
22
To understand how § 85, a statutory provision aimed at
preventing states from destroying the national banking system
in its infancy, came to justify a legal doctrine preempting virtu-
ally all significant state consumer credit laws, we must exam-
ine three distinct dimensions of the evolution of the Exporta-
tion Doctrine-the expansion of its geographic reach (from
intrastate to interstate), the expansion of its substantive scope
(from numerical interest rate to many additional significant
credit terms), and the expansion of its orbit of beneficiaries
(from national banks to any corporate entity that acquires or
contracts with any sort of depository institution).
note 95, at 67.
119. Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 410-11.
120. Id. at 413.
121. Id. at 412-13. The Court explained that if national banks
were restricted to the rates allowed by the statutes of the State to
banks which might be authorized by the State laws, unfriendly legis-
lation might make their existence in the State impossible. A rate of
interest might be prescribed so low that banking could not be carried
on, except at a certain loss. The only mode of guarding against such
contingencies was that which, we think, Congress adopted. It was to
allow to national associations the rate allowed by the State to natural
persons generally, and a higher rate, if State banks of issue were au-
thorized to charge a higher rate.
Id.
122. See, e.g., Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548 F.2d 255, 261 (8th Cir. 1977)
(credit card law); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir.
1976) (credit card law); Acker v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 729, 739 (3d
Cir. 1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 1975) (in-
stallment loan law); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th
Cir. 1972) (credit card law); Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855, 861-64 (6th Cir. 1972) (mortgage rate for savings and
loans); United Mo. Bank v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 784-85 (W.D. Mo.
1975) (small loan law); Comm'r of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 A.2d
685, 690 (Md. 1973).
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2. Expanding the Geographic Reach of § 85
a. The Genesis of the Exportation Doctrine-The Marquette
Decision
In 1978, the Supreme Court dramatically augmented the
power of § 85, articulating what came to be known as the "Ex-
portation Doctrine." In Marquette National Bank v. First of
Omaha Service Corp.,' the Court held that under § 85, a na-
tional bank in Nebraska could "export" the credit card interest
rate permitted under Nebraska law to cardholders living in
Minnesota, where this rate was usurious.' In reaching this de-
cision, the Court focused on the meaning of the term "located"
in the part of § 85 authorizing national banks to charge "inter-
est at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or
District where the bank is located."2' Was this Nebraska bank
"located" in Nebraska, where it had its physical presence, or in
Minnesota, where its customers were using their credit cards?
The Court noted that the bank's national charter gave its
address as Nebraska, and that the bank had no branches in
Minnesota. 2 6 Indeed, under federal banking law at the time,
the bank could not legally have had any branches in Minne-
sota. 7 The Court also noted that the bank conducted most of
the significant commercial activity related to the loan in the
state of Nebraska-assessment of finance charges, receipt of
payments, and credit approvals. 18 The fact that the bank sys-
tematically solicited customers in Minnesota did not affect its
location for purposes of § 85. Nor did the fact that the bank's
credit cards were being slapped onto counters in stores in Min-
nesota affect the bank's location. Indeed, the Court explained:
If the location of the bank were to depend on the whereabouts of each
credit card transaction, the meaning of the term "located" would be so
stretched as to throw into confusion the complex system of modern in-
terstate banking. A national bank could never be certain whether its
contacts with residents of foreign States were sufficient to alter its lo-
cation for purposes of § 85. We do not choose to invite these difficul-
ties by rendering so elastic the term "located.""9
123. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
124. Id. at 299.
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. at 309.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 311-12.
129. Id. at 312.
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For the Marquette Court, the bank's unambiguous physical
presence in and only in the state of Nebraska was enough to
anchor the bank's "location" to the state of Nebraska. 130 The
Court focused on what it deemed to be the one inalterable fea-
ture of a bank's interstate lending program-the bank's physi-
cal location, limited by law at the time to the borders of its
state. 31 Marquette was decided, however, at what turned out to
be the infancy of interstate banking; since 1978, national banks
have acquired the technological and legal capability to main-
tain physical presences of many types in many states.
The development of computer-generated data management
technologies has enabled banks to offer standardized, nation-
wide credit card programs to consumers across the country. To-
day, the location of a bank's charter address or main headquar-
ters often bears little relation to the physical location of its
customers, the computers generating the data required for
making credit decisions, or the legions of employees processing
applications, payments, or other mailings. 32 This functional
dispersal of bank operations presaged the advent of interstate
branching.
b. Interpreting the Exportation Doctrine in the Era of
Interstate Banking
In 1994, Congress finally acknowledged the reality of na-
tionwide banking operations by enacting the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal).'33
Riegle-Neal gives national banks the power to branch across
state lines.'3 4 Riegle-Neal's alteration of Marquette's basic as-
sumptions (that the Nebraska bank did not, and legally could
not, have a branch in Minnesota) raises questions about the
continued vitality of the decision. In enacting Riegle-Neal, how-
130. Id. at 309.
131. Id.
132. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
133. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (2000)).
134. For a broad discussion of this legislation, see Patrick Mulloy & Cyn-
thia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 270-72 (1995);
Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the Riegle-Neal
Act of 1994, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 183, 184-87 (1996); Stacey Stritzel, Note,
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Pro-
gress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 161, 173-84 (1995).
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ever, Congress declined to address directly the Exportation
Doctrine. Instead, Congress stated merely, "No provision of this
title.., shall be construed as affecting in any way.., the ap-
plicability of [§ 85].
To what was Congress referring? What was the "applicabil-
ity" of § 85 in the context of interstate branching? The Supreme
Court has not reconsidered the geographic reach of the Expor-
tation Doctrine since Marquette, and thus has not clarified how
subsequent changes in technology and legal restrictions affect
exportation. 3 6 Since Marquette, the applicability of § 85 has
been construed primarily in administrative actions, which
courts have occasionally reviewed. The most active agency in
this area has been the OCC, whose interpretations have
evolved in two distinct stages.
First, when banks could not branch across state borders,
the OCC issued a series of interpretations delineating how
much of a physical presence a bank could have in a state and
still not be considered to have a branch there. Although these
interpretations were not issued in connection with § 85 issues,
they are significant for § 85 analysis. Marquette's holding that
the Nebraska bank was not "located" in Minnesota was based
in part on the fact that the Nebraska bank had no branches in
Minnesota. For banks exporting rates into states where they
had some sort of physical presence, then, it was important to
ensure that such presence did not rise to the level of a branch,
thereby taking them out of the parameters of Marquette.
Second, after banks were granted the authority to branch
across state borders, the OCC issued a series of interpretations
articulating the view that a bank could be "located" in more
than one state and "export" the rates permitted at any of its lo-
cations, provided it "makes" the loan from that location. 38
These interpretations permit a bank to choose the most favor-
able rates available in any of the states where it has banking
operations, and to charge those rates to all its customers re-
135. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
§ 111 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811, note (2000)).
136. The Court has considered the substantive scope of the Exportation
Doctrine, considering the scope of what is exportable as "interest" under § 85.
See infra Part II.B.3. However, the Court has declined to reconsider the effect
of a significant presence (arguably constituting a branch) in the state into
which a bank is exporting rates. Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., 515 U.S. 1103
(1995), denying cert. to 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1994).
137. See infra notes 139-60 and accompanying text.
138. See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii.
548 [Vol 88:518
EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
gardless of where they live. Let us examine these two
interpretative strands.
i. OCC Branch Interpretations Before Riegle-Neal
In the decades before the enactment of Riegle-Neal, banks
were becoming increasingly frustrated by their inability to re-
spond to customers' demands for services commensurate with
developing nationwide markets. When banks tried to provide
services at locations other than their main offices or permitted
branches, they bumped up against the NBA's restrictive ap-
proach to bank branching. The NBA permitted a national bank
to establish a branch only at locations permitted under the
laws of the state where the bank was located. 139 Not only did all
state laws prohibit branching across state lines, but many state
laws placed extensive restrictions on the number and geo-
graphic location of branches within state lines."
Creative bankers began to push the limits of these restric-
tions by attempting to offer services to customers at facilities
carefully structured to avoid the NBA's definition of a "branch."
The NBA defines a "branch" to include any "place of busi-
ness.., at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or
money lent.""' Banks tested the parameters of this definition
by, inter alia, offering limited banking services through ATM
machines, 42 setting up offices offering only discount brokerage
services,143 and sending armored cars across state lines to pick
up deposits from customers."4 These experiments were chal-
lenged repeatedly in court by competitors and state regulators,
resulting in a series of judicial opinions from the 1960s through
the 1980s expanding the limits of that statutory definition. 45
In 1993, the OCC pulled all of these cases together into a
three-pronged definition of "branch." 46 Under the OCC's analy-
139. 12 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2)(C) (1994).
140. See generally Carl Felsenfeld, Electronic Banking and Its Effects on
Interstate Branching Restrictions-An Analytic Approach, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1019, 1021-30 (1986) (describing the then-current restrictions on inter-
state banking imposed by restrictive branching laws).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 36(j) (2000).
142. Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 455 (2d
Cir. 1985); Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
143. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1987).
144. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 125-26 (1969).
145. See cases cited supra notes 142-44.
146. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 634, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 91 83,518 (July 23, 1993) [hereinafter IL 634] (re-
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sis, a bank facility only constitutes a "branch" if the following
criteria are met. First, the activities performed at that facility
must include at least one of the "core banking functions" de-
lineated in the NBA's statutory definition: receiving deposits,
paying checks, or lending money.47 Second, the facility must be
owned or operated by the bank itself.148 Third, the facility must
be accessible to the public, with this accessibility giving the
bank a competitive advantage in serving its customers. 49
These refinements in the definition of "branch" were
prompted primarily by banks eager to find ways to engage in
interstate banking despite the restrictions of state banking
laws. If interstate facilities were not technically "branches,"
they would not be subject to legal restrictions on interstate
branching. Under this three-part definition, banks could en-
gage in discount brokerage at locations across the country be-
cause discount brokerage was not a "core banking function."
Banks could offer ATMs nationwide, as long as the banks
themselves did not own or operate them. Banks could also op-
erate labor-intensive backroom data processing units or cus-
tomer call centers at locations with cheap and plentiful labor
supplies, even outside of the state where the bank was located,
as long as they were not open to the public.
As the technology developed for banks to offer large-scale,
standardized consumer loan products, economies of scale man-
dated offering these products to ever-larger pools of custom-
garding loans originated at loan production offices); OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 636, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,520
(July 23, 1993) [hereinafter IL 636] (regarding origination and approval of
loans); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 635, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,519 (July 23, 1993) [hereinafter IL 635] (regard-
ing remittance processing operating subsidiaries).
147. The OCC cited Clarke, 479 U.S. at 409 (holding that national banks
could offer discount brokerage services at locations other than authorized
branches, including locations outside of bank's home state, because such ser-
vices were not "core banking functions"). IL 634, supra note 146.
148. The OCC cited Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that "customer-bank communication terminals" es-
tablished by a bank are branches of that bank) and Independent Bankers Ass'n
v. Marine Midland, 757 F.2d 453, 463 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that nonpropri-
etary ATMs, not owned or operated by the bank, are not branches of that
bank). IL 634, supra note 146.
149. The OCC cited Dickinson, 396 U.S. at 136-37 (holding that armored
cars and secured receptacles at which bank customers could leave deposits and
receive cash in exchange for checks constitute "branches" because they offer
customers accessibility equivalent to that of a branch). IL 634, supra note 146.
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ers.150 The geographic location of these customers became ir-
relevant. Mass mailings of credit card solicitations could reach
customers across the country, applications for credit generated
by such solicitations could be efficiently processed by pools of
data processors inputting data into the bank's computers from
centralized locations having no relation to the bank's locations,
and the dispersal of credit occurred in thousands of stores
across the country.' Banks relied on the three-pronged
"branch" tests to ensure that none of the locations at which in-
creasingly dispersed functions of the lending process took place
constituted impermissible branches.'52
As the lending process became increasingly mechanized
and geographically dispersed, banks and the OCC relied on in-
creasingly sophisticated definitions of "lending" as a core bank-
ing function.'5 3 This culminated in another three-part defini-
tion, this time parsing the process of lending: "lending money"
consisted of origination, approval, and disbursement of funds to
the borrower."' With respect to disbursal, relying on judicial
precedent, the OCC accepted that a loan was clearly "made" at
the time and place a borrower actually received the loan pro-
ceeds. 5 Under this interpretation, a loan was not "made" at
any location where a bank disbursed the borrowed funds to any
party other than the borrower, such as the seller of a piece of
150. William F. Baxter, Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer
Welfare, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1995).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., A "Back Room" Office, Letter No. 343, [1985-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,513 (May 24, 1985) (approving back-
room facility making loan approval decisions); Delinquent Credit Card Ac-
count Collection Center, No-Objection Letter No. 87-7, [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,036 (Sept. 10, 1987) (approving
backroom delinquent credit card account collection center); IL 634, supra note
146 (approving backroom loan origination and solicitation at same locations);
IL 636, supra note 146 (approving backroom telemarketing loan solicitation
and credit application processing at same location).
153. See supra note 152.
154. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 818, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,267 (Jan. 12, 1998) [hereinafter IL 818] (re-
garding loan production offices); IL 634, supra note 146. This position has
been adopted by the OCC in its regulations as well. See Bank Activities and
Operations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1003-.1005 (2003).
155. IL 818, supra note 154 (citing Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d
921, 945 n.45, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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real estate.156 With respect to the other two prongs of the lend-
ing test, origination 57 and approval, the OCC took the position
that if any two occur at the same location, a loan was made at
that location; however, any one of these functions occurring
separately did not constitute "lending."
5 8
These odd-sounding distinctions were not the result of aca-
demic hairsplitting. To the contrary, they were reactions to ef-
forts by hardheaded business people to take advantage of tech-
nological developments that opened the doors to nationwide
banking, despite legal barriers. And these distinctions were
significant in structuring consumer lending operations. After
Marquette, it became clear to banks that it was to their advan-
tage to locate consumer lending operations (particularly na-
tionwide credit card programs) in states with generous (or non-
existent) usury laws. Indeed, states such as South Dakota,
Delaware, and Utah amended their laws to deregulate interest
rates on credit cards for the express purpose of attracting non-
polluting, labor-intensive credit card operations to their
states.159 Large credit card issuers chose such states to charter
banks whose activities were largely limited to issuing credit
156. IL 818, supra note 154.
157. The OCC was never clear on what it meant by "origination." The term
seemed to be used for some combination of solicitation of loan business and the
loan application process. One Interpretative Letter listed four functions as ex-
amples of "loan solicitation and origination activities": "1) solicitation of loan
business ... ; 2) providing information as to loans rates and terms; 3) inter-
viewing and counseling of applications regarding loans ... ; 4) aiding custom-
ers in the completion of loan applications." Loan Origination Activities Per-
missible, Letter No. 88, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,155 (Jan. 31, 1979).
158. IL 634, supra note 146; Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 7.1004-.1005 (2003). This represents the latest articulation of the OCC's
policy permitting national banks to establish "loan production offices" perform-
ing various aspects of loan processing at locations other than established
branches. See OCC Policy on Loan Production Offices, Banking Circular 199,
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 45-595 (May 23, 1985).
159. For a number of years, DRI/McGraw-Hill published an annual report
that ranked states based on factors such as "restrictions on APR," whether
late fees and overlimit fees were permitted, and the restrictiveness of their le-
gal environment. DRIIMCGRAw HILL, A STUDY ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF
STATES TO CREDIT CARD ISSUING FIRMS (1993-1995) (issues on file with au-
thor). States continue to consider this strategy. As recently as the spring of
2002, the Illinois Bankers Association was trying to enact legislation increas-
ing the fees that Illinois-chartered state banks could charge on certain loans,
arguing that "Illinois is becoming less attractive for headquartering financial
institutions" because of the fee restrictions. Ben Jackson, Illinois Banks Push
Loan Fee/Penalty Bill, AM. BANKER, May 17, 2002, at 5.
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cards, and moved all their existing credit card operations from
their commercial banks to those credit card banks. 6 ° Because
the consumer loan programs already established by those
banks were conducted in dispersed geographic locations, there
often was not much incentive to move all aspects of the credit
card operations to the charter location of the new bank. Thus,
banks had to consider whether they had enough activity occur-
ring at the charter location to ensure that the bank was "lo-
cated" in that state in order to use Marquette to export rates
from that state. At the same time, banks also had to consider
whether any of their disbursed locations constituted "branches"
in states where customers lived, potentially undermining their
Marquette-based right to export into those states.
ii. OCC Branch Interpretations After Riegle-Neal
As discussed above, in enacting Riegle-Neal, Congress de-
clined to address directly how the presence of a branch in a
state into which a bank wishes to export another state's inter-
est rates might affect the Exportation Doctrine. Instead, Con-
gress adopted an oblique clause indicating that nothing in
Riegle-Neal should affect the applicability of § 85.161 The OCC
was quick to jump into the interpretative void left by this vague
language, issuing an exhaustive opinion letter explaining ex-
actly what Congress meant by this provision, dubbed the
"usury savings clause." "'
Relying extensively on a statement inserted into the Con-
gressional Record by Delaware Senator William Roth, Jr.,63 the
160. DeMuth, supra note 54, at 215-16, 234 tbl. 4; Rougeau, supra note 54,
at 10. Financial institutions continue this strategy. See, e.g., Matt Andrejczak,
Calif. Bank Moves Operations to Nevada to Capitalize on Its Card-Friendly
Laws, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1998, at 10.
161. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Riegle-Neal also provides
that the laws of the state where an interstate branch is located regarding,
among other things, consumer protection, shall apply to such a branch except
to the extent preempted by federal law. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A) (2000). This is
not particularly helpful to our analysis, since the extent to which § 85 pre-
empts state usury laws is precisely what we are trying to determine.
162. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 822, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,265 (Feb. 17, 1998) [hereinafter IL 8221 (regard-
ing the application of state usury laws).
163. Senator Roth was prompted to offer the usury savings clause after
both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, in hearings of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, expressed uncertainty about the con-
tinued ability of banks to export home state interest rates into states where
they had branches after enactment of interstate banking legislation. He took
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sponsor of the usury savings clause, the OCC concluded this
clause was intended to ensure that "the Marquette doctrine,
permitting a bank to utilize interest rates allowed by the law of
the state where the bank is located regardless of the state of
the residence of the borrower, is not defeated simply because a
bank has a branch in the state where the borrower resides."164
This much is arguably supported by the plain meaning of
the language of the usury savings clause. As discussed above,
before Riegle-Neal was enacted, § 85 was interpreted to mean
that a bank could export the interest rate of the state where it
was chartered (the "home state") to other states. By its terms,
the usury savings clause expresses the intent to preserve that
power, allowing a bank to continue to export its home state in-
terest rates to other states, regardless of the now-permitted
presence of branches in those other states.
The OCC went further, however, attributing to the usury
savings clause additional power not found in the plain meaning
of its language. Again relying heavily on Senator Roth's state-
ment, the OCC asserted that the drafters intended the usury
savings clause to give a bank the power to make loans either
from the bank's home state or from any state in which the bank
has interstate branches (the "host state"). If the loan is "made"
in the home state, the bank can export the home state's interest
rates. If the loan is "made" in the host state, the bank can ex-
port the host state's interest rates.
To determine where a loan is "made," the OCC suggested a
different test from its prior three-pronged test.'65 Again relying
on Senator Roth's testimony, the OCC divided all lending-
related activity into either "ministerial" or "non-ministerial"
functions. The ministerial functions include acts such as "pro-
viding credit card or loan applications or receiving pay-
ments,"'66 and are considered irrelevant to the determination of
where a loan is "made." Only three non-ministerial functions-
"the decision to extend credit, the extension of credit itself, and
action "to address this potential threat not only to Delaware's credit card in-
dustry but to all banks that extend credit to borrowers who reside outside the
State where the bank, or under this legislation, the branch making the loan or
other extension of credit is located." 140 CONG. REc. S12,788-89 (1994) (state-
ment of Sen. Roth).
164. IL 822, supra note 162, 1 90,259.
165. The OCC does not clearly state whether it intends the new test to re-
place the old test, or merely supplement the prior test in cases involving inter-




the disbursal of the proceeds of a loan"117 -are relevant to the
"making" of the loan."" Thus, the "origination" prong of the old
test was replaced with "extension of credit," which the OCC in-
terpreted as "the communication of final approval by the bank
to the borrower."'69 The OCC went on to provide remarkably
clear guidance as to exactly where each of these functions oc-
curs. Approval occurs wherever the human beings who either
make discretionary judgments of approval or establish non-
discretionary approval criteria are located.170 Disbursal occurs
wherever the customer physically obtains the loan proceeds-
either in person or through the crediting of a bank account.
171
Extension of credit occurs at the location from which the first
communication of final approval comes.'7 2
If all three of these non-ministerial functions occur in a
host state, the loan is definitely "made" in that state. 73 If fewer
than all three of these functions occur in the host state, how-
ever, the OCC did not offer any definitive guidance on where
the loan is considered to have been "made."74 Instead, it held
that in such situations the bank's home state rates "may al-
ways be applied,"' but that the old three-pronged test could
still be applied to justify charging host state rates instead. 76
To sum up, the geographic reach of § 85 has been vastly
expanded through aggressive interpretations of the term "lo-
cated." Section 85 permits a national bank to charge "interest
at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where
the bank is located, and no more." The Supreme Court's Mar-
quette decision held that a bank was "located" in the state





171. Id. 90,263. Consistent with the prior three-pronged test, however, if
the funds are disbursed by the bank to an escrow agent or title agent who
later disburses them to the customer, the ultimate disbursal to the customer is
considered merely the delivery of previously disbursed funds to the customer




175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. 90,262 ("While ... we conclude that the state rates may be used,
the OCC ... has reviewed the entire transaction to determine whether there
was a clear nexus between the host state, the rates of which the bank sought
to apply, and the loan to justify imposition of the host state's rates.").
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port" the rates of that state to borrowers in other states. At the
time Marquette was decided, banks were not legally permitted
to have branches outside their home states. The enactment of
Riegle-Neal allowed banks to establish branches in other
states, and the Act further contained a provision stating that
nothing in the statute should be construed to affect in any way
the applicability of § 85. The OCC has interpreted that provi-
sion to mean that a bank can be "located" in either its home
state or any of its host states, and that the Exportation Doc-
trine can be used by a bank to export rates from either location,
depending on where the loan is "made." In addition, through its
near-Dickensian parsing of the lending process, the OCC has in
effect restricted the meaning of "location" for purposes of the
Exportation Doctrine-a bank is not necessarily "located" in a
state where it has a substantial physical presence, provided
certain aspects of the lending process do not take place in that
state.
Clearly, the term "location," as used in § 85 in support of
the Exportation Doctrine, bears little relation to its dictionary
meaning. The next phase in the transformation in the nation-
wide banking system-its expansion onto the Internet-
provides additional evidence of the increasing strain being
placed on the antiquated language of § 85.
c. Further Complications from Internet Banking
In 1996, then Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A.
Ludwig noted:
Since our inception, the United States has been committed to a
legal infrastructure that ties the activities of all manner of banks
closely to state laws. Even national banks draw many of their au-
thorities from state laws. But technology has put this legal infrastruc-
ture under increasing strain. For example, who should we say has ju-
risdiction over a loan issued by a depository institution with offices in
State A to a consumer in State B who applies for a loan through a
Web site maintained on a server in State C... or country C for that
matter?77
Over the past few years, a number of national banks have
been chartered as "Internet-only" banks, interacting with cus-
tomers primarily through the Internet rather than through
traditional bricks-and-mortar bank offices. 17 Each of these
177. OCC News Release No. 96-27 (consisting of the remarks by Eugene A.
Ludwig before the Institute of International Bankers) (Mar. 4, 1996).
178. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 462,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/mayO1/ca462.pdf (Apr. 4, 2001) (approving a
national bank charter for Effinity Bank, a full-service Internet bank) [herein-
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banks has a specific charter address in the state where its
"main office" (typically described as "an office suite [including]
a 'call center' reached by telephone or computer")7 9 is located.
Although the designation of these sites as the "location" of the
bank sometimes appears to be supported by the existing physi-
cal presence of corporate affiliates,1 80 it is not clear from the
publicly available data how much of a physical presence the
banks actually maintain at their designated "locations," espe-
cially since many of the banking functions requiring substan-
tial physical assets or manpower are outsourced to third par-
ties.'8 While the outsourced functions are well within the range
after Effinity Approval]; OCC Conditional Approval No. 383,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/apr00/ca383.pdf (Apr. 13, 2000) (approving a
national bank charter for Hutton National Bank, an Internet-only bank focus-
ing on equipment leasing) [hereinafter Hutton Approval]; OCC Conditional
Approval No. 368, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/apr00/ca368.pdf (Apr. 3,
2000) (approving a national bank charter for pointpathbank, a full-service
Internet-only bank) [hereinafter pointpathbank Approval]; OCC Conditional
Approval No. 347, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/jan00/ca347.pdf (Jan. 29,
2000) (approving a national bank charter for AeroBank.com, an Internet-only
bank focusing on small business loans) [hereinafter AeroBank Approval]; OCC
Conditional Approval No. 313, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/jul99/ca313.pdf
(July 9, 1999) (approving a national bank charter for CIBC National Bank, a
full-service Internet-only bank) [hereinafter CIBC Approval]; OCC Conditional
Approval No. 312, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/may99/ca312.pdf (May 8,
1999) (approving a national bank charter for NextBank, an Internet-only
credit card bank) [hereinafter NextBank Approval]; OCC Conditional Ap-
proval No. 253, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/aug97/ca253.pdf (Aug. 20,
1997) (approving a national bank charter for CompuBank, an Internet-only
bank focusing on equipment leasing) [hereinafter CompuBank Approval].
179. CIBC Approval, supra note 178, at 2; see also NextBank Approval, su-
pra note 178, at 4 (describing the bank's main office suite location as the
"principal executive offices"); CompuBank Approval, supra note 178, at 2 (de-
scribing the bank's main office as a "call center" without frequent walk-in cus-
tomers).
180. See, e.g., Effinity Approval, supra note 178, at 1-2 (stating that the
bank's main office is in the same location as its parent corporation); Hutton
Approval, supra note 178, at 1 (describing a bank that shares adjacent office
space with its corporate affiliate); pointpathbank Approval, supra note 178, at
1 n.2 (describing the bank's offices in a building housing the operational func-
tions of corporate affiliates); AeroBank Approval, supra note 178, at 1 (stating
that the bank shares adjacent offices with an affiliated company).
181. See, e.g., Effinity Approval, supra note 178, at 4 ("The Bank will out-
source its Internet banking system, core processing services, check processing,
check imaging, financial reporting, and customer scoring."); Hutton Approval,
supra note 178, at 3 ("The Bank will likely outsource to a third-party service
provider for Web site hosting, core data processing, item processing, bill pay-
ment services, off-hour telephone call center operations, and ATM network
services."); pointpathbank Approval, supra note 178, at 4 ("The Bank will
likely outsource to a third-party service provider for data processing, Internet
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of data-processing and servicing functions that have been out-
sourced by conventional banks for decades with full regulatory
approval,"" in the case of an Internet bank, the outsourcing of
significant functions further diminishes the already attenuated
presence of the bank at its designated "location."
It is not clear from the publicly available approval docu-
ments whether the OCC was concerned about how substantial
an actual physical presence backed up the applicants' location
designation. Recent regulatory pronouncements have done
nothing to clarify this issue. The OCC recently promulgated a
regulation addressing electronic activities of banks. In its ini-
tial request for public comment on the topic, the OCC noted
that the concept of "location" was potentially problematic in
this context and suggested that it would be willing to take a
broad look at the issues raised." The final regulation, however,
contains only two provisions dealing with these issues, both of
which merely rephrase the positions developed by the OCC in
the interstate context in language applicable to the Internet:
For purposes of [§ 851, the main office of a national bank that operates
exclusively through the Internet is the office identified by the bank
[in its charter application or through a subsequent relocation]."8
access services, hosting and processing mortgage loan operations, and insur-
ance."); AeroBank Approval, supra note 178, at 4 ("The Bank will likely out-
source to a third-party service provider for off-peak telephone customer ser-
vice, the Internet banking platform, item processing, core data processing, bill
payment services, card and check production, accounts receivable audit, delin-
quent loan collection, legal, and internal audit."); CIBC Approval, supra note
178, at 4 ("The Bank will likely outsource to a third-party or affiliated service
provider for telephone customer service, the Internet banking platform, item
processing, core data processing, bill payment services, delinquent loan collec-
tion, card and check production, and statement issuance."); NextBank Ap-
proval, supra note 178, at 4 ("Completely outsourced functions will include
card issuance, online customer service, balance transfers, credit reports, fraud
detection, collections, billing, and payment processing.").
182. OCC Bulletin No. 2001-47, 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 35-522
(summarizing prior agency issuances on third-party relationships).
183. Electronic Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,992, 34,992 (May 17, 2002) (codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt.7).
184. The OCC stated:
We invite comment on whether new developments in bank tech-
nology require the OCC to address how "location" applies in the con-
text of activities conducted via the Internet. Specifically, is the deter-
mination of "location" for purposes of the statutes an impediment to
national banks conducting all or part of their operations on the Inter-
net? If so, should we further clarify our regulations on this issue?
Electronic Banking, 65 Fed. Reg. 4895, 4897 (Feb. 2, 2000) (codified at 12
C.F.R. ch. 1).




A national bank shall not be considered located in a State solely be-
cause it physically maintains technology, such as a server or auto-
mated loan center, in that state, or because the bank's products or
services are accessed through electronic means by customers located
in the state.'m
Whether the mere designation of a headquarters location
by these Internet banks in their charter applications will be
considered sufficient to support a "location" for purposes of the
Exportation Doctrine remains to be seen. The preamble to the
new regulation suggests that even the OCC is not certain of the
strength of its position. For one thing, the OCC claimed that its
position that the physical location of technology in a state is not
the sole factor to be considered in determining its "location" is
"consistent with evolving case authority," yet it cited only one
decision from a federal district court in New Jersey. 187 For an-
other, the OCC rejected one commentator's proposal to elimi-
nate any inference that the location of a bank's technological
equipment or customers may ever be considered in the deter-
mination of a bank's "location," explaining:
It is not our intent to remove these factors altogether from the de-
termination of where a bank is located since the equipment may be
connected to other relevant activities of the bank. Instead, the pur-
pose of this provision is simply to make clear that these factors alone
will not determine the bank's location in a State.8
Internet banks clearly present a vivid canvas for graphi-
cally displaying the true scope of the OCC's aggressive inter-
pretations of the geographic reach of the Exportation Doctrine.
One Internet-only bank, NextBank, changed its designated "lo-
cation" from California to Arizona sometime between the date
it opened and the date the OCC closed it less than three years
later."8 9 While the specific reasons for the change in location
were not publicized, it is difficult not to suspect that the com-
parative liberality of interest rate laws in Arizona as opposed to
sively Through the Internet, 12 C.F.R. § 7.5009 (2003).
186. Location of a National Bank Conducting Electronic Activities, 12
C.F.R. § 7.5008 (2003).
187. Electronic Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,992, 35,001 (May 17, 2002) (cit-
ing Amberson Holdings LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 F. Supp. 2d
332 (D.N.J. 2000)).
188. Id. at 35,002.
189. Compare NextBank Approval, supra note 178, at 1 (giving San Fran-
cisco, California, as the bank's charter address), with OCC News Release No.
2002-09 (Feb. 7, 2002) (giving Phoenix, Arizona, as its charter address).
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California'9" was a significant motivation.
In summary, this dimension of the expansion of the Expor-
tation Doctrine demonstrates that "location" has lost any ra-
tional connection to the actual physical presence of a bank. As
long as a bank puts enough personnel engaged in "non-
ministerial" lending functions in a jurisdiction with favorable
consumer credit laws, it will be considered "located" in that
state. Actual physical presence of other personnel or assets in
any other state is irrelevant. As banks get more aggressive in
using the Exportation Doctrine to avoid state consumer credit
laws, it is likely that the OCC's expansive understanding of
what constitutes a bank's "location" for purposes of the Expor-
tation Doctrine will face judicial scrutiny. If, however, these
courts follow the precedents established by cases examining the
regulatory expansions of the definition of "interest," as dis-
cussed in the next section of this Article, it is unlikely that
these interpretations will be restrained in any way.
3. Expanding the Substantive Scope of § 85-Defining
"Interest"
The second dimension of the Exportation Doctrine that has
been the subject of a dramatic expansion is its substantive
scope-exactly what credit terms are "exportable" under this
Doctrine? The language of § 85 seems clear enough in that re-
gard; on its face, it gives banks the power to charge "interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State ... where the bank is
located."' 9' Based on this plain language, one would assume
that state laws imposing consumer protection features other
than interest rate restrictions, such as licensing requirements
for certain types of loans, limitations on penalties like late fees
or bad check fees, restrictions on the types of security that may
be taken for a loan, or unique disclosure requirements, should
not be preempted under the Exportation Doctrine.
This has not been the case, however. In 1966, the OCC
opened the door to a more expansive interpretation of "interest"
as used in § 85 by issuing a ruling clarifying that banks using
the Most Favored Lender Doctrine to charge rates permitted to
other lenders under state law were not subject to the licensing
190. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 6-140, 6-632, 6-635 with California's
more restrictive combination of usury statutes and opinions described in Ed-
ward H. Rabin & Robert W. Brownlie, Usury Law in California: A Guide
Through the Maze, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 397, 398-424 (1987).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (emphasis added).
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requirements of those laws. '92 For example, a national bank us-
ing the Most Favored Lender Doctrine to charge customers
rates available to licensed lenders in Minnesota would not be
required to obtain a license from the state of Minnesota or
submit to Minnesota's regulatory scheme for licensed lenders.
The OCC was differentiating between two different sources of
preemption of state law. The Most Favored Lender Doctrine
permits our hypothetical bank to use Minnesota's licensedJ . 193
lender law to preempt other state interest rate restrictions.
As a federally chartered depository institution, however, the
bank operates under a national bank charter.' Through the
operation of the Supremacy Clause, the federal regulatory
scheme governing national bank charters preempts Minne-
sota's licensing scheme.'95 Thus, the national bank can use the
specific preemptive power of § 85 to disregard state interest re-
strictions, and can use the more general preemptive power of
the Supremacy Clause to disregard Minnesota's licensing re-
quirements.
Navigating between these two sources of preemption au-
thority in its later codification of this ruling, the OCC used the
following language: "If State law permits a higher interest rate
on a specified class of loans, a national bank making such loans
at such higher rate is subject only to the provisions of State law
relating to such class of loans that are material to the determi-
nation of the interest rate."'96 Provisions of the law such as li-
censing requirements were not considered to be "material to the
determination of the interest rate"; thus, they did not apply to
national banks using the Most Favored Lender Doctrine.97
Provisions that were "material to the determination of the in-
terest rate," such as the numerical rate limitation and methods
of calculating interest, did apply to national banks using the
Most Favored Lender Doctrine. 98
192. Bornstein, supra note 116, at 1090. This ruling was later codified as
Interest Charges and Usury, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1977), amended by 61 Fed.
Reg. 4849, 4863 (Feb. 9, 1996).
193. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
196. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1972), amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 4849, 4863
(Feb. 9, 1996) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1972)
(state laws regarding compounding of interest); Northway Lanes v. Hackley
Union Nat'l Bank, 464 F.2d 855, 863-64 (6th Cir. 1972).
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In other words, the OCC interpreted the term "interest" in
§ 85 to mean more than simply the numerical interest rate ad-
dressed in a state usury statute. "Interest" was interpreted to
include any additional terms that were "material to the deter-
mination of the interest rate." With the subsequent proclama-
tion of the Exportation Doctrine, banks quickly grasped the po-
tential of this regulatory "gloss" on § 85's straightforward
language. They argued that credit terms such as closing costs,
compounding laws, annual and cash advance fees on credit
cards, bad check fees, and late fees were all "material to the de-
termination of the interest rate," and thus exportable as "inter-
est" under the Exportation Doctrine. Courts across the country
by and large accepted these arguments.'99
By the time this issue made its way up to the Supreme
Court, the question centered on where we look to define "inter-
est"--the laws of the state from which the bank is exporting the
rate, the laws of the state into which the rate is being exported,
or the regulations of the relevant regulator? With respect to na-
tional banks, in Smiley v. Citibank... the Supreme Court held
that the relevant definition is the one promulgated by their
primary federal regulator, the OCC.2°' In the course of the liti-
gation leading up to these decisions, the OCC had amended its
definition of "interest" to include a wide variety of fees and
charges, over and above the numerical interest rate.0 2
199. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 747 (1996) (late
fees); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 829-30 (1st Cir.
1992) (late fees); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548 F.2d 255, 258-59 (8th Cir.
1977) (cash advance fees); Watson v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 837 F. Supp.
146, 150 (D.S.C. 1993) (overlimit fees); Tikkanen v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 801
F. Supp. 270, 278-79 (D. Minn. 1992) (late payment and overlimit fees); Hill v.
Chem. Bank, 799 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D. Minn. 1992) (overlimit fees); Stoorman
v. Greenwood Trust Co., 908 P.2d 133, 135 (Colo. 1995) (late payment fees);
Copeland v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 907 P.2d 87, 93 (Colo. 1995) (late pay-
ment fees); Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Equitable Trust Co., 450 A.2d 1273, 1292
(Md. 1982) (N.S.F. fees). Some cases expanding the definition of exportable
"interest" predated the OCC's "material to the determination of the interest
rate" formulation. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi.
Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 325, 326-27 (1896) (commission fees); Panos v. Smith, 116
F.2d 445, 446 (6th Cir. 1940) (mortgage tax charges and recording fees); In re
Gerber's Estate, 9 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. 1939) (brokerage charges); First Nat'l
Bank v. Phares, 174 P. 519, 520 (Okla. 1918) (transaction fees).
200. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
201. See id. at 744.
202. The OCC's regulation defines interest to include:
any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an
extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default
or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was ex-
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The Supreme Court upheld the OCC's expansive interpre-
tation of "interest" as reasonable. °3 Moreover, the Court re-
jected the argument that the traditional deference shown to
agency interpretations such as this should be "trumped" by the
fact that § 85 preempts state law.0 4 Thus, in addition to being
able to choose among many possible locations for the exporta-
tion of favorable interest rates, national banks now have the
authority to ignore state laws in the states where their custom-
ers reside on a large number of credit terms in addition to the
basic usury limits.
More recently, the OCC has used the preemptive authority
of § 85 to bolster its argument that a state disclosure law was
preempted. In American Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer,2 5 a coalition
of federal depository institutions and their trade associations
challenged a California statute imposing on credit card issuers
disclosure requirements beyond those required under TILA.
The statute required specific warnings about the effect of mak-
ing only minimum payments on credit card accounts.0 6 The
OCC submitted an amicus curiae brief, arguing that the Cali-
fornia statute was preempted because, among other things, it
"would encroach directly upon the national bank power to de-
termine the terms and conditions of offers of credit."20 7 The OCC
pointed first to the two exemptions in this statute for issuers
charging no interest and issuers requiring minimum payments
of 10%.208 The OCC argued that the first exemption directly im-
plicated § 85, and the second implicated national banks' "power
tended. It includes, among other things, the following fees connected
with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late
fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash
advance fees, and membership fees. It does not ordinarily include ap-
praisal fees, premiums and commissions attributable to insurance
guaranteeing repayment of any extension of credit, finders' fees, fees
for document preparation or notarization, or fees incurred to obtain
credit reports.
12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (1996).
203. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739-44 (applying the standard of deference to
such interpretations articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
204. Id. at 743-44 (rejecting an argument based on the "'presumption
against... pre-emption' announced in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 518 (1992)"). The Court held that the OCC's interpretation dealt only
with the meaning of § 85, not with its preemptive effect. Id. at 744.
205. 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
206. Id. at 1002.




to determine the terms and conditions of offers of credit."2 °9 In
addition, the disclosure requirements themselves imposed a
significant burden on bank operations. 21' The court deferred to
the OCC's finding of such a burden, and accepted the plaintiffs
argument that the California statute "interferes with the fed-
eral power to lend money through its imposition of costly opera-
tional and administrative burdens on national banks' lending
activities."2 ' In doing so, the court held: "Consumer protection
is not reflected in the case law as an area in which states have
traditionally been permitted to regulate national banks. Ac-
cordingly... 'the presumption against preemption of state laws
is inapplicable. 212
The Lockyer court did not base its preemption decision
solely on § 85. The preemptive force of the entire scheme of
regulation provided for national banks' lending operations was
clearly persuasive to the court.213 The court did, however, ex-
plicitly defer to the OCC's analysis, which expressly included
the invocation of § 85.214 In doing so, the court did not object to
the OCC's determination that, because California's disclosure
law provided exemptions based on the interest rate charged,
the entire law was "material to the determination of the inter-
est rate," and thus preempted under the Exportation Doc-
215trine. If courts continue to accept this argument, there do not
appear to be any logical limits to the substantive scope of the
Doctrine.
This dimension of the expansion of the Exportation Doc-
trine is extremely significant for two reasons. First, it is crucial
to understanding the substantive scope of the preemptive effect
that the Exportation Doctrine has on state consumer credit
laws. The Doctrine does not just preempt all state laws estab-
lishing usury limits. It also preempts all state laws dealing
with everything the OCC declares to be "material to the deter-
mination of the interest rate." If the Lockyer ruling holds, there
appear to be almost no limits to the sorts of consumer credit
statutes that the OCC could hold to be related to interest rates.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1016.
212. Id. (quoting Bank of Am. v. City of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559
(2002)).
213. Id. at 1007-22.




Second, Smiley decisively rejects the argument that consumer
credit regulation is the primary province of states when the
lender is a national bank. This would appear to leave some
room for state regulation of consumer credit in situations where
the lender is not a national bank. However, the third dimension
of the expansion of the Exportation Doctrine further diminishes
even that vestige of state power, extending the orbit of the Doc-
trine's beneficiaries to many additional lenders.
4. Expanding the Orbit of the Beneficiaries of the Exportation
Doctrine to State Banks-Competitive Equality in Action
One of the most important forces in the dynamic of our na-
tion's distinctive dual banking system is the drive to maintain
"competitive equality" among the two banking systems. If a
regulatory innovation applicable to one type of depository insti-
tution provides a competitive advantage, that innovation is
typically made available to the other type of depository institu-
tion as well, leveling the playing field, and thus maintaining
the crucial "competitive equality" of the dual banking system.1 6
The extension of the Exportation Doctrine to state-chartered
banks is a vivid demonstration of this dynamic in play.
The Most Favored Lender Doctrine and Exportation Doc-
trine clearly gave national banks a competitive advantage over
state banks. In most states, the legislatures directly addressed
this imbalance by abolishing state usury laws disfavoring state
banks and sometimes enacting laws favoring banks in their
states over other types of lenders.21 ' However, these accommo-
dations proved inadequate during the inflationary period of the
late 1970s. Even the most liberal of the state usury laws proved
constrictive when prime rates reached levels of 20% in April
1980.218 Section 85 had been amended in 1933 to give national
banks the option of charging either the highest state rate
available as Most Favored Lenders, or a rate pegged to federal
discount rates.219 In a high interest rate environment, the fed-
216. "Competitive equality" has been characterized as "shorthand in the
courts for the complex state-federal balances created by federal banking stat-
utes." Duncan, supra note 9, at 222.
217. See Rougeau, supra note 54, at 10-11.
218. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 105-07.
219. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191. This amended § 85 to
provide national banks the option of charging interest of "1 per centum in ex-
cess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Fed-
eral reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located."
Id.
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eral discount rate option often exceeded even the most favor-. 220
able state rates. State banks did not have that option. In or-
der to maintain the competitive equality of the dual banking
system, Congress stepped in and enacted legislation giving fed-
erally insured state banks the same advantage.
Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980221 (DIDMCA) gave state-
chartered, federally insured banks the power to charge
interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of the dis-
count rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal
Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State
bank... is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, terri-
tory, or district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater.2
The legislative rationale in enacting section 521 of
DIDMCA is expressly included in the language of the statute,
which begins: "In order to prevent discrimination against State
chartered insured depository institutions .... 223 Section 521 is
equally forthright about its preemptive effect, permitting state-
chartered banks to charge its rates "notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the pur-
poses of this section."224
Section 521 was enacted for the specific purpose of ena-
bling state banks to peg interest rates to federal discount rates.
However, Congress accomplished this goal by appropriating all
220. See Ackerman, supra note 26, at 105-07.
221. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.). This Act attempted to address a number of legal
restrictions on bank operations that were perceived as hampering the ability
of banks to compete against the growing loss of bank deposits to mutual funds.
It included liberalization of depository interest rate ceilings, allowing deposi-
tory institutions to offer negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, and total
preemption of state usury ceilings on mortgage loans. See Timothy A. Canova,
The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competi-
tion to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1315 (1995); Ac-
kerman, supra note 26, at 106-07.
222. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
223. Id.; see also Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826
(1st Cir. 1992) (discussing legislative history of section 521).
224. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a). Although DIDMCA gave states the option of
.opting out" of this preemption, few did. Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act § 525; see 12 U.S.C. § 1743 note (since repealed,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 363 (1989)). Seven states-Colorado, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Maine, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin-and Puerto
Rico opted out of DIDMCA's preemption provisions. Jeffrey I. Langer & Jeffrey
B. Wood, A Comparison of the Most Favored Lender and Exportation Rights of
National Banks, FSLIC-Insured Savings Institutions, and FDIC-Insured State
Banks, 42 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 18 n.323 (1988).
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of § 85, not just the federal rate language. Pursuant to the
"general rule that when Congress borrows language from one
statute and incorporates it into a second statute, the language
of the two acts should be interpreted the same way,"2 section
521 has been interpreted to extend to state banks all of the
powers deriving from § 85 that were extended to national
banks, from Most Favored Lender status 226 to the Exportation
Doctrine.227
The FDIC, as primary federal regulator of state banks, has
invariably followed the OCC's lead in providing regulatory sup-
port for aggressive expansions of the Exportation Doctrine, and
both legislatures and courts have been largely cooperative. A
few years after Riegle-Neal was enacted, Congress enacted the
Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997,228 which clarifies the ap-
plicable law for state banks engaged in interstate branching.
This law generally provides that interstate branches of state
banks are subject to the laws of the state where they are lo-
cated to the same extent as interstate branches of nationalb 229
banks. It also adds the equivalent of the "usury savings
clause" for state banks.20 The FDIC relied on this clause in
adopting the OCC's interpretation of the ability of state banks
to export rates from either their home states or from states
where their branches are located.23'
Similarly, the FDIC has adopted the OCC's expansive defi-
nition of "interest."23 2 When the issue of the appropriate defini-
tion of "interest" under section 521 reached the Supreme Court,
the Court declined to review a First Circuit decision which held
that the relevant definition is the one found in the laws of the
225. Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827.
226. Id. at 827 n.8; FDIC Gen. Couns. Opinion No. FDIC-81-3, [1988-89
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,006 (Feb. 2, 1981).
227. Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827 n.8; FDIC Deputy Gen. Couns.
Opinion No. FDIC 93-27, [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) % 81,635 (July 12, 1993); Opinion No. FDIC-81-7, [1988-89 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,008 (Mar. 17, 1981).
228. Pub. L. 105-24, 111 Stat. 238 (1997).
229. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1) (2000).
230. Id. § 1831a(j)(3)(B) ("No provision of this subsection shall be construed
as affecting the applicability of... Federal law to State banks and State bank
branches in the home State or the host State.").
231. Interest Charges by Interstate Banks, FDIC Gen. Couns. Opinion No.
FDIC 11, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-016B (May 18, 1998).
232. Interest Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance




state from which the rate is being exported.233 Not surprisingly,
states which host significant credit card banks have enacted
extremely generous definitions of "interest."
234
Thus, the orbit of the beneficiaries of the Exportation Doc-
trine has been broadened by federal statute to include state-
chartered banks. This extension of the Exportation Doctrine to
state-chartered banks does not appear to be susceptible to legal
challenge. Congress provided for this extension pursuant to its
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate
commerce. 235 The extension of the Exportation Doctrine to state
banks has been implicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court.236
The FDIC's interpretation of the meaning of the language of
section 521 is presumably subject to the same amount of defer-
ence as the OCC's interpretations of the meaning of the lan-
guage of § 85. 2
Moreover, as a matter of banking policy, the extension of
the Exportation Doctrine to state banks is justified. Although
the statutory provision from which the Doctrine was derived,
§ 85, was enacted for the purpose of fostering national banks as
alternatives to state banks,238 the Exportation Doctrine itself
clearly serves a different purpose-that of fostering the devel-
opment of an interstate banking system.239 Under the principle
of competitive equality, a privilege that fosters the development
of interstate banking for national banks ought to be made
available to state banks as well. The next stage in the expan-
sion of the orbit of the Exportation Doctrine's beneficiaries is
233. Massachusetts v. Greenwood Trust Co., 506 U.S. 1052 (1993), denying
cert. to 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992).
234. Delaware's definition of interest for credit card loans includes, in addi-
tion to periodic charges based on the amount of credit outstanding, transaction
charges; minimum periodic charges; administrative fees such as commitment,
application, and processing fees; official fees and taxes; costs incurred for ex-
aminations of title, inspection, appraisal, recording, mortgage satisfaction, and
filing fees; returned payment charges; documentary evidence charges; stop
payment fees; overlimit charges; ATM charges; and prepayment charges. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 945(a) (2001). South Dakota defines interest for credit card
loans to include membership fees, transaction fees, overlimit fees, stop pay-
ment fees, NSF fees, and "[o]ther charges made in connection with the . .. ac-
count arrangement." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-12-13 (Michie 1990).
235. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
236. See Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 818.
237. See supra Part II.B.3. At the same time, the FDIC's adoption of the
OCC's interpretation of "location" is presumably subject to the same challenge.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
238. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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not, however, so readily justified by any established principle of
banking policy.
5. Expanding the Orbit of Beneficiaries of the Exportation
Doctrine to Nonbank Corporate Entities
a. Banking Regulation 102-Why Depository Institutions Are
Special, Part Two
The unique charter bestowed on depository institutions as
a consequence of their role as financial intermediaries carries
with it a heavy regulatory burden.24 ° This burden includes the
body of activity and ownership restrictions aimed at insulating
the financial intermediary from the general stream of com-
merce in which it functions. This separation of "banking" from
"commerce" is grounded in the desire to preserve the stability
and impartiality of the nation's financial system, which is de-
pendent on the intermediation performed by depository institu-
tions.24 ' Although the exact nature and extent of these restric-
tions have varied at times, currently a bank is not free to
engage in general commercial activity, and, conversely, a com-
mercial enterprise is not free to engage in the business of bank-
ing.
These restrictions take on two forms-activities restric-
tions and affiliation restrictions. The activities restrictions de-
rive from the fact that "a bank is a creature of its enabling
statute, so that 'powers not conferred.., are denied.'" '42 The
enabling statute for national banks gives them the generic
powers required to function as a legal entity-such as the
power to make contracts, engage in litigation, appoint officers
240. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
241. WILLIAM JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG.,
REPORT No. 93-769E, MIXING BANKING AND COMMERCE USING FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: INDUSTRIAL BANKS AND NONBANK BANKS 1-2 (1993)
(discussing the development of nonbank banks as a result of loopholes in fed-
eral legislation); Constance Z. Wagner, Structuring the Financial Service Con-
glomerates of the Future: Does the Choice of Corporate Form to House New Fi-
nancial Activities of National Banks Matter?, in 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 329,
341-44 (2000) (discussing the public policy rationales in favor of banking regu-
lation); see also MACEY ET AL., supra note 96, at 460-72 (summarizing argu-
ments for and against maintaining separation of banking and commerce).
242. MALLOY, supra note 93, § 5.22, at 197 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934), amended sub nom. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank of El Paso, Texas, 291 U.S. 649 (1934)).
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and directors, and prescribe bylaws.243 In addition to these ge-
neric powers, banks are only empowered to exercise "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business
of banking."244 The powers of state-chartered banks are simi-
larly limited.245 Conversely, state statutes typically prohibit en-
tities without either a state or federal bank charter from engag-
ing in the business of banking.246 As one commentator
explained:
The premise underlying these provisions is that an entity should not
be allowed to engage in the business of banking unless the entity
complies with the regulatory safeguards designed to restrain the risks
associated with depository institutions and also presumably complies
with the social obligations and political constraints imposed on the
banking industry.247
In other words, banks can only engage in "the business of
banking" and only banks can engage in "the business of bank-
ing." Although the exact scope of what constitutes the "business
of banking" is not always clear,248 it is clear that banks are not
permitted to engage in general commercial activities such as
making cars or selling clothes, and commercial entities such as
car manufacturers and retailers are not permitted to engage in
general banking business.
In addition to the activities restrictions imposed by the
federal and state laws described above, the separation of bank-
ing from commerce is accomplished through a number of re-
strictions on corporate affiliations between banks and general
commercial enterprises. These restrictions address situations
in which both entities are part of the same corporate structure,
243. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (First)-(Sixth) (2000).
244. Id. § 24 (Seventh) (emphasis added). For a comprehensive list of the
activities currently permissible for national banks, see OCC, 2002 Activities
Permissible for a National Bank (Apr. 2003), http'J/www.occ.treas.gov/
corpapps/bankact.pdf.
245. State enabling statutes typically contain the same type of language as
the federal banking statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96 (McKinney
2001); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 32.001 (Vernon 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 221.0301 (West 2001). In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act im-
poses similar restrictions on the activities of all FDIC-insured state-chartered
banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (2000).
246. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 3390 (West 1999); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 131 (McKinney 2001); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 31.004(a) (Vernon 1998).
247. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services
Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 368 (1999).
248. Id. at 368-69 & n.126; Thomas Vartanian & Robert H. Ledig, The
Business of Banking in the Age of the Internet: Fortress or Prison?, BANKING
POL'Y REP., Mar. 4-18, 1996, WL 15 No. 5 BNKPR 6.
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or controlled by the same individuals. Beginning with the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,249 Congress enacted progressively
tighter restrictions on corporate affiliations between banks and
commercial enterprises. Glass-Steagall prohibited corporate af-
filiations between banks and securities companies. 250 The Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956251 (BHCA) prohibited corporate
affiliations between banks and entities engaged in any activi-
ties other than banking or activities "so closely related to bank-
ing as to be a proper incident thereto."252 With the enactment of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,153 banks meeting certain
financial and regulatory criteria can affiliate with a broader
category of entities engaged in activities other than banking,
but such activities must still be "financial in nature" or "inci-
dental" or "complementary to" a financial activity.54 Again,
while the exact parameters of "financial in nature" have yet to
be fleshed out, we are left with a legal structure in which for-
mal corporate affiliations between banks and nonfinancial
commercial enterprises, such as car manufacturers and cloth-
ing retailers, are generally prohibited.255
While such affiliations are generally prohibited, there are
some exceptions. A couple of these exceptions are significant for
purposes of our analysis because they enable commercial enti-
ties with no interest in becoming full-fledged banks to obtain
one particular benefit of a bank charter-the exportation
power-in order to offer uniform nationwide lending programs
without having to observe nonuniform state consumer credit
laws. 256 Through these mechanisms, the orbit of beneficiaries of
249. 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (repealed 1999).
250. Id.
251. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850 (2000)).
252. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2), (c)(8). For a basic description of bank holding
company regulation, see MACEY ET AL., supra note 96, at 430-43.
253. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sec-
tions of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
254. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (1). For a basic description of the liberalization
leading to and resulting from the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
see MACEY ET AL., supra note 96, at 443-49; Wagner, supra note 241, at 330-
34.
255. State and federal thrifts are subject to an essentially equivalent regu-
latory scheme, effectuated through an essentially equivalent statutory frame-
work for thrift holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1), (c)(2)(F)(i) (2000).
For a general discussion of the regulations applicable to thrift holding compa-
nies, see MALLOY, supra note 93, §§ 6.6-6.9, at 244-50.
256. Alvin C. Harrell, Consumer Credit in Review, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
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the Exportation Doctrine is expanded to include commercial en-
tities. The two primary mechanisms through which commercial
enterprises can acquire exportation powers are, first, the re-
maining "nonbank bank" loopholes in the BHCA, and, second,
contractual arrangements falling short of formal corporate af-
filiations, in which commercial entities essentially "rent" a
bank's charter.
b. Nonbank Banks
The BHCA effectuates its prohibition of corporate affilia-
tions between banks and commercial enterprises by subjecting
the corporate parents of banks to regulation as "bank holding
companies."257 If a corporation is a bank holding company, it is
prohibited from engaging in any activities other than those
"closely related to banking" or "financial in nature," or having
any corporate or ownership affiliation with any other entity en-
gaged in such activities.258
Historically, there have been many exceptions to this gen-
eral prohibition, deriving from the BHCA's definition of "bank."
Originally, a holding company owning only one bank was not
considered a bank holding company. When the BHCA was
amended in 1970 to extend its reach to include single-bank
holding companies, the definition of "bank" was amended to
read "any institution ... which (1) accepts deposits that the de-
positor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and (2) en-
REP. 62, 70 (1997). Conversely, it is sometimes to the advantage of banks to
conduct some of their lending activities through non-bank consumer finance
corporation affiliates. Joseph P. Savage, Have Nonbank Banks Become a Non-
issue Issue?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 380-81 (1987). The BHCA permits affilia-
tions with consumer finance corporations, since consumer lending is clearly
"closely related to banking." Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control (Regulation Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(a), (b)(1) (2003). Indeed, consumer
finance is one of the most common activities performed by nonbank affiliates
of banks. For general discussions of the factors motivating banks to operate
consumer lending through nonbank subsidiaries, see Cynthia Glassman,
Banking Organization: The Debate Surrounding Bank Operating Subsidiaries,
BANKING POLY REP., May 3, 1999, at 1; Michael Hudson, The Poverty Indus-
try, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY 1, 7-8 (Michael Hudson ed., 1996); Eric Rorer,
Shark Bait: How Some Consumer Finance Companies Make a Killing Off Peo-
ple Who Badly Need Money, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY, supra, at 30, 35-36;
Carey Gillam, Barnett's Path to Interstate Is Consumer Lending, AM. BANKER,
June 4, 1997, at 4.
257. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 96, at 430-49 (discussing
regulations applicable to bank holding companies).
258. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (1).
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gages in the business of making commercial loans."259 This defi-
nition became known as the "nonbank bank loophole": Any en-
tity chartered as a bank that did not engage in both of those ac-
tivities could function as a bank for most practical purposes,
yet not be considered a bank for purposes of the BHCA. Thus,
the BHCA would not prohibit a commercial entity from owning
or having a corporate affiliation with such a "nonbank bank."
The most popular use of the nonbank bank loophole was by
commercial enterprises desiring to offer consumer banking ser-
vices, particularly consumer lending.6 °
When Congress addressed this loophole by enacting the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987261 (CEBA), it failed
to close the loophole completely. First, CEBA grandfathered ex-
isting nonbank banks, provided they complied with certain re-
strictions on growth and activities, 62 thus permitting commer-
cial enterprises such as Chrysler Corporation, General Electric
Company, and Sears, Roebuck & Company to retain their af-
filiated banks.6 3 Second, at the same time that Congress
amended the BHCA's bank definition, it enacted a lengthy list
of exceptions to the definition. 264 This list consists of particular
banklike institutions that Congress determined should not sub-
ject their parents to regulation as bank holding companies,
even though they would otherwise fall within the BHCA's bank
definition. Thus, commercial enterprises may own these types
of banklike institutions. Included on this list are "credit card
banks," banks which limit their operations to issuing credit
cards,265 and "industrial loan companies," a unique type of gen-
259. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607,
§ 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1762 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)
(2000)); see Carl Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41
Bus. LAw. 99, 108-14 (1985) (explaining the evolution of the BHCA's defini-
tion of "bank").
260. Felsenfeld, supra note 259, at 112; Carl D. Lobell, Nonbank Banks:
Controversy over a New Form of Consumer Bank, 39 BUS. LAW. 1193, 1195-96
(1984).
261. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987). CEBA changed the BHCA's
definition of "bank" to include any FDIC-insured bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c)(1)(A).
262. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f) (2000).
263. At Last: The Definitive Nonbank Bank List, BANKING EXPANSION
REP., June 20, 1988, at 7 (including a comprehensive list of nonbank banks as
released by the Federal Reserve Board).
264. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2).
265. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(F). The BHCA credit card bank exception applies to:
An institution, including an institution that accepts collateral for ex-
2004]
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eral-purpose state-chartered financial institution available only
in a few states.266
Commercial enterprises (including companies such as Gen-
eral Electric, Merrill Lynch & Company, Whirlpool Corpora-
tion, and Nordstrom) have been aggressive in taking advantage
of both of these loopholes to engage in consumer lending. 7
tensions of credit by holding deposits under $100,000, and by other
means which-
(i) engages only in credit card operations;
(ii) does not accept demand deposits or deposits that the depositor
may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third par-
ties or others;
(iii) does not accept any savings or time deposit of less than
$100,000;
(iv) maintains only one office that accepts deposits; and
(v) does not engage in the business of making commercial loans.
Id.
266. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H). The industrial loan company (ILC) exception ap-
plies to:
An industrial loan company, industrial bank, or other similar institu-
tion which is-
(i) an institution organized under the laws of a State which, on
March 5, 1987, had in effect.., a statute which required... such
institution to obtain [federal deposit insurance]-
(I) which does not accept demand deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third par-
ties; [or]
(II) which has total assets of less than $100,000,000 ....
Id. Only ILCs chartered in Colorado, Nevada, and Utah qualify for this excep-
tion. Yan M. Ross & George Sutton, Utah Industrial Loan Corporations: A
Fresh Look Backward and Forward, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 7, 8 (1994);
Laura Mandaro, Toyota Sizes Up Nevada for Thrift Charter, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 18, 2002, at 1. Until quite recently, California ILCs were also possible
targets, Ross & Sutton, supra, at 8, but the California legislature amended its
laws to prevent Wal-Mart from acquiring a California ILC, Nicole Duran, Nix-
ing Wal-Mart's Bid to Buy Bank, Davis Cites GLB, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 2002,
at 4.
267. The ink had barely had time to dry on CEBA before articles authored
by lawyers specializing in consumer financial services began touting the Ex-
portation Doctrine as a reason to consider acquiring banks under the CEBA
exemptions. See, e.g., Harvey N. Bock, Opportunities for Nonbanking Compa-
nies to Acquire Depository Institutions in the Wake of the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, 44 Bus. LAw. 1053, 1055 (1989); Yan M. Ross & Kenneth
J. Sheppard, Utah Industrial Loan Corporations: Non-Banks of the Future?, 43
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 236, 239 (1989). Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Dis-
cover & Company owns a grandfathered nonbank bank, a credit card bank,
and an industrial loan company. Antoinette Coulton, Nonbanks Set the Pace in
Credit Card Loan Growth, AM. BANKER, Sept. 23, 1997, at 9. General Electric
owns two credit card banks. Id. Merrill Lynch & Company owns a Utah indus-
trial loan company. Id. Whirlpool Corporation owns a credit card bank. Id. Re-
tailers such as Nordstrom, Sears, Roebuck & Company, Target Corporation
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Thus, through the operation of the nonbank bank exception to
the bank holding company, the orbit of the beneficiaries of the
Exportation Doctrine has been expanded to include many com-
mercial enterprises.
c. Charter Renting or Attribute Franchising
Another way a commercial enterprise can obtain exporta-
tion powers is by entering into a contractual arrangement with
a bank pursuant to which the bank extends credit to the cus-
tomers of the commercial enterprise. Some consumer activists
characterize these arrangements as "charter renting";268 the
OCC sometimes prefers to characterize them as "franchising
the bank's attributes."269 Regardless of the characterization,
these arrangements all involve a relationship between a bank
and some other entity that does not wish to extend credit itself.
For a variety of reasons, this other entity wants to make credit
available to its customers, but does not itself want to be the en-
tity extending the credit. For example, it may be that the com-
mercial entity is not interested in acquiring the expertise and
infrastructure necessary to administer consumer credit. Or it
may be that the commercial entity wants to take advantage of
some unique feature of a bank charter, such as particular fund-
ing sources, access to existing credit card systems such as Visa
and MasterCard, or exportation powers. If the commercial en-
tity is not interested in establishing its own nonbank bank to
(which owns Target, Marshall Field's, and Mervyn's), and Federated Depart-
ment Stores (which owns Macy's, Bloomingdale's, Burdine's, and Stem's) all
own credit card banks. Id. While many of these retailers started off using their
bank subsidiaries solely to issue private-label cards (cards that could only be
used in their stores), many are now successfully issuing general-purpose bank
credit cards. Jennifer Kingson Bloom, The Old Store Card Is Making a Come-
back, AM. BANKER, Sept. 4, 1998, at 6; W.A. Lee, Sears Is Back as a Player in
Cards, AM. BANKER, Feb. 15, 2001, at 1. Some of these retailers are developing
into some of the largest general purpose credit card issuers in the country.
Sears, Roebuck & Company is among the top twenty-five general purpose
credit card issuers; Nordstrom is in the top fifty. Lee, supra; see Coulton,
supra.
268. See Payday Lending Report, supra note 9, at 14, 15-23.
269. OCC Bulletin No. 2001-47, supra note 182, 35-522. This characteri-
zation is fleshed out in greater detail in an article written by senior officials of
the OCC. See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The Impact of
Technology on Banking: The Effect and Implications of "Deconstruction" of
Banking Functions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 135, 160-65 (2001). The OCC, how-
ever, sometimes uses the term "charter renting" as well, in circumstances in-
volving subprime lending. See infra note 356; see also infra note 343 (illustrat-
ing the FDIC's use of the term).
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conduct its credit operations, it can enter into a contract (or,
more likely, a complex series of contracts) with a bank,
whereby the bank issues the credit on behalf of the commercial
entity.
While variations of these arrangements have existed for
decades,270 three recent versions are significant for purposes of
this Article-cobranded credit cards, refund anticipation loans,
and payday loans. In order to fully appreciate the extent to
which the Exportation Doctrine has in fact emasculated state
consumer credit laws, it is crucial to understand the full extent
to which it is being used by nonbanks as well as by banks.
Moreover, these arrangements all involve, or have the potential
for involving, subprime credit products or products typically as-
sociated with predatory lending. The use of the Exportation
Doctrine by such lenders dramatically highlights the conse-
quences of its expansion.
i. Cobranded Credit Cards
In the early 1990s, a group of highly visible commercial en-
terprises launched "cobranded credit card programs." The
credit cards issued under these programs were prominently
identified with the commercial enterprise launching the pro-
gram; most of these cards offered rebates on products sold by
the commercial enterprise, such as AT&T's 10% discount on
long distance calls,271 Ford Motor Company's rebate on Ford
cars based on charge volume,272 or 10% discounts on World
Championship Wrestling merchandise.273 However, each of
these credit cards was issued by an existing conventional bank
that had no corporate affiliation with the commercial enter-
prise-Universal Bank issued AT&T's card,274 Citibank issued
270. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 23 (1997) (de-
scribing a 1940 arrangement entered into by Sears, Roebuck & Company and
National City Bank of New York-later Citibank).
271. Yvette Kantrow, AT&T Wrinkle Rankles Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 17,
1990, at 14.
272. Stephen Kleege, Citicorp-Ford Card Called Reaction to GM, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 1, 1993, at 2.
273. Jennifer Kingson Bloom, Capital One Kicks Off Customizable Wres-
tling Card, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1998, at 19.
274. Kantrow, supra note 271. In 1997, AT&T sold its entire credit card
operations to Citibank, which now issues AT&T's Universal credit card. Lisa
Fickenscher, Citi Touts Deal for AT&T Unit as "Partnership," AM. BANKER,
Dec. 19, 1997, at 1.
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Ford's card,2 ' and Capital One issued the World Championship
Wrestling card.276 Cobranded credit card relationships continue
to be established by major commercial entities, including most
major airlines, 7 Mercedes-Benz, 78 Walt Disney, 79 Kmart,28 °
Wal-Mart,81 and Amazon.com. 82
The degree of control that the commercial enterprise in a
cobranding relationship retains over the credit extended under
this arrangement can vary considerably, ranging from delegat-
ing virtually the entire responsibility for the program to the
bank issuing the credit, to retaining control over virtually every
aspect of the program, including repurchasing the receivables
generated through use of the credit cards .2 " Logically, commer-
275. Kleege, supra note 272.
276. Bloom, supra note 273.
277. David Breitkopf, Airline Cobrand Cards Reach for New Heights, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 12, 2000, at 1.
278. Antoinette Coulton, Capital One: Benz Cobranding Effort Burgeons,
AM. BANKER, June 22, 1998, at 17.
279. Jennifer A. Kingson, Visa, Bank One Say Disney Not Your Average
Cobrand, AM. BANKER, June 5, 2002, at 1.
280. Lavonne Kuykendall & W.A. Lee, Capital One Backing Away from
Teasers It Invented, AM. BANKER, June 14, 2001, at 1.
281. Jennifer Kingson Bloom, Wal-Mart on Retail Road Less Traveled: Co-
branding, AM. BANKER, Sept. 11, 1998, at 8.
282. Amazon.com initially partnered with NextBank, NextCard to Cobrand
with Amazon.com, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1999, at 29, a now defunct Internet-
only bank, see supra note 178 and accompanying text. Amazon.com later es-
tablished a cobranding arrangement with Citibank for a "virtual cardless
credit card," and with Bank One for a more traditional Visa card. Amazon
Teams Up with Bank One, BANK MARKETING INT'L, Nov. 19, 2002, 2002 WL
10962762.
283. See Frank Martien, How New Issuers Can Get a Piece of the Action,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 15, 2000, at 15. Martien suggests two strategies for entities
interested in entering the credit card business: First, entrants can rent a Visa
or MasterCard authorization code from a bank. Id. "Under this arrangement,
issuance is technically performed by another bank, but branding, program
management, funding, processing, and servicing is conducted by the entrant."
Id. Alternatively, entrants can "[e]stablish[] an affinity arrangement, in which
the company offers its customers branded credit card accounts that are sup-
plied by an existing credit card issuer." Id.; see also Yvette D. Kantrow,
MasterCard's GM Card Gambit Rekindles Dispute with Visa, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 16, 1992, at 1 (comparing GM's arrangement with Household: "House-
hold will own all of the receivables, make all credit decisions, and carry all of
the credit risk," with AT&T's arrangement with Universal Bank: "AT&T owns
the bulk of its receivables"). Household is a federal thrift rather than a na-
tional bank, but these arrangements raise the same issues for federal thrifts
as they do for banks. See infra notes 394-413 and accompanying text. While
most cobranding arrangements were traditionally offered to retailers on a fee
basis, First National Bank of Omaha recently announced what it called a
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cial enterprises that choose to enter into cobranding relation-
ships are probably not terribly interested in maintaining con-
trol over their credit operations. If they wished to maintain
control over their own credit operations, they could easily have
chartered their own credit card banks. Similarly, the opportu-
nity to piggyback on the exportation powers of the chartered
bank issuing the credit would likely be of negligible interest,
since they could easily acquire such powers themselves by char-
tering a credit card bank. Their motivation for entering into
such a relationship is more likely to be to offer credit to their
customers without having to acquire the expertise or infra-
structure necessary to manage credit.284
ii. Refund Anticipation Loans
The next significant credit product offered by commercial
entities under contractual arrangements with banks is the re-
fund anticipation loan (RAL). RALs are short-term loans ex-
tended to consumers "in anticipation" of their tax refunds.285
They are marketed by commercial tax preparers as quick re-
funds, enabling taxpayers using the tax preparers to file elec-
tronically and obtain their refunds within a day or two. In ac-
tuality, RALs are loans extended by banks, through a
contractual arrangement with the tax preparer. They typically
are structured as follows:
"'unique revenue-sharing cobranding modefl'" in which it will share profits
with its partners. W.A. Lee, First National Cobrand Plan: "Split" Profits, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 27, 2002, at 7 (quoting Scott Wagner, a vice president at First
National).
284. When interviewed about this issue, the head of Wal-Mart's card opera-
tions said, "'We do not want to be managing receivables ourselves .... [We're
merchants and we want to sell goods.... That's why we picked a good partner
in providing a financial service for the customer.'" Bloom, supra note 281
(quoting Steve Hunter of Wal-Mart). Subsequent unsuccessful efforts by Wal-
Mart to acquire a full-service nonbank subsidiary seem to evidence an evolu-
tion in Wal-Mart's opinion on this issue. See supra note 266 and accompanying
text; see also W.A. Lee, Citi Challenging Leaders in Private-Label Cards, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 1, 2002, at 8 (citing Matthew Fassnacht, a securities analyst
who focuses on credit card processing companies: "[M] any retailers do not have
the financial skill to make their card programs profitable.... Outside finan-
cial institutions.., have technology, risk analysis, marketing, and collections
systems in place that most retailers could not afford. . . ."). For an interesting
discussion of the motives of banks entering into such arrangements, see Val-
erie Block, Cobranding a Threat or a Savior? Take Your Pick, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 5, 1995, at 16.
285. Two comprehensive sources of general information about RALs are
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 612-14, 634, and RAL Report, supra note 9,
at 6.
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When the loan is made, the bank prepares to collect on the loan by
opening a temporary bank account for the borrower to receive elec-
tronic deposit of the refund. The documents signed by the borrower
instruct the IRS to direct deposit the refund into that account. The
contract usually contains a right of setoff, so the lender is repaid
when the refund appears in the bank's account. The consumer is li-
able for the full amount of the loan if the refund is disallowed in
whole or in part. The refund amount would be affected if, for example,
[the] IRS disallows a deduction or if there is an intercept of the refund
for child support or a student loan debt.2
Consumers usually pay three fees in connection with
RALs-a tax preparation fee to the tax preparer, an electronic
filing fee to the tax preparer, and a loan fee to the bank making
the loan, a portion of which is typically paid by the bank to the
tax preparer.287 The loan fees, typically ranging from $29 to
$89,288 are based on the size of the refund, translating into ef-
fective annual percentage rates ranging from 67% to 608%.289
Obviously, such interest rates would typically exceed the legal
rate of interest under state law for a tax preparer.2 90 Thus, the
loans are extended by banks chartered in states with no restric-
tions on interest charges, such as Delaware.29 1 Until quite re-
cently, RALs were offered by the two largest tax preparers,
H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt, among others. 92
286. RAL Report, supra note 9, at 6.
287. Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1045 (Md. 1999); Basile v.
H&R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Pa. 2000); RAL Report, supra note 9, at
5. IRS regulations require the tax preparer to charge the lender a flat fee,
rather than a fee based on the amount of the RAL. RAL Report, supra note 9,
at 18. However, nothing prohibits the bank from charging the customer a fee
based on the amount of the RAL.
288. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 613 & n.135; RAL Report, supra
note 9, at 5.
289. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 613-14 & n.136.
290. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
291. Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1994);
Christiansen v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 972 F. Supp. 681, 684 (S.D. Ga. 1997);
Basile, 761 A.2d at 1117.
292. H&R Block originally offered its RALs in an arrangement with Bene-
ficial National Bank, which was acquired by Household International in 1998.
Thereafter, some of the RAL loans were issued by Beneficial, while others
were issued by a thrift subsidiary of Household, Household Bank FSB. RAL
Report, supra note 9, at 13 n.61. More recently, H&R Block reduced its direct
involvement in these loans, while continuing an arrangement with Household
permitting H&R Block customers to get RALs through Block's offices. Gene
Meyer, H&R Block Cuts Direct Involvement in Tax Loan Program, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Jan. 9, 2003, 2003 WL 4554446. To complicate matters further,
Household entered into a contractual arrangement with a state-chartered in-
dustrial loan company in the process of converting into a nationally chartered
commercial bank, Imperial Bank, to originate RALs that Household will pur-
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As with the cobranding arrangements, the motivations of
the parties entering into these arrangements, and the degree of
control each party retains over the lending involved, vary
widely. We can assume that the profit to be made from the
various fees charged is a prime motivation for both the tax pre-
parers and the banks. The tax preparers have additional mo-
tives, however, since they do not have the legal power to im-
plement two aspects of a RAL program on their own. First,
RALs require the taxpayer to have a bank account into which
the IRS can directly deposit the refund. 93 Offering bank depos-
its is one of the most straightforward hallmarks of the "busi-
ness of banking," and is illegal under most state laws by enti-
ties other than chartered depository institutions.294 Second, a
bank, of course, has the power under the Exportation Doctrine
to construct a nationwide program with standardized terms
and high effective interest rates, by "exporting" the law of a ju-
risdiction with no restrictions on RALs, regardless of any more
restrictive consumer protection statutes in the jurisdictions
where the taxpayers reside. 295 Both the lack of interest rate lim-
its and the lack of a need to continually monitor and comply
with consumer protection statutes in fifty states clearly have a
major impact on the economics of a national program.
Details about the specific arrangements between the tax
preparers and the banks extending the credit have not been as
widely covered in the general press as details about the co-
branding agreements. The opinions issued in connection with
lawsuits challenging these arrangements suggest that the par-
ticipants are sensitive to issues of control over the credit deci-
chase. Ben Jackson & Alan Kline, Refund Lending? No Problem, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 27, 2002, at 1. Household reportedly said, "[P]artnering with a national
bank like Imperial ... would enable it to avoid rate restrictions outside of Illi-
nois, its home state." Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Massachusetts Hits Rapid Re-
fund, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 2003, at 1. The second-largest tax preparer, Jack-
son Hewitt, offers RALs through an arrangement with Santa Barbara Bank &
Trust. RAL Report, supra note 9, at 14. Other banks offering significant RAL
programs through a variety of tax preparers include Bank One (Illinois), Re-
public Bank & Trust (Kentucky), Republic First Bancorp, and River City
Bank. Id.
293. RAL Report, supra note 9, at 6.
294. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Even credit card banks are
prohibited from offering the types of deposits required for RALs; they are only
authorized to offer deposits of $100,000 or more. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)(iii)
(2000).
295. Cades, 43 F.3d at 873-74; RAL Report, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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sions and the tax preparers' operations.296 They are not appar-
ently as concerned, however, about control over the resulting
receivables; for example, H&R Block purchased about one-half
of the RALs it generated.297
iii. Payday Loans
The third significant type of credit offered by commercial
entities under contractual arrangements with banks is the
payday loan.29 8 Payday loans are short-term cash advances,
typically made on the security of postdated personal checks is-
sued by the borrower to the lender. The lender agrees not to
deposit this check until some date in the near future, typically
two weeks from the date of the advance (in other words, on the
next "payday," when sufficient salary will presumably be depos-
ited in the borrower's account to repay the loan).299 Fees
charged for such loans, which are deducted by the lender from
the cash advanced, typically translate into effective APRs aver-
aging 470%.3 00 Although structured as short-term advances, the
loans are often renewed when the borrower cannot repay on the
due date and are often the subject of abusive collection prac-
tices.30 1
Although the payday loan industry emerged only in the
early 1990s, it quickly expanded into a multi-billion-dollar in-
296. See Cades, 43 F.3d at 872; Basile, 761 A.2d at 1121 (in declining to
find that H&R Block acted as "agent" for taxpayers obtaining RALs, the court
characterized Block's role as "[s] imply introducing appellees to a lender willing
to provide a loan").
297. See Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1044 (Md. 1999); RAL
Report, supra note 9, at 12. At one point, another bank, Mellon Bank, actually
funded the RAL program underwritten by Beneficial Bank. Daniel Dunaief,
Mellon Leads $1.25B Loan to Underpin H&R Block's Tax-Refund Loan Pro-
gram, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7, 1996, at 20.
298. Recent descriptions of the payday lending industry include Daniel A.
Edelman, Payday Loans: Big Interest Rates and Little Regulation, 11 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 174, 174-75 (1999); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans:
Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23-97 (2002);
Lisa B. Moss, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions
and the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1731-33 (2000); Payday
Lending Report, supra note 9.
299. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 599-605; Schaaf, supra note 8, at
341-43.
300. Payday Lending Report, supra note 9, at 13. Another article published
around the same time reports that the most typical rates range from 200% to
300%. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 599.
301. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 605-12; Payday Lending Report,
supra note 9, at 8-10, 15.
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dustry. °2 The industry leaders are commercial entities special-
izing in this business, check-cashing outlets, and pawn shops.3
They are organized as national or regional chains, offering
loans in their offices, online, and through the telephone.0 4 The
explosive growth of this industry has attracted the intense
scrutiny of consumer activists and state legislatures, and has
resulted in state legislation attempting to stem more blatantly
abusive features of such loans.0 5
In response to these state efforts, a number of payday
lenders teamed up with depository institutions.36 As with the
cobranded credit cards and the RALs, these payday lenders en-
tered into contractual arrangements whereby the bank actually
extends the credit to the borrowers. In contrast to the other two
types of credit products, however, the motives of the payday
lenders entering into these arrangements were simple. They
did not need the credit-granting expertise of the banks, since
they were already fully engaged in the business of making
these loans. Indeed, they almost certainly had more expertise
in this particular credit product than any of their bank part-
ners. Nor did they need the unique bank power to accept depos-
its; anyone can cash a check that is made out to her. The pri-
mary motivation of the payday lenders in entering into these
arrangements was to obtain the benefit of § 85's exportation
powers.0 7 This can be evidenced by the reported structures of
302. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 4, at 604-05; Payday Lending Report,
supra note 9, at 6.
303. Payday Lending Report, supra note 9, at 6.
304. Id.
305. Id. at app. A (summarizing state legislation regulating payday lend-
ing).
306. Some of the more prominent partnerships were between ACE Cash
Express and Goleta National Bank, Cash America pawn shops and First Na-
tional Bank in Brookings, South Dakota, and the multiple partnerships of
state-chartered County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, with payday lend-
ers such as Check 'n Go, EZPAWN, and various Internet-based payday loan
providers. Id. at 20-22.
307. One industry analyst described the advantages to payday lenders of
partnering with a national bank to include that the partnership "provides a
standardized product, permits companies to enter states that have not enacted
safe-harbor legislation, [and] protects storefront owners from changes in local
or state legislation." Id. at 16 (citing Jerry L. Robinson, Payday Advance-The
Final Innings: Standardizing the Approach 7-8 (Sept. 22, 2000), http:l
www.stephens.com). Another related motive would be the freedom from state
licensing schemes and general regulation afforded through the operation of
the Supremacy Clause by the preemptive effect of the national bank charter-
ing scheme. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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some of these programs, in which little of the control over the
lending was surrendered to the bank partner. For example, un-
der the arrangement between Goleta National Bank and ACE
Cash Express, ACE purchased a 90% participation in each loan
made by the bank, bore 90% of the loss on any loan that de-
faulted, received the loan payments, paid collection costs, andS301
kept the loan records.
Clearly, the Exportation Doctrine has been dramatically
expanded by the extension of the scope of its beneficiaries to
nonbank commercial entities. However, federal banking regula-
tors have not been as unequivocal in their support for this di-
mension of the expansion of the Exportation Doctrine as they
were with respect to the expansion of the definitions of "loca-
tion" and "interest." At least with respect to nonbanks engaged
in subprime lending, regulators have suggested that there are
some limits to the use of the Doctrine by nonbanks.
d. Regulatory Reaction to the Extension of the Exportation
Doctrine's Orbit of Beneficiaries to Subprime Lenders
The position that federal bank regulators have taken with
respect to the expansion of the orbit of the beneficiaries of the
Exportation Doctrine to commercial entities is more nuanced
than their whole-hearted support of the other two dimensions
of expansion. Regulators have been steadfast in their support of
the legal authority of commercial entities interested in exploit-
ing these opportunities to do so-either by chartering nonbank
banks or by partnering with banks. Federal bank regulators
have, however, demonstrated an increased willingness to use
existing discretionary powers to deny or curb particular appli-
cations of these powers in cases involving subprime lending.
i. Nonbank Banks
With respect to the first method of extending the Exporta-
tion Doctrine to nonbanks-the use of the nonbank bank excep-
tions to the BHCA-both the OCC and the FDIC have readily
approved applications of various commercial enterprises to
308. Payday Lending Report, supra note 9, at 24 (citing Ohio Dep't of
Commerce, Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order, Notice of Oppor-
tunity for Hearing (July 16, 2001)); see also OCC Stipulation and Consent to
the Issuance of a Consent Order, Doc. No. AA-EC-02-18, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2002)
(regarding Goleta National Bank; stating that ACE purchased a 90-95%




charter or acquire credit card banks. °9 So far, courts facing
challenges to the legal authority of exportation by credit card
banks have not balked at extending the Doctrine, at least to
national banks.30 However, a state-chartered credit card bank
is the subject of one of the most significant ongoing legal chal-
lenges to the use of the Exportation Doctrine by nonbank
banks. In Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia,311
Patricia Heaton, a resident of Louisiana, filed a class action
lawsuit against Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, a sub-
sidiary of General Electric (Monogram), charging that Mono-
gram had no authority to charge late fees in excess of the
amount permitted by Louisiana law. 12 Heaton argued that
Monogram was not entitled to export the rates permitted under
laws of the state where it was located (Georgia) because Mono-
gram was not a "state bank" for purposes of section 52 1.313 The
only deposits Monogram accepted were from its parent corpora-
tion. Heaton argued that it was therefore not "engaged in the
business" of accepting deposits, and was therefore not a "state
bank.
,3 14
Thus far, this argument has been asserted only in prelimi-
nary skirmishes involving the removal of the case to federal
court;311 the argument has not been heard or argued on its mer-
309. See supra note 267.
310. In Krispin v. May Department Stores Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the assignment of credit card accounts from a department
store to its newly established credit card bank was sufficient to legally make
the bank, rather than the store, the originator of accounts after the date of the
transfer, regardless of the fact that the department store purchased the bank's
receivables on a daily basis. 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000).
311. 297 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2002).
312. Id. at 419.
313. Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., No. CIV.A.98-1823,
1998 WL 709808, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1998). 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2) (2000)
defines a "state bank" as
any bank, banking association, trust company, savings bank, indus-
trial bank (or similar depository institution which the Board of Direc-
tors finds to be operating substantially in the same manner as an in-
dustrial bank), or other banking institution which--(A) is engaged in
the business of receiving deposits, other than trust funds (as defined
in this section); and (B) is incorporated under the laws of any State.
Id.
314. Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., No. CIV.A.98-1823,
1999 WL 1789422, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 1999).
315. The issue at stake was whether a usury claim brought in state court
under state usury laws could be removed to federal court on the grounds that
it was covered by the federal statutes underlying the Exportation Doctrine.
The Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in favor of removal, at least
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its, as it affects Monogram's authority to export Georgia's late
fees. However, during these preliminary skirmishes, the FDIC
actively supported Monogram's position. The FDIC issued a
General Counsel's Opinion holding that maintaining one de-
posit in a minimum amount of $500,000 is enough to be "en-
gaged in the business" of receiving deposits. This opinion let
ter was quickly promulgated as a regulation.3 " The opinion and
regulation merely formalized a long-standing position of the
FDIC."8 Indeed, the FDIC could not have granted Monogram
FDIC insurance had it not reached this conclusion at the time
the charter was granted.3 19 However, the timing of the issuance
of the opinion, and the fact that it was apparently drafted by
counsel for Monogram for the FDIC's signature, attracted both
the attention of the media32 and the approbation of at least one
of the judges ruling against Monogram in the complicated se-
ries of venue skirmishes.321
While the federal banking regulators continue to support
the legal authority of commercial enterprises to establish non-
bank banks to take advantage of the Exportation Doctrine, they
are demonstrating an increasing willingness to use their regu-
latory powers to prevent entities from taking advantage of this
power in order to engage in arguably predatory lending prac-
tices. Three distinct regulatory initiatives are evident.
with respect to national banks. In Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 123
S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2003), the Court held:
In actions against national banks for usury, these provisions super-
sede both the substantive and the remedial provisions of state usury
laws and create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive,
even when a state complainant, as here, relies entirely on state law.
Because §§ 85 and 86 provide the exclusive cause of action for such
claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury
against a national bank.
Id.
316. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 12, Engaged in the Business of
Receiving Deposits Other Than Trust Funds, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,568, 14,568
(Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter FDIC Op. No. 12].
317. Filing Procedures, 12 C.F.R. § 303.14 (2003).
318. The General Counsel's opinion refers to the FDIC's thirty-year history
of approving applications for deposit insurance for "nontraditional depository
institutions" that accept only one deposit from their parents or affiliates;
credit card banks are specifically mentioned as one of these entities. FDIC Op.
No. 12, supra note 316, at 14,570.
319. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (2000).
320. Paul Beckett, Clashing Interest: Why Patricia Heaton Could Cause
Problems for a GE-Owned Bank, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2001, at Al.




First, regulators have demonstrated an increasing willing-
ness to withhold approval of expansion or new charter applica-
tions involving subprime lenders. Regulators imposed many
conditions on Citigroup's acquisition of Associates First Capital
Group, a national subprime mortgage lender and credit card is-323
suer. 3 The OCC also conditioned the acquisition of a check-
cashing company by a national bank on the bank's agreement
not to permit the subsidiary to engage in payday lending.324 The
OCC also denied an application by CompuCredit Corporation, a
subprime credit card lender, to acquire a credit card bank.325
Second, federal banking agencies have issued a number of
regulatory guides dealing with subprime lending which, al-
though not exclusively aimed at nonbank bank subsidiaries of
322. This trend is also apparent at state banking regulatory agencies.
Household International, a major subprime lender, apparently yielding to
pressure by the New York State Banking Department, is proposing to begin
offering prime loans through its branches, in order to obtain approval of its
acquisition by a London-based financial services company. Michelle Heller &
Robert Julavits, HSBC Takes New York's Hint; Household to Sell Prime, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 29, 2003, at 1.
323. Citigroup was required to commit to making significant changes to
Associates' practices before this acquisition was approved. Erick Bergquist,
Judging Citi, a Year Later, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 1 (describing con-
cessions made by Citigroup); Bill Stoneman, PR Woes Continue to Cloud Citi-
Associates Deal, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 2001, at 8A (same). Consumer advo-
cates continue to protest acquisitions by Citigroup, based on predatory lending
concerns. Rob Blackwell, Fed Asks Citi More on Golden State Deal, AM.
BANKER, July 25, 2002, at 20; Rob Garver, Another Fed Probe of Citi Subprime
Lending Arm, AM. BANKER, July 12, 2002, at 1. Similarly, when HSBC Hold-
ings plc, an England-based international financial holding company, acquired
Household International, a similarly diversified, U.S.-based international fi-
nancial holding company, the OCC approved the acquisition of Household's
credit card bank subsidiary only after the bank agreed to pay restitution to
certain credit card consumers subject to deceptive practices and to ensure that
all of its private label credit card programs comply with applicable laws and
regulations. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2003-2, at 5 n.6 (Mar. 27, 2003),
http://www/occ.treas.gov/interp/cd03-2.pdf; Formal Agreement by and Between
Household Bank (SB), National Association Las Vegas, Nevada, and the OCC,
No. 2003-17 (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003-17.pdf
[hereinafter Household Bank Agreement]. Although the credit card bank sub-
sidiary was not identified as targeting subprime borrowers, the private label
program at issue involved financing of door-to-door sales of heating, ventila-
tion, and air conditioning systems. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2003-2, supra,
at 5 n.6.
324. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2001-24, 2001 WL 1104409 (Aug. 17,
2001) (regarding acquisition of "Cashzone, LLC" by Metropolitan National
Bank).
325. David Breitkopf, OCC Denies CompuCredit Application to Buy Bank,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1.
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commercial enterprises, contain strong warnings that such en-
tities might be particularly vulnerable to enforcement of these
policies. Indeed, the policies have been applied against a num-
ber of such subsidiaries.
The four federal financial institution regulators-the OCC,
the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OTS-have issued two
joint guidances on subprime lending in the past few years, not-
ing the increased involvement of insured depository institu-
tions in subprime lending.326 While the agencies expressed their
support for responsible subprime lending as a way to "expand
credit access for consumers and offer attractive returns,"327 they
stressed that it carries elevated levels of risk and demands in-
tensive risk management and additional capital support. The
first guide warned, "If the risks associated with this activity are
not properly controlled, the agencies consider subprime lending
a high-risk activity that is unsafe and unsound."328 The second
guide was specifically aimed at depository institutions whose
subprime activities constitute 25% or more of their business,
329
which would certainly include any nonbank bank chartered by
a commercial enterprise engaging heavily in subprime con-
sumer lending. In this guide, the agencies outlined detailed
risk management expectations, warning that "[w]hen a primary
supervisor determines that an institution's risk management
practices are materially deficient, the primary supervisor may
instruct the institution to discontinue its subprime lending
programs."33 °
The agencies have also released a joint guide on account
management policies for credit card lending.331 This guide ad-
dressed specific credit card account management, risk man-
agement, and loss allowance practices observed in recent ex-
aminations that the agencies deem "inappropriate."32 The
practices identified in this proposed guide are characteristic of
326. 2001 Subprime Lending Guide, supra note 1; Interagency Guidance on
Subprime Lending (Mar. 1, 1999), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
SRLETTERS/1999/sr9906al.pdf [hereinafter 1999 Subprime Lending Guide].
327. 2001 Subprime Lending Guide, supra note 1, J 63-792.
328. 1999 Subprime Lending Guide, supra note 326, at 2.
329. 2001 Subprime Lending Guide, supra note 1, 63-792.
330. Id.
331. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Interagency
Guidance, Credit Card Lending: Account Management and Loss Allowance
Guidance (Jan. 8, 2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/
2003/20030108/attachment.pdf.
332. Id. at 1.
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predatory lending: failing to consider the repayment capacity of
individual borrowers when extending new lines of credit or in-
creasing existing lines; lack of prudent over-limit practices, es-
pecially with subprime credit accounts; and workout and for-
bearance programs that make it difficult for the borrower to
extinguish the indebtedness.333 The agencies warned that they
would not tolerate accounting practices that do not reflect the
334true risks and losses of subprime credit card programs.
Again, although the scope of this guide was not limited to sub-
sidiaries of commercial enterprises, it addressed the sole busi-
ness engaged in by many such subsidiaries.
These three guides, taken together, provide a strong warn-
ing to commercial enterprises offering consumer lending
through nonbank bank subsidiaries that the regulators intend
to use their supervisory powers to closely monitor subprime
lending and to prevent predatory lending. Moreover, all of the
federal banking agencies have taken enforcement actions dem-
onstrating that these warnings are to be taken seriously. Two
credit card banks with high concentrations of subprime loans
were closed by their respective regulators.3 ' A number of finan-
333. See id. at 2-4.
334. See id. at 4-5.
335. BestBank, a state-chartered, FDIC-insured bank in Boulder, Colorado,
was closed in July 1998 by the Colorado State Bank Commissioner, and the
FDIC was named receiver. FDIC Press Release PR-49-98, FDIC Announces
Receivership of BestBank, Boulder, Colorado (July 1, 1998), http://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/1998/pr9849.html. The FDIC subsequently ex-
plained that BestBank's principal assets were subprime credit card accounts,
made available to "people with low incomes, no credit history, or bad credit
histories," and offered in conjunction with the purchase of a membership in a
"travel club." Recent Bank Failures and Regulatory Initiatives: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 143 (2000) (testi-
mony of Donna Tanoue, Chairman of the FDIC), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/archives/2000/sp8FebOO.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). The
travel club membership fee ($498) and credit card annual fee ($45) were
charged to the cardholder's account at the time the card was issued; the credit
limit on the card was $600. Id. In February 2002, the OCC closed NextBank,
the Internet-only credit card bank that opened with much fanfare in 1999.
OCC News Release No. 2002-09, supra note 189. The OCC found that Next-
Bank was "operating in an unsafe and unsound manner and had experienced a
substantial dissipation of assets and earnings through unsafe and unsound
practices." Id. Although NextBank was not originally chartered as a subprime
lender, informal discussions of OCC officials concerning this closure suggest
that the credit problems that led to the bank's closure were related to the
credit quality of the borrowers who were attracted to the Internet model-
people with troubled credit histories. Lavonne Kuykendall, After NextBank,
Doubts on Internet-Only Model, AM. BANKER, Feb. 11, 2002, at 1.
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cial institutions offering subprime credit cards were subject to
regulatory enforcement proceedings resulting in agreements
that the banks will conduct such activities in accordance with
the newly promulgated credit card account management poli-
336
cies.
The third regulatory initiative on this front is the agencies'
growing willingness to use their authority under the FTCA337 to
police unfair or deceptive trade practices. 338 The CC recently
settled a number of such enforcement actions involving decep-
tive marketing practices in credit card programs targeting sub-
prime borrowers.339 In each case, the bank was either a credit
336. See Neil Irwin, Capital One to Boost Bad-Loan Allowances: Credit
Card Firm Agrees to Several Changes to Resolve Regulators' Concerns, WASH.
POST, July 17, 2002, at E3 (describing regulatory actions against Capital One);
Carrick Mollenkamp, Capital One Sees Shares Fall 40% on Fed Warning,
WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at Cll (describing regulatory actions against Pro-
vidian, NextCard, and Metris, the parent company of Direct Merchants Na-
tional Bank); FDIC Order to Cease and Desist, Docket No. FDIC-02-035b, 15
(May 15, 2002) (obligating Cross Country Bank to conduct subprime credit
card operations in accordance with regulatory guidelines), http:fl
www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcementl1932.html#HN15; OCC Consent
Order No. 2002-40, at 8 (May 15, 2002) (obligating First Consumers National
Bank, the credit card subsidiary of The Spiegel Corporation, to conduct credit
card operations in accordance with regulatory guidelines),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2002%2D40.pdf; Operating Agreement Be-
tween Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, N.A., Metris Companies, Inc., and
the OCC, at 16 (Mar. 18, 2003) (obligating bank to conduct credit card opera-
tions in accordance with regulatory guidelines), http://www.occ.treas.gov.ftp/
eas/DMCCBOperating%Agreement.pdf.
337. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
338. The agencies did not promulgate any joint guidance in this area, but
rather each separately expressed its intention to enforce the FTCA. Banking
Regulators Affirm Power to Enforce FTC Act, Issue No. 1967, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) (June 7, 2002) (citing Letter from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan to Rep. John LaFalce, House Financial Services Committee (May
30, 2002)); FDIC Advisory Letter No. FIL-57-2002, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 64-123 (May 30, 2002) (detailing the FDIC's guidance on unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices); OCC Advisory Letter No. AL 2003-2, 6 Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 64-125 (Feb. 21, 2003) (explaining the OCC's guidelines for
national banks to guard against predatory abusive lending practices); OCC
Advisory Letter No. AL 2002-3, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-122 (Mar.
22, 2002) (providing OCC guidance on unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
339. OCC Consent Order No. 2003-1, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 93-424 (Jan. 17, 2003) (regarding First National
Bank in Brookings); OCC Consent Order No. 2001-24, [2001-2002 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 92-745 (May 3, 2001) (Direct Merchants
Credit Card Bank, N.A.); OCC Consent Order No. 2001-97 (Dec. 3, 2001) (First
National Bank of Marin), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea200l%2D97.pdf;
OCC Consent Order No. 2000-53 (June 28, 2000) (Providian National Bank),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2000%2D53.pdf. Two similar enforcement
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card bank or a full-service national bank specializing in credit
cards; in each case, the consent order provided that the bank
pay restitution to customers harmed by practices characterized
as unlawful, unsafe, or unsound, and reform such practices.
The practices at issue included (1) marketing cards requiring
the purchase of $156 credit protection plans as "no annual
membership fee" credit cards; 4' (2) using solicitations suggest-
ing guaranteed approvals of no-fee, unsecured cards, followed
by approvals of cards with high fees or requiring security de-
posits; 341 and (3) marketing cards to subprime borrowers as un-
secured cards with guaranteed approval, and then charging
significant security deposits against the cards when issued-
which, together with high, nonrefundable processing fees, left
little or no available credit.
4 2
With all three of the initiatives described above, the regu-
lators are clearly warning all of the entities under their respec-
actions were brought by the OCC in connection with credit card programs not
obviously targeted at subprime borrowers, but involving similar unfair and
deceptive practices for which the banks were required to pay restitution. OCC
Consent Order No. 2003-39 (Apr. 5, 2003) (involving annual fees and resulting
late charges assessed after First Consumers National Bank of Beaverton, Ore-
gon, knew it had to liquidate credit card portfolio), http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003%2D39.pdf; Household Bank Agreement, su-
pra note 323, at 8-10 (involving installation of substandard HVAC units, over-
charges for merchandise and services, finance charges in excess of disclosed
rate, and improper late fees in connection with private label cards issued for
Hispanic Air Conditioning and Heating, Inc.). In addition, the OCC brought an
enforcement action against a full-service national bank regarding loans to
subprime borrowers to pay delinquent property taxes. In addition to alleging
violations of various real estate lending laws, the OCC alleged that the terms
of the loans inherently violated the FTCA. OCC Consent Order No. 2003-135
(Nov. 7, 2003) (regarding Clear Lake National Bank), http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003-135.pdf.
340. OCC News Release No. 2000-49, Providian to Cease Unfair Practices,
Pay Consumers Minimum of $300 Million Under Settlement with OCC and
San Francisco District Attorney (June 28, 2000), http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/release/2000-49.txt.
341. OCC Fact Sheet Regarding Settlement Between the OCC and Direct
Merchants Bank, [2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
T 92-745 (May 3, 2001).
342. OCC Fact Sheet Regarding Settlement Between the OCC and First
Nat'l Bank of Marin, at 1-2 (Dec. 4, 2001), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/
fact%20sheetl%20%2D%20fnb%20marin2Ol%2D97.pdf. Similar practices are
described in OCC News Release No. 2003-03, OCC Concludes Case Against
First National Bank in Brookings Involving Payday Lending, Unsafe Mer-
chant Processing, and Deceptive Marketing of Credit Cards, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 93-424 (Jan. 21, 2003) (de-




tive jurisdictions-including commercial entities with nonbank
bank subsidiaries-that they intend to closely monitor con-
sumer lending practices and aggressively pursue predatory
lending practices. Indeed, they have prevented the acquisition
of nonbank bank subsidiaries by some commercial entities al-
ready engaged in subprime lending. At the same time, the
regulators continue to aggressively support both the legal au-
thority of commercial enterprises to make use of the Exporta-
tion Doctrine through nonbank bank subsidiaries, and the pre-
emptive power of the Exportation Doctrine being asserted by
such subsidiaries. This aggressive support includes interven-
tion in ongoing litigation where the underlying legal principles
are being challenged, as in the Heaton case.
ii. Charter Renters
The pattern noted above holds with respect to charter-
renting arrangements as well. While the banking regulators
are demonstrating an increased willingness to use existing en-
forcement powers to limit the use of the Exportation Doctrine
through partnerships between banks and commercial entities
when these ventures involve lending considered predatory, the
regulators continue to defend the legal principles underlying
the extension of the Exportation Doctrine to nonbanks through
such partnerships.343
The emergence of the new partnerships between banks and
subprime lenders has prompted a number of regulatory pro-
nouncements that warn in stern, but vague, terms that the
benefits of the Exportation Doctrine may not be available to
third-party partners of national banks in all circumstances. In
a general bulletin on risk management principles applicable to
third-party relationships, the OCC distinguished among the
various ways in which a bank may use a third party-" [t]o per-
form functions on the bank's behalf' (e.g., payroll processing or
human resources administration), "[t]o provide products and
services that the bank does not originate" (e.g., investment or
343. A pithy recent articulation of this position was in a speech made by
the former Chairman of the FDIC, Donna Tanoue, who said, "The practice of
renting a charter merely to collect a fee to allow a high-cost payday lender to
circumvent state law is inappropriate. It may be legal-but I don't like it."
FDIC Press Release PR-41-2000, FDIC Chairman Tanoue Denounces "Charter




insurance products), or "[t]o 'franchise' the bank's attributes."344
With respect to that third category, the OCC refrained from
giving any specific examples, but instead generally described
the activity34 5 and provided stern warnings about its potential
for "significant reputation, strategic, transaction, and compli-
ance risk to the bank. 34 6 The OCC cautioned national banks to
be wary of any third party "seeking to avail itself of the benefits
of a national bank charter":
In some instances, nonbank vendors may target national banks to act
as delivery vehicles for certain products and services, or act as the
nominal deliverer of products or services actually provided by the
third party, in order to avoid state law standards that would other-
wise apply to their activities .... National banks should be extremely
cautious before entering into any third-party relationship in which
the third party offers products or services through the bank with fees,
interest rates, or other terms that cannot be offered by the third party
directly. Such arrangements may constitute an abuse of the national
bank charter."7
In detailing the specific risks associated with third-party
relationships, the OCC included the reputation risk that can
result if a third-party partner violates consumer laws, as well
as the possible credit risk if the third-party partner solicits cus-
tomers, conducts underwriting analysis, or offers products
(such as payday loans) in ways that increase risks.348
While providing this generic warning about the potential
for abuse of third-party relationships, the OCC continues to in-
tervene to assert the rights of commercial partners to enter into
such arrangements with banks. The OCC recently opined that
contractual arrangements between national banks and auto-
mobile dealers under which the dealers act as "agents" for the
banks by soliciting loans, taking applications, and preparing
loan documentation, sufficed to preempt the licensing and in-
terest rate requirements of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales
Act.3 9 The OCC stressed that "[t]he Banks prescribe the terms
of the loan, including the minimum interest rate, and fund the
loans and issue loan approvals." 350 This ruling specifically dis-
344. OCC Bulletin No. 2001-47, supra note 182, 35-522.
345. "The bank lends its name or regulated entity status to products and





349. Preemption Determination, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,593 (May 23, 2001).
350. Id. at 28,595.
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tinguished these programs from situations "where a loan prod-
uct has been developed by a non-bank vendor that seeks to use
a national bank as a delivery vehicle, and where the vendor,
rather than the bank, has the preponderant economic interest
in the loan."
351
The OCC has targeted third-party relationships between
banks and payday lenders for particular scrutiny. In a bulletin
directly addressing payday lending, the OCC singled out ar-
rangements in which banks fund loans originated by third-
party payday lenders.352 The OCC expressed concern that in
some such arrangements, the third party offers services nor-
mally provided by the bank itself, or purchases the loans or
their servicing rights. After discussing those possibilities, the
OCC sternly warned, "Payday lenders entering into such ar-
rangements with national banks should not assume that the
benefits of a bank charter, particularly with respect to the ap-
plication of state and local law, would be available to them."
3 53
Shortly thereafter, the OCC began making good on this
warning, commencing enforcement proceedings that precipi-
tated the termination of all four of the existing contractual
partnerships between national banks and payday lenders. In
2002, the OCC signed Consent Orders with both Goleta Na-
tional Bank 354 and Eagle National Bank, 55 requiring them to
cease payday lending activities they had been conducting
through contractual arrangements with ACE and Dollar Finan-
cial Group, respectively. In the Eagle case, the OCC alleged
that the bank had essentially ceded the entire administration
of the program to Dollar.356 In the Goleta case, the OCC noted
351. Id. at 28,595 n.6.
352. OCC Advisory Letter No. 2000-10 (Nov. 27, 2000),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-10.txt. This Advisory Letter also
addresses guidelines for banks engaging in payday lending directly, aimed at
ensuring that all such activities are done in a safe and sound manner, without
"engag[ing] in abusive practices that would increase the compliance, legal, and
reputation risks associated with payday lending." Id.
353. Id.
354. OCC Consent Order No. 2002-93 (Oct. 28, 2002) (regarding Goleta Na-
tional Bank), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2002%2D93.pdf.
355. OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (Dec. 18, 2001),
http://www/occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea200l-lO4.pdf, OCC News Release, OCC Or-
ders Eagle to Cease Payday Lending Program (Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter OCC
Eagle Press Release], http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-Ol.txt.
356. The OCC even rejected the "attribute franchising" characterization of
this relationship, and called it "charter renting." OCC Eagle Press Release,
supra note 355 (citing John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency).
5932004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that ACE purchased a 90-95% participation in the loans
"shortly after origination,"357 and expressed concerns about Go-
leta's failure to manage its relationship with ACE in a safe and
3581
sound manner.
In January 2003, the OCC entered into similar consent
agreements pursuant to which First National Bank in Brook-
ings, South Dakota, agreed to terminate its contractual ar-
rangement with Gash America,3  and Peoples National Bank in
Paris, Texas, agreed to terminate its contractual arrangement
with Advance America. ° In both cases, the OCC stressed that
the banks' failure to properly supervise their payday lender
partners resulted in both safety and soundness concerns and
violations of federal consumer protection laws.361' The OCC also
expressed great concern over 'arrangements in which national
banks essentially rent out their charters to third parties who
want to evade state and local consumer protection laws,"' warn-
ing that "'[t]he preemption privileges of national banks derive
from the Constitution and are not a commodity that can be
transferred for a fee to nonbank lenders.' 363
The OCC's recent enforcement actions appear to be offering
a list of benchmarks for distinguishing partnerships that will
permit the use of exportation by the nonbank partner and those
that will not. Among the benchmarks being offered are: who
sets the terms of the credit, who issues the loan approvals, who
funds the loans, and who has the preponderant economic inter-
est in the credit.363 The exact point in the spectrum where that
line is reached will likely be fleshed out over the next couple of
years as the many lawsuits challenging various aspects of pro-
357. OCC Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order, su-
pra note 308, at 2.
358. OCC News Release No. 2002-85, OCC Takes Action Against ACE
Cash Express, Inc. and Goleta National Bank (Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter ACE
& Goleta Press Release], http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-85.txt.
359. OCC Consent Order No. 2003-1, supra note 339, I 93-424.
360. OCC Consent Order No. 2003-2, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 93-440 (Jan. 30, 2003) (regarding Peoples National
Bank of Paris, Texas).
361. OCC News Release No. 2003-06, Peoples National Bank to Pay
$175,000 Civil Money Penalty and End Payday Lending Relationship with
Advance America, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
93-440 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Peoples National Press Release]; OCC
News Release No. 2003-03, supra note 342.
362. Peoples National Press Release, supra note 361 (quoting John D.
Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency).
363. See supra notes 350-51, 356-58, 361 and accompanying text.
594 [Vol 88:518
EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
grams involving partnerships between banks and nonbanks
start producing decisions on the merits.364
What is clear is that payday lenders are not favored lend-
ing partners for national banks. Indeed, the recent enforcement
actions in the payday lending cases demonstrate that the
OCC's discomfort about payday lenders extends further than
simply desiring to exclude them from the orbit of beneficiaries
of the Exportation Doctrine. In two of these cases, the OCC as-
serted its regulatory authority over both the national bank and
the nonbank payday lender partner. Asserting the regulatory
jurisdiction that the federal banking regulators have over par-
ties with close relations with banks, 65 the OCC also entered
into consent decrees with the nonbank payday lenders, requir-
ing them not only to terminate their relationships with their
bank partners, but also prohibiting them from entering into
any similar relationship with any other national bank without
the prior written approval of the OCC.366 Moreover, the OCC
charged both the national banks and their nonbank partners
with violations of numerous federal consumer protection stat-
utes-the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, TILA, and consumer
privacy protections included in Gramm-Leach-Bliley-and as-
sessed civil money penalties for these violations. The OCC is
demonstrating the same readiness to police predatory lending
364. Indeed, the private bar is clearly heavily engaged in the efforts to
identify and influence the resolution of this ambiguity. See, e.g., John L. Doug-
las, Renting the Charter and Other Assorted Sins: Eagle and the Virtual Bank,
ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP., Mar. 2002, at 13, 14 (offering "some of
the guiding principles as to where the line might be drawn"); Darrell L. Dre-
her & Deborah Freye, Continuing Challenges to Interstate Lending by Deposi-
tory Institutions, 57 BUS. LAW. 1297, 1299-1303 (2002) (describing the prolif-
eration of litigation "attacking exportation rights in interstate lending
transactions by alleging ... that someone other than the depository institution
is the actual lender in the transaction"); Payday Lending Report, supra note 9,
at 20 & n.35 (describing numerous class action law suits against ACE Cash
Express).
365. The OCC asserted its regulatory authority over bank service compa-
nies pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c), and over institution-affiliated parties as
defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u). OCC Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance
of a Consent Order, No. AA-EC-02-10, at 2 (Oct. 25, 2002) (regarding ACE
Cash Express), http://www/occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ace%20stipulation.pdf.
366. OCC Consent Order, AA-EC-03-01, EA No. 2003-3, at 3 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(regarding Advance America), http://www/occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/
as2003%2D3.pdf; OCC Consent Order, AA-EC-02-19, EA No. 2002-92, at 3
(Oct. 25, 2002) (regarding ACE Cash Express), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
eas/ace%20order.pdf.
367. ACE & Goleta Press Release, supra note 358; Peoples National Press
Release, supra note 361.
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through its power to enforce consumer protection statutes in
connection with charter-renting arrangements that it is show-
ing in connection with nonbank bank subsidiaries of commer-
cial entities.
In the face of the OCC's clear hostility, some payday lend-
ers have begun to explore similar partnerships with state-
chartered banks . In contrast to the OCC, the FDIC is at least
perceived as evincing some tolerance for relationships between
state-chartered banks and payday lenders. The FDIC does con-
sider payday lending activity to involve significant risks, and
its aggressively conservative approach to the amount of capital
required to support such activity has caused at least one bank
to exit the payday lending business. 9 While warning banks of
the additional risks inherent in engaging in payday lending
through third-party relationships, however, its recently pub-
lished examination guidelines 370 do not forbid such relation-
ships entirely. 371 At least one payday lending executive has
stated that he is "encouraged" by the FDIC's recognition of the
legitimacy of such third-party relationships.372 Indeed, one
prominent state bank partner to a number of payday lenders
recently announced that it was leaving the Federal Reserve
System in order to substitute the FDIC for the Federal Reserve
as its primary federal regulator.373 Whereas the Federal Re-
serve was trying to force the bank out of payday lending, the
FDIC has reportedly reached an agreement with the bank per-
mitting it to continue its relationship with the payday lend-
ers.374 Although the Delaware banking regulators have appar-
ently sanctioned this arrangement as well,375 whether all state
banking regulators will be as accommodating remains to be
368. Ben Jackson, OCC Payday Purge Done; Lenders Eye State Banks, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 3, 2003, at 1.
369. Ben Jackson, Brickyard Is Latest to Quit Payday Lending, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 18, 2002, at 1.
370. FDIC Guidelines for Payday Lending, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
64-127 (July 11, 2003).
371. Id.
372. Jackson, supra note 368 (quoting Billy Webster, chief executive officer
of Advance America, the payday lender forced to terminate its relationship
with Peoples National Bank, Paris, Texas, as saying, "In contrast to the OCC,
[the FDIC] recognizes there is a legitimate role for banks.").
373. Craig Linder, Will Payday Path Draw Heat to FDIC?, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 4, 2003, at 1; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.






Charter-renting arrangements have been subject to vary-
ing degrees of judicial challenges. The use of exportation pow-
ers by commercial entities in credit card cobranding arrange-
ments has not been subject to any significant legal challenges
by private litigants. 7 The RAL arrangements have been chal-
lenged in court, but the challenges thus far have not focused on
the authority of the commercial partners to take advantage of
their bank partners' exportation powers.378 Instead, litigants
have challenged (unsuccessfully) the attributed "location" of theloanforexprtaton nd 1.379
loan for exportation and branching purposes, (unsuccessfully)
the TILA disclosures associated with such loans,38° and (largely
successfully) whether the tax preparers had violated various
consumer protection laws or fiduciary obligations to taxpayers
by failing to disclose the financial benefits they received from
their bank partners.381' The litigants in the payday loan suits,
376. Early indications are not so positive. See Ben Jackson, Payday Plan B
May Not Make It Out of the Gate, AM. BANKER, Jan. 24, 2003, at 1 (quoting
South Dakota's banking regulator with decidedly guarded reactions to part-
nerships with payday lenders); John Reosti & Ben Jackson, Hard Stance of
Pennsylvania Regulator Bodes Ill for Payday Lenders, AM. BANKER, Apr. 11,
2003, at 1 (quoting Pennsylvania state banking regulator as vowing to be "as
aggressive as the federal banking regulators" in dealing with payday lenders).
377. When AT&T announced the first major cobranding deal in 1990, sev-
eral major banks raised with the Federal Communications Commission the
issue of whether AT&T had the authority to enter in the credit business. Jef-
frey Kutler, At AT&T Card Unit, Decision to Sell Strengthens Management's
Resolve, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.
378. One challenge that was brought in Alabama state court appears to be
a more broad-based allegation of usury violations, but the only opinions yet
issued involve the unsuccessful attempt to remove it to federal court, on the
basis of complete preemption by § 85. Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d
1038 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S.
Ct. 2058 (2003).
379. Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873-75 (4th Cir. 1994);
Christiansen v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 972 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 (S.D. Ga.
1997).
380. Cades, 43 F.3d at 874-76.
381. Peterson v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (holding H&R Block was not Peterson's agent); Beckett v. H&R
Block, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding H&R Block
was not the client's agent); Carnegie v. H&R Block, Inc., 703 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding H&R Block was not the plaintiffs agent); Basile
v. H&R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000) (holding Block is not the
agent of the taxpayer). But see Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039,
1055-57 (Md. 1999) (holding Block is the agent of the taxpayer). There are
also a number of cases in litigation challenging the enforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses in a variety of consumer credit contracts, some of which involve
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however, are directly challenging the ability of the nonbank
partner to take advantage of their bank partners' exportation
powers, and the regulators are, for the first time, signaling
some openness to this position. 82
As noted above, the regulators appear to be distinguishing
among permissible and impermissible uses of the Exportation
Doctrine by nonbanks according to the nature of the lending ac-
tivity-if the nonbank partner is a payday lender or otherwise
engaged in lending that is considered particularly susceptible
to being predatory, the partnership is not permitted. 83 All three
types of arrangements can be, and indeed are, structured with
varying degrees of responsibility and authority given to the
bank or the nonbank partner.34 Although it is possible that
such programs could be distinguished by relative divisions of
control over credit decisions, risks, rewards, and ownership of
receivables, such distinctions are not being consistently applied
by the regulators as justifications for permitting some of these
arrangements but not others.
As a practical matter, the sorting mechanism being used by
the regulators might be a prudent regulatory approach. How-
ever, as a policy matter, there is no functional difference be-
tween a cobranded credit card program and the Goleta Na-
tional Bank's payday lending program with ACE. Both types of
programs should be subject to the same analysis of whether it
is justifiable under any principles of banking law, or any other
legal principle, to permit any nonbank to benefit from the Ex-
RALs. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions: A Contradiction in
Terms, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 2002 (PLI Corporate
Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-017R, 2002), WL
1302 PLI/Corp 7; Erick Bergquist, Mandatory Arbitration Latest Subprime Is-
sue in Spotlight, AM. BANKER, July 2, 2002, at 1.
382. See supra note 364 and sources cited therein.
383. Of course, this is not how regulators characterize their actions. In a
recent speech, Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., stated that
decisions to assert preemption must be "value-blind" with respect to the value
of the state law at issue, depending solely on whether or not the state law im-
pairs or significantly interferes with the powers granted national banks under
federal law. However, he also warned:
The benefit that national banks enjoy by reason of this important
constitutional doctrine cannot be treated as a piece of disposable
property that a bank may rent out to a third party that is not a bank.
Preemption is not like excess office space in a bank-owned building. It
is an inalienable right of the bank itself.
John D. Hawke, Jr., Remarks Before the Women in Housing and Finance
(Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-10a.txt.
384. See supra notes 283-84, 296-97, 307-08 and accompanying text.
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portation Doctrine through a nonbank bank subsidiary or a
contractual arrangement with a depository institution.
e. Evaluating the Adequacy of the Justifications for Extending
the Orbit of Beneficiaries to Nonbank Corporate Entities
Extending the Exportation Doctrine to nonbanks is not jus-
tified under the banking law principles from which it was de-
rived. Section 85 was originally enacted to preserve the nascent
national banking system from hostile states.38 5 The Exportation
Doctrine was drawn from § 85 to foster the development of the
38
emerging interstate banking system. 86 Section 85 was then ex-
tended to state banks pursuant to the doctrine of competitive
equality when it became clear that state banks needed the
same powers to be competitive with national banks in the
emerging nationwide banking system.387 Up until this point, the
expansion of the Exportation Doctrine served the purpose of
supporting developing interstate banking systems. National
and state banks are bestowed the privilege of operating under
one single state's interest laws, based on the judgment that the
value of a national and a state banking system functioning effi-
ciently on an interstate basis outweighs the value of allowing
states to regulate the terms of consumer credit extended to
their citizens. The Exportation Doctrine is but one manifesta-
tion of the conviction that banks are somehow special, that the
role that they play in our economy merits some special legal
privileges.
Extending the Exportation Doctrine to nonbank lenders
through the nonbank bank exemptions or through charter-
renting arrangements is inconsistent with the underlying ra-
tionale of the Exportation Doctrine as one of the unique privi-
leges accorded depository institutions. Admittedly, the history
of the nonbank bank exemptions demonstrates that Congress is
comfortable breaching the wall between banks and commercial
enterprises in many consumer lending contexts.388 However,
Congress has never explicitly sanctioned any of the charter-
renting arrangements, and has made clear that there are limits
to its comfort level with such breaches.
385. See supra Part II.B.1.
386. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
388. See supra Part II.B.5.b.
389. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act retained significant limits
to commercial activities of banks, see supra note 254 and accompanying text,
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There might be other valid policy reasons to maintain the
current, expanded scope of the orbit of the beneficiaries of the
Exportation Doctrine. 390 From the perspective of the consumer,
there is no functional difference between the car loan offered by
a national bank and that offered by a consumer finance com-
pany, or the credit card loan offered by a retailer and that of-
fered by a retailer's credit card bank subsidiary. Granting all
consumer lenders access to the Exportation Doctrine is argua-
bly justifiable as a rational and efficient way to establish a
competitive national consumer credit market. 39 1 It is also ar-
guably justifiable as an efficient way to provide for effective en-
forcement of predatory lending laws.392 Moreover, extending the
Exportation Doctrine to commercial entities solely to make
relatively small consumer loans to individuals scattered across
the nation does not raise the specter of harmful concentrations
of financial resources or power that could affect the stability or
impartiality of the financial system that underlies the statutory
restrictions on affiliations between banks and commercial en-
terprises.393
Nevertheless, the extraordinary preemptive force of the
Exportation Doctrine requires a powerful justification. Non-
banks using the Exportation Doctrine, either through nonbank
bank subsidiaries or through charter-renting arrangements,
are not justified in relying on the banking law principles that
rationalize the broad expansions of the Exportation Doctrine
with respect to depository institutions.
C. CODA: BEYOND THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE-LESSONS
FROM THE THRIFTS
When the federal banking regulators began pressuring
and closed the unitary thrift holding company loophole, see infra note 404 and
accompanying text.
390. Cf. Peter Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regula-
tion, 44 EMORY L.J. 589, 663-74 (1995) (proposing to extend federal choice of
law principles under Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), to all consumer loans).
391. Allowing commercial entities to access the Exportation Doctrine ar-
guably makes more consumer credit available to consumers. More sources of
credit means more competition in credit; competition should drive down the
price of credit for consumers. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text
for arguments for and against the free market as an adequate mechanism for
regulating consumer credit, in the context of the U3C adoption debate.
392. See infra note 488 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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banks to end their contractual relationships with payday lend-
ers, one Ohio-based thrift perceived a market opportunity. First
Place Bank of Warren, Ohio, a relatively small, federally char-
tered thrift, entered into a contractual relationship with a na-
tional payday lender, Check 'n Go, to offer payday loans in
Texas. 94 The president of First Place Bank said he wanted to
establish this relationship now in order to get a jump on the
bigger institutions that were sure to snap up this business as
soon as the regulators finally decide how they intend to regu-
late such relationships.395 What is the advantage to thrift char-
ters that would lead him to this conclusion?
Thrifts can also take advantage of the Exportation Doc-
trine. In addition, thrifts have statutory and regulatory author-
ity to disregard state consumer credit laws that is even broader
than that provided by the Exportation Doctrine. If any of the
expansions of the Exportation Doctrine described above were to
be curbed by legislative or judicial action, thrifts might retain
their power to disregard almost all state consumer protection
laws. Recently, the OCC has begun to aggressively assert simi-
lar preemption powers on behalf of national banks. Since this
independent preemption power would significantly bolster any
preemptive authority the OCC asserts as a result of the Expor-
tation Doctrine, it is necessary for us to consider yet one more
layer of laws and regulations further complicating an already
complicated area-the preemption powers of thrifts. I will dis-
cuss, first, the application of the Exportation Doctrine to
thrifts; second, the broader preemption powers that federal
thrifts have; and, third, recent actions by the OCC to assert
similar broader preemption powers for national banks.
1. Application of the Exportation Doctrine to Thrifts
State and federal thrifts have virtually the same
exportation powers as national banks. Congress extended § 85
powers to state and federal thrifts at the same time that it did
so to state banks, in the enactment of DIDMCA. 96 Both the
OTS and its predecessor regulatory agency, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), have ruled that the DIDMCA gives
394. Ben Jackson, Payday Shift to Thrifts?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 10, 2003,
at 1.
395. Id.
396. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 522, 94 Stat. 132, 164-65 (1980) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g)(1) (2000)).
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thrifts both most-favored lender status and Marquette exporta-
tion powers.397 The few courts that have considered this issue
have generally agreed. 39 The OTS has followed the OCC's lead
in expansively interpreting the meaning of both "interest"399
and "location' 00 for purposes of the Exportation Doctrine. The
concept of "location" is just as problematic for Internet-only
thrifts as it is for banks.401
397. See Lending and Investment, 12 C.F.R. § 560.110 (2003); FHLBB
General Counsel Opinion (Sept. 29, 1980), WL FHLBB 1245; Letter from A.
Patrick Doyle, FHLBB Deputy General Counsel (Aug. 6, 1982), 1982 FHLBB
LEXIS 65.
398. Gavey Props./762 v. First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 845 F.2d 519, 520
(5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting identical language in a provision of DIDMCA re-
lated to mortgage loans); Ament v. PNC Nat'l Bank, 849 F. Supp. 1015, 1020
(W.D. Pa. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Spellman v. Meridian
Bank (Del.), Nos. 94-3203, 94-3217, 94-3216, 94-3215, 94-3204, 94-3218, 1995
WL 764548 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 1995), vacated, affd sub nom. Deffner v. Core-
states Bank of Del., N.A., 92 F.3d 1170 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table opin-
ion no. 94-3217).
399. 12 C.F.R. § 560.110(a)-(b).
400. Federal thrifts have always had the power to branch across state
lines. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r)(1) (2000). Thus, the FHLBB had to grapple with
the limitations of Marquette's "location" analysis immediately after the enact-
ment of DIDMCA section 522, which it did through opinion letters essentially
the same as the OCC's. See Letter from Harry W. Quillian, Acting General
Counsel of OTS (June 27, 1986), WL FFIN-OTS; Letter from Norman H.
Raiden, General Counsel of FHLBB (Dec. 11, 1984), WL FHLBB 1078; Letter
from Norman H. Raiden, General Counsel of FHLBB (July 23, 1984), WL
FHLBB 3899. The most recent opinion on this topic seems to take a position
that is even more aggressive than the OCC's, asserting that a federal thrift
can always export the most favored lender rate of its home state, even for a
loan that is "made" from a branch in another state to a borrower in the branch
state. See Letter from Harris Weinstein, Chief Counsel of OTS, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 82,645 (Dec. 24, 1993) (per-
mitting exportation of rates from any state where a thrift has a branch). In
this opinion, Weinstein supported its conclusion, in part, by the following ar-
guably overly aggressive interpretation of Marquette:
[A]llowing federal savings associations to export their home state in-
terest rates to loans originated in other states (including other states
where the association has an established presence) is consistent with
the desire expressed by the Supreme Court in Marquette to interpret
the statutory most favored lender provisions in a manner that allows
federal lenders to establish workable national lending networks that
are free from the burden of mandatory compliance with a patchwork
of state usury laws.
Id.
401. The first two Internet-only depository institutions were thrifts, rather
than banks. See OTS Approval of Holding Company Acquisition and Purchase
of Assets and Assumption of Liabilities, Order No. 97-66 (July 11, 1997) [here-
inafter OTS Atlanta Approval] (regarding Atlanta Internet Bank), http://
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/67066.pdf; OTS Approval of Purchase of Assets and
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Furthermore, the orbit of the beneficiaries of the exporta-
tion powers of thrifts is as broad as it is for banks. There is a
thrift analogue to the nonbank bank. Until quite recently,
commercial enterprises could take advantage of an exception in
the thrift holding company regulatory scheme similar to the
nonbank bank exception to the bank holding company regula-
tory scheme-an exception for companies owning only one
thrift (commonly called "unitary thrift holding companies").
40 2
This loophole was closed in Gramm-Leach-Bliley, although ex-
isting unitary thrift holding companies were grandfathered .
In the years of congressional debates preceding the enactment
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, as it became clear that the unitary
thrift holding company loophole was likely to be closed, there
was a surge in applications for thrift charters from commercial
enterprises.4 0 ' These new unitary thrift holding companies were
grandfathered when Gramm-Leach-Bliley was passed. Among
the commercial enterprises joining that surge were State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company;405 Franklin Resources,
a mutual fund company;40 6 Excel Communications, a long-
Assumption of Liabilities, Order No. 95-88 (May 8, 1995) (regarding Security
First Network Bank), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/65088.html; Press Release,
OTS No. 95-33 (May 10, 1995), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/77533.html. At-
lanta Internet Bank was formed through the consolidation of an existing fed-
eral thrift located in Acworth, Georgia, and certain assets of an existing state
thrift located in Greenville, South Carolina. OTS Atlanta Approval, supra.
Immediately after the consolidation, the new entity relocated its home office
from Acworth, Georgia, to Columbia, South Carolina. Id. Three days after the
approval, the OTS approved a modification of the original order, in part to ac-
commodate "a possible change in the proposed Internet service provider of cer-
tain financial services to be offered." OTS Modification of Approval of Holding
Company Acquisition and Purchase of Assets and Assumption of Liabilities,
Order No. 97-76, at 2 (July 25, 1997), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/67076.pdf.
402. To qualify for this exception, the thrift must maintain at least 70% of
its assets in real estate related or other consumer loans. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(c)(3), (i) (2000).
403. See id. § 1467a(c)(9).
404. David Harrison, OTS' Top Cop Keeps Tight Grip on Charters, AM.
BANKER, May 20, 1999, at 3.
405. Steve Cocheo, A Closer Look at Unitary Thrifts, AM. BANKERS ASS'N
BANKING J., Oct. 1998, at 64, 70 (describing State Farm's proposed product
lineup as including "residential mortgages; home equity loans; auto loans and
leases; [and] credit cards"); Kathleen Day, State Farm Gets Go-Ahead to Open
Thrift, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1998, at Fl.
406. David Harrison, A Flurry of Nonbank Filings for Thrift Charters at
Yearend, AM. BANKER, Jan. 6, 1999, at 2 (noting that application was to con-
vert the charter of a grandfathered CEBA nonbank bank located in California
to a federal thrift to be headquartered in Salt Lake City, "to take advantage of
Utah's favorable usury laws").
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distance phone company;4°7 and two of the first retailers to ac-
quire credit card banks: Federated Department Stores and
Nordstrom.408 Wal-Mart also applied to acquire a thrift, but its
application arrived after the deadline for closing the unitary
thrift loophole set by Gramm-Leach-Bliley. °9
Commercial enterprises also engage in charter renting
with thrifts. The Rolling Stones partnered with Chevy Chase
Savings Bank of Maryland to offer a Visa card providing dis-
counts on music products and Rolling Stones catalog merchan-
dise.410 General Motors MasterCard, offering a rebate on GM
car purchases equal to 5% of charge volume, was issued by
Household Bank, a federal thrift.41' Indeed, as one of the na-
tion's largest credit card issuers, Household is involved with
numerous highly visible cobranding relationships, 412 and is an
active participant in the RAL market.4 3 And, as discussed
above, at least one federal thrift has entered into a partnership
with a payday lender.
41 4
2. Broader Thrift Preemption Powers
Beyond these derivative § 85 powers, moreover, federal
thrifts have an independent basis for preempting state con-
sumer credit laws that is even more robust than the Exporta-
tion Doctrine. This power derives not from one single statutory
provision, but rather from the entire scheme of federal statutes
and regulations governing the operations of federally chartered
thrifts. Federally chartered thrifts were created pursuant to
407. Barbara A. Rehm, Phone Carrier On Line for Thrift Charter, AM.
BANKER, June 13, 1997, at 3.
408. Jacqueline S. Gold, Stocking the Shelves with Financial Services: Tar-
get's E-Trade Alliance Just Another Product, AM. BANKER, Dec. 1, 2000, at 1.
In a clear indication that at least some of these retailers are making full use of
their expanded thrift powers, the author of this Article recently received an
unsolicited e-mail from FDS Bank, the new thrift subsidiary of Federated De-
partment Stores, touting its mortgage rates. E-mail from FDS Bank to Eliza-
beth R. Schiltz (Dec. 10, 2002) (on file with author).
409. Gold, supra note 408.
410. Valerie Block, Rock 'n' Roll Cobranding: Rolling Stones Go Plastic,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 22, 1994, at 1.
411. Yvette D. Kantrow, GM to Offer Credit Card Priced Lower than GE's,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 1992, at 1.
412. Top 50 Companies in Managed Bank Credit Card Loans, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 21, 1999, at 17 (listing Household's corporate parent as the sixth largest
credit card issuer as of March 31, 1999).
413. See supra note 292.
414. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
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the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA).415 HOLA was en-
acted in reaction to the widespread collapse of the state thrift
system-the primary source of funding for home mortgages-
during the Great Depression. In contrast to the NBA, HOLA
evinces no deference to state regulators or state laws. Instead,
the perspective suggested by the language and legislative his-
tory of HOLA is that the state thrift system had largely failed,
necessitating the creation of a "new and improved" federal sys-
tem. The federal regulators charged with establishing this new
system were given explicit authority to dictate every aspect of
the operations of thrifts, "giving primary consideration [to] the
best practices of thrift institutions in the United States,"4 6
rather than deferring to any existing state laws.
In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,417
the Supreme Court generously interpreted HOLA's preemptive
reach, holding that an FHLBB regulation permitting federally
chartered thrifts to freely exercise due-on-sale clauses in mort-418
gages preempted contrary California law. The Court held
that "[flederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than
federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator
to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial
review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory
authority or acted arbitrarily."419 Furthermore, the Court said,
"[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on express
congressional authorization to displace state law."420 The only
relevant issues in this case, according to the Court, were, first,
whether the FHLBB meant to preempt California's law, and,
second, whether such an action was within the scope of the au-
thority Congress delegated to the FHLBB.42'
With respect to the first issue, the Court found that the
FHLBB unambiguously intended to preempt California law,
quoting, among other things, the following language in the pre-
amble to the FHLBB's regulation:
[1It... is the Board's intent to have ... due-on-sale practices of Fed-
415. Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1461-1468 (2000)).
416. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (2000).
417. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
418. A due-on-sale clause is "a contractual provision that permits the
lender to declare the entire balance of a loan immediately due and payable if
the property securing the loan is sold or otherwise transferred." Id. at 145.
419. Id. at 153-54.




eral associations governed exclusively by Federal law.... [E]xercise of
due-on-sale clauses by Federal associations shall be governed and
controlled solely by [the FHLBB regulations]. Federal associations
shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which im-
poses different ... due-on-sale requirements...."
With respect to the second issue, whether the FHLBB
acted within its statutory authority in issuing this preemptive
regulation, the Court began by discussing the legislative his-
tory of HOLA, stressing Congress's perception of it as "'a radi-
cal and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the ex-
isting state systems."'423 The Court found confirmation of this
perception in two portions of the basic enabling provision of
HOLA, section 5(a). First, section 5(a) authorized the FHLBB,
"'under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to pro-
vide for the organization, incorporation, examination, opera-
tion, and regulation' of federal thrifts.424 The Court held that
this broad language could not possibly be understood to exclude
authority to regulate the lending practices of thrifts. Second,
section 5(a) stated that, in prescribing such regulations, the
FHLBB should "giv[e] primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in
the United States."4 25 This language, the Court held, is evidence
that "Congress plainly envisioned that federal savings and
loans would be governed by what the Board-not any particu-
lar State--deemed to be the 'best practices.' Thus, the statutory
language suggests that Congress expressly contemplated, and
approved, the Board's promulgation of regulations superseding
state law."426
The de la Cuesta Court's generous interpretation of the
FHLBB's preemption powers has not gone unchallenged. In-
deed, a concurring opinion cautioned that "the authority of the
[FHLBB] to pre-empt state laws is not limitless, ',27 and a dis-
422. Id. at 158 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286, 18,287 (1976) (emphasis
added in opinion, but does not appear in original regulation)). This lack of any
ambiguity with respect to the FHLBB's intention in this regard created a clear
conflict between the federal and the state law, rendering it unnecessary for the
Court to rule on whether HOLA or FHLBB regulations occupy the entire field
of thrift regulation. Id. at 159 n.14.
423. Id. at 160 (quoting Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604
F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), affd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980)).
424. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis
added in opinion, but does not appear in original statute)).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 161-62.
427. Id. at 171 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor issued the fol-
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senting opinion argued that the FHLBB exceeded its congres-
sional mandate in enacting its due-on-sale regulation. 428 Com-
mentators have also challenged this decision as an overbroad
application of preemption principles.4 2 9 Regardless of these
challenges, however, the FHLBB and its successor agency, the
OTS, have aggressively exploited the preemptive power be-
stowed upon them by the Court, and subsequent courts review-
ing the actions of these regulators have, for the most part,
sanctioned their actions.
In 1986, the OTS undertook to update, reorganize, and
streamline its existing lending and investment regulations and
policy statements. In doing so, the OTS consolidated all of its
prior regulations and opinions on lending activities of federal
thrifts, and prefaced them with a preamble clearly written to
invite the welcoming embrace of the de la Cuesta ruling:
To enhance safety and soundness and to enable federal savings asso-
ciations to conduct their operations in accordance with best practices
(by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to the public free from undue
regulatory duplication and burden), OTS hereby occupies the entire
field of lending regulation for federal savings associations. OTS in-
tends to give federal savings associations maximum flexibility to ex-
ercise their lending powers in accordance with a uniform federal
scheme of regulation. Accordingly, federal savings associations may
extend credit as authorized under federal law ... without regard to
state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit ac-
tivities ....430
The OTS followed this general preemption proclamation
with a list of "illustrative examples" of the types of state laws
preempted, including: licensing, registration, and filing re-
quirements; terms of credit, including amortization and defer-
ral and capitalization of interest; loan-related fees, including
late charges, prepayment penalties, and overlimit fees; escrow
lowing warning:
[I] t is clear that HOLA does not permit the [FHLBB] to pre-empt the
application of all state and local laws to such institutions. Nothing in
the language of § 5(a) ... remotely suggests that Congress intended to
permit the [FHLBB] to displace local laws, such as tax statutes and
zoning ordinances, not directly related to savings and loan practices.
Id. at 172.
428. Id. at 173-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
429. See Duncan, supra note 9, at 317-18 (criticizing both the de la Cuesta
Court's inference of preemption from agency regulation and "best practices" or
"national uniformity" as basis for preemption); Kreissman, supra note 8, at
911 (criticizing administrative preemption as policy matter; critical of de la
Cuesta Court's legislative history analysis).




accounts; access to and use of credit reports; and disclosure and
advertising.431 Also included in this list were "[u]sury and inter-
est rate ceilings to the extent provided in [section 522 and its
implementing regulation] . The OTS did provide some limit
to its exercise of preemption. It expressly declined to preempt
state laws such as contract and commercial laws, tort laws, or
criminal laws, "to the extent that they only incidentally affect
the lending operations of Federal savings associations."433 And
it expressly declined to preempt state laws that might be favor-
able to a federal thrift exporting such laws under the Most Fa-
vored Lender Doctrine.434
The OTS justified its regulatory fiat with references to de
la Cuesta and prior decisions holding that Congress intended
federal thrifts to be "uniquely federalized financial institu-
tions-even more so than national banks."433 It claimed that
freeing federal thrifts from the "hodgepodge of conflicting and
overlapping state lending requirements" would further both the
"best practices" and the "safety and soundness" objectives of
HOLA.436 Further, the OTS claimed that the interests of bor-
rowers were adequately protected by "the elaborate network of
federal borrower-protection statutes applicable to federal
thrifts," as well as additional consumer protection regulations
adopted by the OTS when it detects a "gap" in the existing fed-
eral protections.437
Since then, the OTS has aggressively defended its preemp-
tion of state laws affecting consumer lending for federal
438thrifts, issuing numerous opinions that particular state re-
431. Id. § 560.2(b).
432. Id. § 560.2(b)(12).
433. Id. § 560(c).
434. Id. §§ 560(a), 560.110(c).
435. Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,965 (Sept. 30, 1996)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590) (citing People v.
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 50,965-66. As examples of such regulations, the OTS cites the
adoption of the FTC's Credit Practices Rule, 12 C.F.R. pt. 535; regulations im-
posing disclosure requirements on late charges and adjustments to terms of
home loans, 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.33, 560.35; and a regulation requiring prepay-
ment penalties on home loans to be applied to principal, unless the loan con-
tract provides otherwise, 12 C.F.R. § 560.34. Lending and Investment, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 50,965-66.
438. In contrast, the OTS recently announced its intention to retract the
preemption powers it had previously extended to nonthrift mortgage lenders.
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
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strictions on various types of loan-related fees are preempted
by its lending regulation. 439 The OTS opined that California's
unfair and deceptive practices statutes were preempted to the
extent they are applied in such a way as to interfere with a fed-
eral thrift's ability to advertise its loans, require insurance on
security for loans, or limit the amounts of loan-related fees.44 °
The OTS's opinion preempting a California law requiring spe-
cific disclosures detailing the financial consequences of making
only minimum payments on credit card balances was upheld by
a district court in the Lockyer case.4 ' Even more recently, the
OTS has issued legal opinions asserting that its comprehensive
regulation of lending by federal thrifts preempted most of the
terms of a number of recent state statutes dealing with preda-
tory real estate loans.44' The breadth of the federal thrift pre-
Stat. 1545 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2000)), authorized mortgage
lenders other than thrifts or banks to make alternative mortgage loans pursu-
ant to thrift regulations. The OTS has recently amended the regulation im-
plementing that statute, taking away from such lenders the power to disre-
gard state restrictions on prepayment penalties and late fees when making
such loans. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, Preemption Delay of
Effective Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,304 (Dec. 12, 2002) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
560, 590, 591); Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, Preemption, 67
Fed. Reg. 60,542 (Sep. 26, 2002) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 560, 590, 591). This
action has thus far withstood legal challenge by a mortgage lender trade
group. Nat'l Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. OTS, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C.
2003).
439. See, e.g., OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [Current Volume] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 83-347 (Dec. 14, 2001) (regarding loan processing, refinanc-
ing, commitment, and closing fees); OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [Current Vol-
ume] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-332 (Apr. 21, 2000) (payoff statement
fees); OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 83-301 (Mar. 10, 1999) (demand statement and facsimile
fees); OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) j 83-200 (Dec. 24, 1996) (appraisal fees and credit insurance
premiums).
440. OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) 83-301 (Mar. 10, 1999). The OTS contrasted the open-
ended provisions in the relevant statutes with the more specific practices de-
fined as deceptive under an Indiana statute that was not completely pre-
empted by the OTS. OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83-200 (Dec. 24, 1996).
441. Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 1000, 1011-12 (E.D. Cal.
2002); see supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
442. OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [Current Volume] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 83-361 (Sept. 2, 2003) (regarding New Mexico); OTS Chief Counsel
Opinion, [Current Volume] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83-360 (July 22,
2003) (New Jersey); OTS Chief Counsel Opinion, [Current Volume] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) 83-357 (Jan. 30, 2003) (New York); OTS Chief Counsel
Opinion, [Current Volume] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-356 (Jan. 21,
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emption power has prompted J.P. Morgan Chase & Company,
one of the few state-chartered banks operating on a national
level, to apply for a federal thrift charter under which it plans
to consolidate most of its national consumer credit operations.443
At the same time that the OTS aggressively defends the
preemptive powers of federal thrifts in the abstract, just like
the federal banking regulators, it has taken actions to curb sub-
prime lending. The OTS was a party to the joint agency
guidances on subprime lending and credit card account man-
agement.444 The OTS has also declined to approve applications
by a number of subprime lenders to acquire or charter thrift
subsidiaries.4 It also closed a federal thrift engaged primarily
in subprime lending.
3. Recent Assertions of Broader Preemption Powers by OCC
National banks do not have the same unambiguous statu-
tory mandate to operate under a predominantly federal regula-
2003) [hereinafter OTS Georgia Preemption Opinion] (Georgia).
443. Liz Moyer, Chase Seeks FSB Charter, Hints at New Markets, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 11, 2003, at 1.
444. See supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
445. Even in the "boom years" of unitary thrift chartering immediately pre-
ceding the closing of the unitary thrift holding company loophole, see supra
notes 404-09 and accompanying text, the OTS conspicuously declined to ap-
prove applications by a number of subprime lenders to charter or acquire
thrift subsidiaries. A charter application by Associates First Capital Corpora-
tion was suspended by the OTS, a charter application by First Alliance
Corporation to acquire Standard Pacific Savings F.A. was withdrawn, Press
Release, Consumers Union, Consumers Union Hails Withdrawal of Expansion
Plan for First Alliance Lending Company (Feb. 11, 1998), http://
www.consumersunion.org/finance/allwc298.htm, and the charter application of
GMAC Mortgage for a thrift with a focus on subprime mortgage lending was
slowed down, GMAC Mortgage Seeks Thrift Charter, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1998, at 5, 1998 WL 18766950. Another application for a thrift that
would focus on the subprime loan market was approved, but only subject to
unusually high capital maintenance requirements. S&L Regulator Approves
Thrift Charter for Memphis Firm with Subprime Program, 73 BNA'S BANKING
REP. 343, 343 (1999). The OTS also gave a "needs to improve" rating on its
Community Reinvestment Act examination of Crusader Holding Corporation
because of its payday lending activities; the thrift had to stop these activities
in order to fulfill a condition of its subsequent acquisition by the Royal Bank of
Pennsylvania. Jackson, supra note 369.
446. Jeffrey Rush, Open Forum: How Superior Masked Its Losses, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, at 4, 2002 WL 8159090. A few months later,
the OTS negotiated a consent agreement with the owners of Superior in which
they agreed to pay $460 million in fines in connection with that closure. David
Barboza, Hyatt Hotel Family Will Pay $460 Million in S.&L. Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2001, at C1.
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tory scheme as federal thrifts have in HOLA. In contrast to
HOLA, the NBA evinces some degree of deference to specific
state laws. 4 ' Nor does the OCC have as clear a Supreme Court
mandate to preempt state laws through regulations as the OTS
has with de la Cuesta. Nevertheless, even though the NBA does
not empower the OCC to establish a national banking system
on a clean slate, it does charge the OCC with authority to es-
tablish and regulate a national banking system, and the OCC
has established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for doing
so. Under the Supremacy Clause's general principles of pre-• 448
emption, this pervasive federal regulatory scheme clearly
carries much preemptive power. Just as the OTS interprets its
general preemption powers to include the power to preempt
state consumer credit regulations, so, too, might the OCC's
general preemption powers include the power to preempt state
consumer credit regulations. If the more recent expansions of
the Exportation Doctrine were held to be excessive under § 85,
they arguably might still be justified under the OCC's general
preemption power.
In response to the increasing number of enforcement ac-
tions brought against national banks by state authorities (often
in response to lending activities perceived as predatory),44 9 the
OCC has become more aggressive in articulating this inde-
pendent basis for the preemptive powers of national banks.45 °
The first salvo was a recent Advisory Letter to all national
banks requesting that they consult with the OCC whenever a
state enforcement official seeks any information from a na-
tional bank "that may constitute an attempt to exercise visita-
tion or enforcement power over the bank."451 This Advisory Let-
ter contained a comprehensive discussion of the statutory and
447. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 109.
449. See, e.g., Nicole Duran, OCC: States' Enforcers Subject to Preemption,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 2002, at 1 (describing recent enforcement actions against
national banks by state attorneys general of California, Indiana, New York,
Illinois, and Vermont).
450. The OCC has asserted such authority in the past. See, e.g., Chavers v.
Fleet Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A. 00-5237, 2002 WL 481797, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2002) (noting that the OCC submitted an amicus curiae brief assert-
ing exclusive power to enforce FTCA for national banks, and agreeing with the
OCC's assertion); Chavers v. Fleet Bank, N.A., No. Civ.A.00-5237, 2001 WL
770904, at *3-4 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 29, 2001) (same).
451. OCC Advisory Letter AL 2002-9 (Nov. 25, 2002) (addressing questions




judicial basis for the OCC's broad visitorial powers with respect
to national banks. This discussion of the OCC's visitorial
powers, moreover, was placed within the broader context of the
general applicability of state laws to national banks. The OCC
described the NBA's creation of the national banking scheme as
creating a new system of nationally chartered banks operating
"independently of state regulation" under "uniform and consis-
tent regulation... by federal standards."453 The OCC asserted
that state law is only applicable to national banks "in limited
circumstances when it does not conflict or interfere with the
national bank's exercise of its powers."454 Indeed, the OCC de-
clared, "Exclusive federal oversight, uniform federal regulation,
and state law preemption constitute three essential and dis-
tinctive elements of the national bank charter."4 5
Shortly after sending this Advisory Letter, the OCC pub-
lished a proposal to amend its regulations to formalize its posi-
tion that states have no visitorial powers over national banks.456
In the preamble to this proposed rule change, the OCC ex-
panded further on its broader argument that the comprehen-
sive federal regulation of national banks essentially preempts
452. This power derives fundamentally from this provision of the NBA:
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as
shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either
House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House
duly authorized.
12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000).
453. OCC Advisory Letter AL 2002-9, supra note 451, at 2.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 3.
456. The proposed 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3) would read:
(i) Unless otherwise provided by Federal law, the OCC has exclusive
visitorial authority with respect to activities expressly authorized or
recognized as permissible for national banks under Federal law or
regulation, or by OCC issuance or interpretation, including the con-
tent of those activities and the manner in which, and standards
whereby, those activities are conducted.
(ii) The question of whether the OCC possesses the exclusive visitorial
authority to assess the applicability of a state law to a national bank,
and determine and enforce compliance with that law, shall be deter-
mined exclusively by Federal law ....
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363, 6376
(proposed Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7). The regulation would
flesh out the three specific exceptions to the OCC's exclusive visitorial powers:
five specific exceptions authorized by federal law (such as exceptions for tax
enforcement), an exception for courts of justice, and an exception for Congress.
Id. (regarding proposed 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)).
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all state laws. The OCC cited the legislative history of the NBA,
arguing that "the legislation's objective was to replace state
banks with national banks."457 It also cited Supreme Court
opinions supporting the position that Congress intended to
fully occupy the field of regulation of national banks, leaving no
room for any state regulation.458 The OCC specifically tied the
particular subject of this regulatory proposal, its visitorial pow-
ers, with its broader position on federal preemption of state
laws, asserting:
The OCC's exclusive visitorial authority complements principles of
Federal preemption, to accomplish the objectives of the National
Bank Act. The Supremacy Clause... provides that Federal law pre-
vails over any conflicting state law. An extensive body of judicial
precedent has developed over the nearly 140 years of existence of the
national banking system, explaining and defining the standards of
Federal preemption of state laws as applied to national banks. Visito-
rial power is a closely related authority .... Together, Federal pre-
emption and the OCC's exclusive visitorial authority are defining
characteristics of the national bank charter, which have fostered the
development of the nationwide system of Federally chartered banks
envisioned by Congress which now operates as part of the flourishing
dual banking system of national and state-chartered banks in the
United States.459
This proposed rule was met with, in the words of one industry
newspaper, "near-unanimous enmity from the states."4 0
Undaunted, the OCC proceeded with an even more aggres-
sive double-salvo a few months later. First, the OCC joined the
OTS41 in declaring that Georgia's recent law addressing preda-
457. Id. at 6367.
458. The OCC quoted Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1903):
It thus appears that Congress has provided a symmetrical and com-
plete scheme for the banks to be organized under the provisions of
[the NBA].... [W]e are unable to perceive that Congress intended to
leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare
and stability of national banks by direct legislation.
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6368. The
OCC also quotes Farmers'& Mechanics'National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29,
34 (1875) ("'[TIhe States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in
any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to
permit."'). Id.
459. Id. at 6368-69 (citations omitted).
460. Todd Davenport, OCC Pushes, States Push Back on Oversight Power,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 2003, at 1. The OCC's proposal was opposed by banking
commissioners from twenty-three states, by attorneys general from forty-six
states, and by officials from Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington,
D.C. Id.
461. See OTS Georgia Preemption Opinion, supra note 442, 83-356.
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tory real estate lending was preempted for national banks.462
The OCC found support for this determination primarily in the
federal law authorizing national banks to engage in real estate
lending468 and the comprehensive regulatory framework estab-
lished by the OCC to implement that statute (including recent
supervisory guidelines on predatory real estate lending prac-
tices). 4 With respect to the provisions in the Georgia law re-
stricting interest rates, 465 however, the OCC relied on two doc-
trines derived from § 85. National banks located outside of
Georgia were exempt by virtue of the Exportation Doctrine. Na-
tional banks located in Georgia were exempt by virtue of the
Most Favored Lender Doctrine-since the OTS had preempted
Georgia's law for federal thrifts, a parity provision in the state
law preempts it for state-chartered thrifts in Georgia; since na-
tional banks in Georgia are entitled to the status of the "most
favored lender," they are therefore also exempt.466
The OCC also supported its Georgia ruling with a broader
preemption argument, which was articulated even more force-
fully in the second flank of the OCC's offensive-a notice of
proposed rulemaking announced on the same day as the Geor-
gia ruling. Noting the increasing confusion over the applicabil-
ity of state laws to national banks, the OCC proposed to amend
its regulations to provide a consistent standard for determining
when a state law is preempted. The standard that the OCC pro-
posed was quite simple: "Except where made applicable by
Federal law, state laws that obstruct, in whole or in part, or
condition, a national bank's exercise of powers authorized un-
der Federal law do not apply to national banks."467
462. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5,
2003) (OCC ruling that parts of the Georgia Fair Lending Act are preempted
by federal law).
463. 12 U.S.C. § 351 (2000).
464. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,275-79.
465. With respect to non-interest fees, the OCC found support in 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (Seventh), which authorizes national banks to engage in activities that
are part of or incidental to the business of banking. The OCC argued that "a
bank's authority to provide products or services authorized by § 24 (Seventh)
to its customers necessarily encompasses the ability to charge a fee for the
product or service." Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at
46,279.
466. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,279.
467. See Bank Activities and Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,132 (pro-
posed Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) (detailing proposed
12 C.F.R. § 7.4009(b)); see also id. at 46,131 (proposed 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)
regarding general principle applied to deposit-taking powers, proposed 12
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The OCC's support for this position could almost have been
taken straight from the pages of de la Cuesta. The OCC first
explained that the national banking system had been created
by Congress with the conscious expectation that it would re-
place the state banking system.4 68 Accordingly, Congress estab-
lished a comprehensive federal supervisory regime for national
banks, administered by the OCC, and gave the OCC "compre-
hensive authority to examine all the affairs of a national bank
and protect national banks from potentially hostile state inter-
ference by establishing that the authority to examine, super-
vise, and regulate national banks is vested only in the OCC,
unless otherwise provided by Federal law."469 The OCC then
referenced the Supremacy Clause and outlined the conditions
under which the Supremacy Clause would preempt a state
law.470 Relying on numerous Supreme Court and federal court
decisions recognizing the unique status of the national banking
system and preempting various state laws, the OCC concluded
that "Federal courts apply no general presumption that state
laws are applicable to national banks."471 Indeed, the OCC con-
cludes, the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme applicable
to national banks justifies a presumption that state laws are
preempted if they pose any obstacle to national bank opera-
tions.
The only state laws that the OCC conceded do apply to na-
tional banks are laws in areas such as "contracts, debt collec-
tion, acquisition and transfer of property, and taxation, zoning,
criminal, and tort law," all characterized as the types of laws
which "typically do not regulate the manner or content of the
business of banking authorized for national banks under Fed-
eral law, but rather establish the legal infrastructure that sur-
rounds and supports the conduct of that business."472 In apply-
ing this general preemption principle to non-real estate
lending by national banks, the OCC elaborated on the types of
state laws subject to preemption. State laws on issues like li-
C.F.R. § 7.4008(c)(1) regarding general principle applied to non-real estate
lending powers).
468. Id. at 46,120.
469. Id. at 46,120-21.
470. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
471. Bank Activities and Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,122. Indeed, the
OCC argues that even in situations where federal law does expressly provide





censing requirements, loan-to-value ratios, terms of credit,473
disclosure requirements, and interest rates are preempted.474
State laws regarding contracts, torts, criminal law, debt collec-
tion, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, and zoning
are not preempted.475
As always, however, the OCC accompanied its strong de-
fense of national bank powers with an equally strong signal
that it will not tolerate the exercise of those powers for the con-
duct of predatory lending practices. Included in the proposed
regulation was a prohibition on making any non-real estate
loan "based predominantly on the foreclosure value of the bor-
rower's collateral, without regard to the borrower's repayment
ability, including the borrower's current and expected income,
current obligations, employment status, and other relevant fi-
nancial resources.' 76 The OCC characterized this as a "safety
and soundness-based anti-predatory lending standard, 477 aimed
at what it characterized as the heart of predatory lending-
making loans without a reasonable basis for believing that the
borrower has the capacity to repay.478 The OCC also empha-
sized that national bank lending is subject to the FTCA, as well
as other laws enforced by the OCC that provide additional con-
sumer protections.479 Indeed, the OCC specifically invited "in-
terested parties to suggest other general standards that would
be appropriate to apply to national bank lending activities that
would further [consumer protection] objectives."4 0
Clearly, the OCC is trying to set the stage for its own de la
Cuesta. This Supremacy Clause-based argument for the pre-
emption of essentially all state consumer credit laws certainly
supports the OCC's aggressive positions with respect to the ex-
panded Exportation Doctrine. However, the OCC is clearly be-
473. Specifically including "schedule for repayment of principal and inter-
est, amortization of loans, balance, payments due, minimum payments, or
term to maturity of the loan, including the circumstances under which a loan
may be called due and payable upon the passage of time or a specified event
external to the loan." Id. at 46,131 (detailing proposed 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4008(c)(2)(iv)).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 46,131-32 (proposed 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)).
476. Id. (proposed 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(b)). This same prohibition is applied
to real estate loans. Id. at 46,132 (proposed 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b)).
477. Id. at 46,129.
478. Id. at 46,126, 46,129.




ing extremely aggressive in its arguments and gearing up for
legal challenge. Moreover, even if the argument were accepted
as a general matter, the existence of § 85-a federal statute ex-
pressly deferring to state law with respect to interest rates-
complicates the analysis of the preemption of state interest rate
regulations. These complications were dodged by the OCC in its
proposal, but are certain to be raised by interested parties in
the inevitable ensuing legal challenges.
III. ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANSION
OF THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
The evolution of the Exportation Doctrine carries impor-
tant lessons for the perennial debate over whether consumer
credit is more effectively regulated through federal or state leg-
islation. To appreciate these lessons, we have to focus once
again on the underlying structure of consumer credit regulation
upon which the Exportation Doctrine acts.
Recall the old "patchwork quilt," that complex edifice of
state and federal consumer credit legislation. Traditionally,
consumer credit was considered the province of state, rather
than federal law. Thus, the first layer of regulation is a set of
unique, nonuniform state laws permitting certain types of
lenders to make certain types of loans at rates higher than the
default interest rate, provided they comply with certain restric-
tions on such loans or licensing and supervision requirements.
In the 1960s, the Conference of Commissioners proposed a uni-
form consumer credit law, the U3C, which could have provided
systematic, comprehensive, uniform state consumer credit
regulation; hardly any states adopted it. Around the same time,
Congress enacted a federal law, the CCPA, which regulates
particular aspects of consumer credit, such as disclosure
requirements, credit reports, discrimination in lending, and
debt collection practices. Another federal law, the FTCA, also
affects consumer credit through its prohibition of unfair or
deceptive trade practices.
On top of this complex statutory edifice perches the Expor-
tation Doctrine. Section 85 was originally intended to protect
the nascent national banking system from hostile state legisla-
tures, by preventing states from disfavoring national banks
over other lenders in the state. Over 100 years after its enact-
ment, § 85 was interpreted in Marquette to permit national
banks to "export" the interest rates permitted under the laws of
their charter states to other states. Since then, the scope of this
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Exportation Doctrine has been vastly expanded in three sepa-
rate dimensions-its geographic reach, its substantive scope,
and the orbit of its beneficiaries-as a result of a combination
of congressional, regulatory, and judicial actions.
The actions expanding the Exportation Doctrine were
taken by various entities faced with the resolution of specific
issues raised in the context of particular dimensions of the Ex-
portation Doctrine. In this Article, I have attempted to pull to-
gether all of the disparate actions taken by all of those entities.
This comprehensive look at all three dimensions of the expan-
sion leads to at least one undeniable conclusion. As a practical
matter, as it currently stands, the expanded Exportation Doc-
trine dramatically undermines the efficacy of the nonuniform
state statutes that theoretically provide the foundation for con-
sumer credit regulation. Virtually any lender interested in es-
tablishing a nationwide consumer credit program can get ac-
cess to a depository institution charter, either through a
subsidiary nonbank bank or unitary thrift, or through a con-
tractual relationship with a depository institution. Once such a
lender has access to a depository institution charter, almost no
state consumer credit law is going to pose any serious obstacle
to its consumer credit operations. It can choose the jurisdiction
from which its loans will be "made." If it chooses a jurisdiction
with little or no meaningful restrictions, it can "export" that
nonrestrictive regulatory regime to its customers in all other
states, even residents of states with more restrictive laws. Al-
though the Exportation Doctrine derives from a statute that
addresses only interest rates, it has been interpreted to permit
exportation of many additional significant credit terms, such as
late fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, and cash advance fees.
More recently, the Exportation Doctrine has been used to pre-
empt a state disclosure statute because of the effect the disclo-
sure law would have on banks' decisions concerning interest
rates.
As Professor White has written, "the elaborate usury laws
on the books of most states are only a trompe l'oeil, a 'visual de-
ception.., rendered in extremely fine detail ..... The presence
of these finely detailed laws gives the illusion that local legisla-
tures are guarding their constituents from high rates, but they
are not."48 1 I believe that my detailed exposition of the extent of
the expansion of the Exportation Doctrine provides irrefutable
481. White, supra note 9, at 445 (footnote omitted).
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support for Professor White's observation.
An accurate perception of the true extent to which the Ex-
portation Doctrine undermines state consumer credit laws is
important in its own right. Careful analysis of each dimension
of the Doctrine's expansion yields additional insights about ef-
fective consumer credit regulation that might be of more gen-
eral application to the debate over whether consumer credit
should be regulated at the state or federal level.
A. EXPANSION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF § 85
The most important lesson to be learned from analyzing
the expansion of the geographic reach of § 85 is that the term
"location" no longer serves any limiting function. When § 85
was enacted, indeed, even when Marquette was decided, the lo-
cation of a bank within the borders of a particular state had
significance. It imposed an important limitation on the use of
the Exportation Doctrine. Banks had to limit their bricks-and-
mortar operations to one state, for both practical and legal rea-
sons. This is no longer true, as banks are now practically and
legally permitted to operate across state lines. The "location" of
a bank, for purposes of the Exportation Doctrine, is a matter of
choice, rather than a limitation. A bank can choose to "locate"
its credit card bank subsidiary in South Dakota, book its loans
out of its branch in South Dakota, or even designate South Da-
kota as the charter address of its Internet bank subsidiary.
Each choice permits the bank to use the Exportation Doctrine
to disregard any interest rate legislation of any other state, re-
gardless of that bank's actual, physical location in any of those
other states.
As a consequence, the Exportation Doctrine offers the myr-
iad lenders within its orbit of beneficiaries an extraordinary
type of preemption power. It is, in essence, an entirely elective
preemption power. The lenders using it have virtually limitless
power to choose the regulatory scheme that will preempt all
other state interest rate laws. If the chosen regulatory scheme
is one of deregulation, the lender can preempt all other state
laws with a lack of regulation. This phenomenon gives states
such as South Dakota and Delaware incentive to engage in a
"race to the bottom" of consumer credit regulatory schemes, in
order to attract consumer lending operations to their states.482
If a lender chooses such a state as its "location" for purposes of
482. See supra notes 159-60, 234 and accompanying text.
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exportation, individual state attempts to curb predatory lend-
ing are largely irrelevant.
As a practical matter, this extreme elasticity of the concept
of "location" in the Exportation Doctrine significantly dimin-
ishes the efficacy of state predatory lending laws. A lender's ac-
tual, physical presence in any one state does not trump the au-
thority of that lender, through the Exportation Doctrine, to
"choose" a different, deregulated state as its "location" for pur-
poses of exportation. There may still be valid reasons for enact-
ing restrictive state legislation. First, not every lender is within
the orbit of the beneficiaries of the Exportation Doctrine. Some
nondepository institution lenders in every state will be forced
to comply with that state's consumer credit restrictions. Sec-
ond, a critical mass of states expressing concern about particu-
lar predatory lending practices could provide the impetus for
reform at the federal level 3 Nevertheless, analysis of this di-
mension of the expansion of the Exportation Doctrine clearly
demonstrates that the ability of lenders to "choose" their "loca-
tion," with little regard to their actual, physical presence in any
state, severely limits the efficacy of state predatory lending
laws.
B. EXPANSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF § 85
A close analysis of expansion of the substantive scope of
the Exportation Doctrine illustrates the vigor of judicial defer-
ence to federal agency interpretations in the area of consumer
credit regulation. The Supreme Court's rulings in Smiley and
de la Cuesta demonstrate that, at least in the consumer credit
context, the presumption in favor of upholding a federal
agency's interpretation of a law that it is charged with imple-
menting absolutely trumps the presumption against preemp-
tion of state laws.484
483. Many commentators have noted the unique role of state legislation as
a laboratory for reform in various consumer protection contexts. See, e.g., Gail
Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2,
2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 155-56 (1997); George
A. Hisert, Uniform Commercial Code: Does One Size Fit All?, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 219, 232 (1994); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Re-
publican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 721 n.163 (1991).
484. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's continued willingness to
preempt state law in other areas of law, despite rhetorical pronouncements
concerning the presumption against the preemption of state law. See, e.g., Lor-
illard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570-71 (2001) (regarding regulation
of cigarette advertising); Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001) (regula-
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As a consequence, legal challenges to regulatory interpre-
tations of other aspects of § 85 and its progeny are unlikely to
succeed. Although much of the expansion described in this Ar-
ticle was accomplished through regulatory action rather than
legislation, it is unlikely to be curbed by the courts. Moreover, if
the OCC's recent assertion of broader, de la Cuesta-type pre-
emption powers over state laws is upheld, the Exportation Doc-
trine could be freed entirely from its restriction in scope to state
laws limiting "interest." If the OCC were to enact a broad regu-
lation governing consumer lending in general, supported by its
statutory authority to regulate generally the lending operations
of national banks, the history of judicial reaction to regulatory
expansions of § 85 suggests that this probably would suffice to
preempt all state consumer credit regulations.
Thus, analysis of the expansion of the substantive scope of
§ 85 illustrates yet another reason for the limits to the efficacy
of state predatory lending laws-the absence of any presump-
tion against the preemption of state consumer credit laws with
respect to depository institutions. Again, this does not render
state consumer credit laws totally without any effect. They still
apply to nondepository consumer lenders and, to a certain ex-
tent, to state-chartered banks located in that particular state.
Nevertheless, analysis of this dimension of the expansion of the
Exportation Doctrine demonstrates that judicial deference to
regulatory interpretations of federal laws, even with respect to
issues of consumer credit regulation, which have traditionally
been considered the province of state legislatures, severely lim-
its the efficacy of state predatory lending laws.
C. EXPANSION OF THE ORBIT OF BENEFICIARIES OF THE
EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
Analysis of the third dimension of the expansion of the Ex-
portation Doctrine-the orbit of its beneficiaries-illustrates
that even nonbank lenders technically subject to the limited
ambit of state predatory lending laws can easily escape the ju-
risdiction of the states through nonbank bank subsidiaries or
charter-renting arrangements.
However, this last expansion of the Doctrine is not justifi-
able under the principles of banking law from which it origi-
tion of pension benefits); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886
(2000) (automobile safety regulations); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
116-17 (2000) (regulation of oil tanker operations and design).
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nally derived, or under the principles that justified its expan-
sion along the first two dimensions. The expansion of the orbit
of the beneficiaries of the Doctrine to nonbank lenders can only
be justified as a way to foster efficient, interstate consumer
credit programs. This is the justification that must be weighed
against the cost-the inefficacy of state predatory lending laws
to nonbank as well as bank lenders-to accurately assess the
implications of the expanded Exportation Doctrine.
Furthermore, regardless of whether fostering efficient in-
terstate consumer credit programs is of sufficient value to jus-
tify preempting state consumer credit laws, this is not the ra-
tionale that underlies the OCC's attenuated analysis of
"location" that renders the use of that term in § 85 a matter of
choice rather than a limitation. Nor is it the rationale that jus-
tifies the inordinate deference to rulings of the regulatory
agencies evidenced in Smiley and de la Cuesta that frees the
Exportation Doctrine from the moorings of the word "interest."
Thus, although this dimension of the expansion of the Exporta-
tion Doctrine has the potential to utterly eviscerate even the
vestigial efficacy of state predatory lending laws, I believe it is
vulnerable to legal challenge.
Merely striking down the application of the Exportation
Doctrine to nonbank lenders does not, however, necessarily ac-
complish the goal of providing adequate protection to consum-
ers who borrow from nonbank lenders. As inadequate as the
authority of the banking regulators over nonbank partners of
banks may be, in the absence of that authority, is there any ef-
fective state regulation or enforcement authority over nonbank
consumer lenders? The history of consumer credit regulation
suggests that the patchwork of nonuniform state laws is not a
very efficient, or effective, way to address predatory lending.
Adding yet another layer of patches to the already threadbare
quilt, as a response to the newest forms of predatory lending,
would likely be just as ineffective in the long run as prior ef-
forts. Instead, I would propose attempting to harness the power
of the Exportation Doctrine in the ways outlined below.
D. HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE
At least with respect to depository institutions, it is
unlikely that any legal challenges will effectively curb the pre-
emptive force of the Exportation Doctrine. With respect to non-
banks, it is possible that legal challenges could succeed; how-
ever, if such challenges were to succeed, little effective state
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predatory lending regulation exists. Instead of challenging the
preemptive force of the Exportation Doctrine, I believe that
consumer advocates would be better served to concentrate their
efforts on giving some content to the Doctrine. There are two
ways that some content could be forced into the Exportation
Doctrine, potentially providing meaningful protection for
consumers against predatory lending.
One way would be to revive the U3C initiative. If all fifty
states were to enact the same baseline restrictions on consumer
credit, the choice of location would not permit any lender to es-
cape all regulation. Although this endeavor proved fruitless in
the 1960s, that was before the confluence of the Marquette de-
cision and the advent of interstate banking which precipitated
the "race to the bottom" in consumer credit regulation. I believe
that the developments described in this Article provide compel-
ling new arguments for a uniform consumer credit code. Be-
cause the Exportation Doctrine does compel deference to state
laws, a uniform, nationwide consumer credit law might enable
states to assert some continued control over depository institu-
tions, even in the face of the OTS's and OCC's ongoing attempts
to assert broader preemption powers over state laws based on
their pervasive regulatory authority.
The second way to force some content into the Exportation
Doctrine would be to either require or convince the federal
banking regulators to accept some baseline restrictions on con-
sumer credit. I do not think it is realistic to expect the enact-
ment of federal legislation explicitly limiting the expansion of
the Exportation Doctrine. The experience with Riegle-Neal's
usury savings clause485 seems to indicate that Congress is not
particularly interested in tackling this issue head-on. Indeed, if
it did, it is not clear that the result would please advocates of
strong consumer credit regulation.486 However, in the past few
485. See supra Part II.B.2.b. But see Payday Lending Report, supra note 9,
at 18 (arguing that provisions of Riegle-Neal requiring public notice and com-
ment period before preemption decisions by the regulators evince Congres-
sional support for curbing regulatory preemption of state consumer protection
laws); RAL Report, supra note 9, at 19 (arguing that Riegle-Neal attempts to
restrain overreaching by banks).
486. The credit industry's lobbying efforts in the current fight for passage
of bankruptcy reform legislation provide a strong indication that efforts to rein
in exportation powers would be met with strong resistance. Elizabeth Warren,
What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-
Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 44-46 & nn.85-91 (2002) (noting
that, "[iun 2000... the credit industry was the single largest campaign con-
tributor in Washington," and providing illustrations of lobbying efforts by the
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years, the federal banking agencies have demonstrated a grow-
ing willingness to curb predatory lending practices by promul-
gating strong guidelines for subprime lending, instituting en-
forcement actions against depository institutions and their
owners engaged in predatory lending, closing depository insti-
tutions engaged in such lending, and preventing acquisitions of
or partnerships with depository institutions when the nonbank
partners are engaging in predatory lending. Indeed, the OCC's
Proposed Preemption Rule does contain a fairly robust
antipredatory lending standard, and specifically invites sugges-
tions for additional content for consumer protection standards.
The expressed motive for most of these actions was concern
about the continued safety and soundness of operations of the
depository institutions involved, either because of the inherent
riskiness of the activities involved, or the reputation risk to the
institutions associated with arguably predatory activities.
However, federal banking agencies are also beginning to be
more vocal about their mandate to enforce consumer protection
statutes.487 Concern about the reputation risk raised by in-
volvement in predatory lending is surely consistent with the
consumer protection mandate; indeed, it may provide a more
powerful incentive for enforcement than consumer protection
alone. At least with respect to depository institutions, contin-
ued pressure on federal banking agencies to take seriously both
the reputational costs of predatory lending on the safety and
soundness of the banking system, and their mandates to en-
force consumer protection laws, is probably the most promising
way to force some content into the Exportation Doctrine.
If the federal banking regulators could be influenced to
give the Exportation Doctrine some content, I believe that con-
sumer advocates should further consider the advantages of
formally extending the Exportation Doctrine to all consumer
lenders, either by requiring or providing some sort of incen-
tive418 for consumer lenders who wish to operate nationwide
credit industry in the fight for passage of bankruptcy reform legislation).
487. See supra notes 479-80 and accompanying text; see also Rob Garver,
How Regulatory Actions Breed Class Actions, AM. BANKER, June 20, 2002, at
10 (noting increased aggressiveness of banking regulatory agencies in enforc-
ing consumer statutes).
488. Consumer advocates might even be able to harness the power of the
mainstream banking industry for such an initiative. The representative of at
least one influential depository institution has suggested that there might be
industry support for a regulatory scheme requiring all nationwide lenders to
be subject to some sort of regulatory oversight. Luke Hayden, executive vice
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credit programs to do so either through or in partnership with a
depository institution.48 9 The OCC's enforcement action against
ACE, which was only possible because of its partnership with
Goleta National Bank, shows how efficiently one well-
intentioned federal banking regulator can act to curb the ex-
cesses of a lender engaged in a nationwide predatory lending
scheme-arguably much more efficiently than any one state at-
torney general, or even any coalition of attorneys general.490
In a sense, such a proposal would bring us full circle in
consumer lending regulation. The very first state usury laws
offered the incentive of higher interest rates for lenders willing
to subject themselves to a particular scheme of regulation. Re-
quiring all lenders who wish to engage in nationwide lending
programs either to obtain a bank or thrift charter, or to enter
into a contractual relationship with a bank or a thrift, would
offer the incentive of exportation powers, in exchange for a
regulatory scheme that has demonstrated the potential to be
extremely effective in curbing predatory lending practices.
president of a subprime mortgage company subsidiary of the national bank
conglomerate J.P. Morgan Chase & Company recently proposed that all sub-
prime lenders be subject to periodic examinations by federal banking regula-
tors, in exchange for an exemption of those who pass from compliance with
state and local antipredator laws. Rob Garver, Chase Subprime Exec: We'd
Swap States for Feds, AM. BANKER, Aug. 24, 2001, at 1. Hayden proposed a
higher national standard of operations that a lender could opt into-"'some
sort of a Good Housekeeping seal of approval for subprime lenders."' Id. at 4.
Hayden noted:
The upside for the government would be a reduction in predatory
lending practices, as borrowers would migrate toward lenders with a
government seal of approval .... For the lenders, the incentive to
submit to further regulation would be the elimination of the cost of
complying with the constantly growing number of state and local or-
dinances.
Id. at 1.
489. As a federally regulated depository institution, a consumer lender
would also be subject to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which some
consumer advocates are asserting could be used more effectively to curb
predatory lending. See, e.g., Anti-Predator Group Gains FTC Support, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 27, 2001, at 5 (referring to a suggestion from National People's
Action group that all lenders be given CRA ratings and that ratings be tai-
lored to specific markets); John Gamboa & Nativo Lopez, Sarbanes Should
Make Regulators Produce Anti-Predator Policies, AM. BANKER, July 20, 2001,
at 9 (suggesting that all banking regulators target subprime lending in the
merger application process, like CRA review).
490. See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The seemingly infinite elasticity of the Exportation Doc-
trine has left us with an extremely powerful federal preemption
tool that has no content. It is a tool that can be wielded by al-
most any type of consumer lender, by choosing to locate in a
state with the least restrictive consumer credit regulations.
Once a lender does this, more restrictive state consumer credit
statutes enacted in the jurisdictions where a borrower lives are
essentially meaningless. An appreciation for the true extent of
the preemption power of the Exportation Doctrine is essential
for purposes of the current debates over predatory lending leg-
islation at the state and federal levels.
However, the federal regulatory agencies that have been
aggressively asserting the preemptive force of the Exportation
Doctrine have also begun to take seriously their mandate to en-
force fundamental consumer protection laws. In doing so, they
have exposed the potential of the Exportation Doctrine as a
powerful tool for curbing predatory lending, potentially more
powerful than anything available at the individual state level.
In the end, the amazing, elastic, ever-expanding Exportation
Doctrine could perhaps be harnessed to provide meaningful
protection against predatory lending to consumers across the
nation.
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